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Abstract 
 
Dependability is an ability of a computer-based system to deliver services that 
can be justifiably trusted. There is a wide range of computer-based systems that 
provide services that are critical for our society, e.g., nuclear power plants, 
transportation, healthcare, etc. Ensuring dependability of such systems 
constitutes an important engineering goal. 
Dependability is an integrated notion that encompasses various system 
characteristics including reliability, safety, availability, etc. For a wide class of 
systems, the main engineering goal is to ensure a high degree of reliability – a 
probability of a system functioning correctly over a given period under a given 
set of operating conditions. Since the occurrence of faults can disrupt correct 
system behavior, to achieve the required reliability, we need to employ fault 
tolerance techniques. 
The main goal of fault tolerance is to ensure that the system can deliver 
its services despite the occurrence of faults. Fault tolerance typically introduces 
some form of architectural or computational redundancy and hence, increases the 
complexity of the system design. Therefore, to ensure a correct implementation 
of fault tolerance mechanisms, we should develop the techniques that facilitate a 
structured analysis of system failure modes, systematic design of error recovery 
and reconfiguration procedures, as well as bolster system verification and 
validation. 
Model-driven engineering allows the designers to cope with system 
complexity and analyze system behavior at different levels of abstraction. In our 
thesis, we aim at studying how to represent various static and dynamic aspects of 
fault tolerance in the model-driven development. 
Often behavior of complex fault-tolerant systems is structured using the 
notion of operational modes – mutually exclusive sets of the system behavior. As 
a reaction on faults as well as different internal and external conditions, the 
system switches between its operational modes. The design of mode transition 
logic in distributed fault tolerant systems is a challenging and error-prone task. 
On the one hand, we need to ensure that all components of the system are put in 
the states required by a certain mode. On the other hand, we should verify that 
the components maintain these states while the system is stable, i.e., before the 
conditions for triggering a transition to another mode are reached. To facilitate 
the design of complex mode-rich fault tolerant systems, in our thesis, we 
demonstrate how to model distributed systems with centralized and distributed 
mode management as well as verify their mode transition logic. We validate the 
proposed approach in the aerospace domain. 
To guarantee that the reconfiguration performed in response to the 
changed operating conditions achieves the required goal, fault-tolerant systems 
should incorporate the appropriate monitoring capabilities and rely on a set of 
explicitly defined rules for triggering adaptation. Usually, these rules establish a 
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connection between globally observed system properties and behavior of system 
components, i.e., span over several architectural layers. To facilitate the 
development of such complex systems, in our work, we propose the generic 
patterns for architecting adaptive fault tolerant systems in a layered hierarchical 
manner. We demonstrate how the proposed patterns can be utilized in the 
context of data intensive fault tolerant systems. 
Development and verification of fault-tolerant distributed systems also 
require the use of advanced verification technologies as well as techniques for 
supporting a disciplined systematic analysis of system failure modes. In our 
thesis, we demonstrate how to perform formal verification of a fault tolerant 
routing protocol and systematically identify system failure modes and recovery 
procedures using Failure Modes and Effect Analysis approach. While reliance on 
formal techniques increases confidence in the correctness of the implementation 
of the fault tolerance mechanisms, the use of a systematic inductive technique 
for identifying failure modes improves the completeness of the analysis. 
The research work performed in our thesis aims at creating a support for 
explicit integration of fault tolerance consideration into the model-driven system 
development. We aim at creating a potentially industry-relevant approach and 
hence, utilize the modeling and verification techniques that are used in current 
industrial practice. Moreover, we validate our approach in a number of case 
studies from different domains. 
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Sammanfattning 
 
Tillförlitlighet är ett datorbaserat systems förmåga att kunna leverera tjänster 
som med goda argument är pålitliga. Det finns ett brett spektrum av 
datorbaserade system som tillhandahåller tjänster som är avgörande för vårt 
samhälle, t.ex. kärnkraftverk, transport, hälso- och sjukvård osv. Att säkerställa 
pålitligheten för sådana system är ett viktigt tekniskt mål. 
Tillförlitlighet är ett integrerat begrepp som omfattar olika 
systemegenskaper, inklusive funktionssäkerhet, säkerhet, tillgänglighet etc. För 
en omfattande klass av system är det huvudsakliga tekniska målet att säkerställa 
en hög grad av tillförlitlighet - en sannolikhet för att ett system fungerar korrekt 
under en viss period med en given mängd driftsförhållanden. Eftersom fel som 
uppstår kan störa ett korrekt systembeteende, måste vi använda 
feltoleranstekniker för att uppnå den tillförlitlighet som krävs. 
Huvudmålet med feltolerans är att säkerställa att systemet kan leverera 
sina tjänster trots att fel uppstått. Feltolerans introducerar typiskt någon form av 
arkitektonisk eller beräkningsmässig redundans och ökar därigenom 
systemdesignens komplexitet. För att säkerställa ett korrekt genomförande av 
feltoleransmekanismer bör vi utveckla de tekniker som underlättar en 
strukturerad analys av systemfelslägen, systematisk utformning av felhantering 
och procedurer för omkonfiguration, samt förstärkning av systemets verifiering 
och validering. 
Modelldriven teknik möjliggör hantering av systemkomplexitet och 
analys av systembeteendet på olika abstraktionsnivåer. Avhandling strävar efter 
att studera hur man representerar olika statiska och dynamiska aspekter av 
feltolerans i modelldriven utveckling. 
Ofta är beteendet hos komplexa feltoleranta system strukturerat enligt 
operativa lägen - ömsesidigt uteslutande uppsättningar av systembeteendet. Som 
en reaktion på fel såväl som olika interna och externa förhållanden växlar 
systemet mellan sina driftlägen. Utformningen av logik för lägesövergång i 
distribuerade feltoleranta system är en utmanande och felbenägen uppgift. Å ena 
sidan måste vi se till att alla komponenter i systemet sätts i de tillstånd som krävs 
av ett visst läge. Å andra sidan bör vi verifiera att komponenterna upprätthåller 
dessa tillstånd medan systemet är stabilt, dvs. innan förutsättningarna för en 
övergång till ett annat läge uppnås. För att underlätta utformningen av komplexa 
feltoleranta system med många tillstånd, visar vi i vår avhandling hur man 
modellerar distribuerade system med centraliserad och distribuerad 
lägeshantering samt verifierar deras logik för lägesövergång. Vi validerar det 
föreslagna tillvägagångssättet inom rymdindustrin. 
För att säkerställa att omkonfigurationen som utförts som svar på de 
ändrade driftsförhållandena uppnår det önskade målet, bör feltoleranta system 
inkludera lämplig övervakningsförmåga och förlita sig på en uppsättning 
uttryckligen definierade regler för start av anpassning. Vanligtvis etablerar dessa 
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regler en koppling mellan globalt observerade systemegenskaper och beteenden 
hos systemkomponenter, dvs. de spänner över flera arkitektoniska skikt. För att 
underlätta utvecklingen av sådana komplexa system, föreslår vi i vårt arbete 
generiska mönster för konstruktion av adaptiva feltoleranta system på ett 
hierarkiskt sätt. Vi visar hur de föreslagna mönstren kan utnyttjas i samband med 
dataintensiva feltoleranta system. 
Utveckling och verifiering av feltoleranta distribuerade system kräver 
också användning av avancerad verifieringsteknik samt tekniker för att stödja en 
systematisk analys av systemets fellägen. I vår avhandling visar vi hur man utför 
formell verifiering av ett feltolerant ruttningsprotokoll och systematiskt 
identifierar systemets fellägen och återställningsförfaranden med hjälp av FMEA 
(Failure Modes and Effect Analysis). Medan formella tekniker ökar konfidensen 
för korrekt implementering av feltoleransmekanismerna, förbättrar användningen 
av en systematisk induktiv teknik för identifiering av fellägen analysens 
fullständighet. 
Forskningsarbetet i avhandlingen strävar efter att skapa stöd för en 
explicit integration av feltolerans i modelldriven systemutveckling. Vi strävar 
efter att skapa ett tillvägagångssätt som är relevant inom industrin och därför 
utnyttjar vi de modellerings- och verifieringsmetoder som används i nuvarande 
industripraxis. Dessutom validerar vi vårt tillvägagångssätt i ett antal fallstudier 
från olika domäner. 
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1 Motivation and Research Objectives 
 
Dependability is an ability of a computer-based system to deliver services that 
can be justifiably trusted. There is a wide range of computer-based systems that 
provide services that are critical for our society, e.g., nuclear power plants, 
transportation, healthcare, etc. Ensuring dependability of such systems 
constitutes an important engineering goal. 
Dependability is an integrated notion that encompasses various system 
characteristics including reliability, safety, availability, etc. For a wide class 
of systems, the main engineering goal is to ensure a high degree of reliability 
– a probability of a system functioning correctly over a given period under a 
given set of operating conditions. Since the occurrence of faults can disrupt 
correct system behavior, to achieve the required reliability, we need to 
employ fault tolerance techniques. 
The main goal of fault tolerance is to ensure that the system can deliver its 
services despite the occurrence of faults. Fault tolerance typically introduces 
some form of architectural or computational redundancy and hence, increases 
the complexity of the system design. Therefore, to ensure a correct 
implementation of fault tolerance mechanisms, we should develop the 
techniques that facilitate a structured analysis of system failure modes, 
systematic design of error recovery and reconfiguration procedures, as well as 
bolster verification and validation of complex fault-tolerant systems. 
This goal can be achieved by employing a model-driven development 
approach. Reliance on abstraction and rigorous mathematical analysis provides 
us with a powerful support while designing complex fault tolerant systems. 
However, despite the popularity of model-driven engineering, there is still a 
lack of approaches supporting an explicit modeling of fault tolerance aspects of 
system behavior. Our first research question 
 
Research question 1. How can we explicitly represent fault tolerance in the 
model-driven system development? 
 
aims at addressing this issue. 
Often the behavior of complex fault-tolerant systems is structured using 
the notion of operational modes – mutually exclusive sets of the system 
behavior. As a reaction on faults as well as different internal and external 
conditions, the system switches between its operational modes. The design of 
mode transition logic in distributed fault tolerant systems is a challenging and 
error-prone task. On the one hand, we need to ensure that all components of the 
system are put in the states required by a certain mode. On the other hand, we 
should verify that the components maintain these states while the system is 
 4 
 
stable, i.e., before the conditions for triggering a transition to another mode are 
reached. 
To address this challenge, we formulate the second research question: 
 
Research question 2: How can we facilitate design and verification of 
complex mode-rich fault tolerant systems with centralized and distributed 
mode management? 
 
Development and verification of fault- tolerant distributed systems also 
require the use of advanced verification technologies as well as techniques for 
supporting a disciplined systematic analysis of system failure modes. Moreover, 
to guarantee that the reconfiguration performed in response to the changed 
operating conditions achieves the required goals, fault tolerant systems should 
incorporate the appropriate monitoring and adaptation capabilities. Our third 
research question: 
 
Research question 3. How can we facilitate systematic analysis of system 
failure modes, structure system architecture to support adaptability and 
verify fault tolerance capabilities? 
 
aims at studying these problems. 
In our thesis, we aim at finding potentially industry-relevant solutions 
addressing the identified research questions. Therefore, we will utilize the 
modeling and verification techniques that are used in the current industrial 
practice. Moreover, we will validate the proposed solutions in a number of case 
studies from different industrial domains. 
 
Organization of the Thesis. This thesis consists of two parts. The overview of 
the research work reported in this thesis is included in Part I. Part II contains the 
original research publications. 
Part I is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the dependability 
concept and pays special attention to fault tolerance as one of the essential 
dependability attributes. 
Chapter 3 overviews the development methodologies, which have been 
used in the thesis. In this section, we discuss UML, SystemC, SPIN model 
checker and the associated modeling language   PROMELA.   We illustrate a 
representation of different aspects of fault tolerance in the corresponding 
frameworks. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the concept of modes and main issues in 
designing fault- tolerant mode-rich systems. We identify the problems and 
solutions in implementing distributed systems with the centralized as well as 
distributed mode management. We use a case study from the aerospace domain 
to illustrate the principles of achieving fault tolerance via mode transitions. In 
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particular, we demonstrate how to address the issue of ensuring correctness 
of mode logic. Moreover, we explain how to use the handshake protocol to 
synchronizing mode transitions in the distributed mode management. 
Chapter 5 focuses on studying architectural aspects of fault tolerance. 
Firstly, we discuss how to modify and apply Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) technique to systematically identify system failure modes and define 
architectural patterns for error masking or recovery. Then we outline the generic 
principles of architecting adaptable fault tolerant systems. 
A detailed description of the published research papers is given in Chapter 
6. The overview of the related work is presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 
summarizes the main contributions of the research work carried out in this thesis, 
discusses its strengths and limitations, as well as outlines the future research 
directions. 
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2 Dependability and Fault Tolerance 
 
In this chapter, we give an overview of the dependability concept and in 
particular, focus on the fault tolerance aspect. 
 
2.1 Dependability Taxonomy 
 
Dependability of a computing system is the ability to deliver service that can 
justifiably be trusted. The notion of dependability was introduced by Laprie [1] 
and further refined by Avizienis et al [2]. Nowadays complex computer-based 
systems are embedded in the infrastructures supporting the majority of critical 
services provided to our society. Therefore, dependability has become the 
concern of the highest priority in the development and operation of modern 
computer-based systems. 
The variety of computing systems on whose services we need to place 
our reliance is broad – it ranges from satellite constellations, airplanes, nuclear 
power plants, or databases containing sensitive health records. Correspondingly, 
different characteristics of system behavior become the main priority in their 
development. For instance, for the satellite systems we need to guarantee a 
high degree of reliability, i.e., to ensure that despite an occurrence of faults and 
other environmental disturbances, the system can continuously operate for a 
certain period. For the airplanes and nuclear power plants, we should ensure that 
the system is safe, i.e., the likelihood of occurrence of hazardous failures is very 
low. Finally, for the databases containing sensitive data, we have to ensure a 
high degree of security, i.e., the absence of unauthorized access or data 
alternations. The concept of dependability provides us with a unified 
framework that allows us to address such diverse concerns within a single 
conceptual framework. It consists of three parts:  dependability attributes, 
threats to dependability and means for achieving dependability. Figure 2.1 
presents the dependability taxonomy [1]. 
The key attributes of dependability are given below: 
 
• Availability: the ability of the system to provide a correct service at 
any given moment in time. 
• Reliability: the ability of the system to provide a service under a 
given set of operating conditions over a specific time interval. 
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• Safety: the ability of the system to provide a service under the 
given conditions without jeopardizing its environment and users. 
• Maintainability: the ability of the system to undergo repairs and 
modifications. 
• Integrity: the ability of the system to prevent improper state 
alterations. 
• Confidentiality: the absence of unauthorized disclosure of 
information. 
 
The threats to dependability, often referred to as the impairments to 
dependability may introduce the unwanted alterations in the service 
provisioning. Dependability is impaired by the occurrence of faults, errors, and 
failures. 
• Fault: a defect within the system. Faults can be generated due to 
internal factors (e.g., software coding mistakes, memory bit 
“stuck”) and external factors (e.g., component defects or human 
mistakes). Faults may result in errors. 
• Error: a deviation from the required operation of the system or 
subsystem. Errors are the effect of faults and may lead to 
subsequent system failure. 
• Failure: a deviation in provisioning a required service to the 
system user. Failures are the effects of errors. 
 9 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Dependability Taxonomy 
 
The means for dependability are the techniques used to facilitate the 
development of dependable systems. The dependability means can be classified 
into four categories: fault prevention, fault removal, fault forecasting and fault 
tolerance. 
• Fault prevention: the techniques aiming at reducing the likelihood 
of an introduction of faults during the process of system 
development. 
• Fault removal: the techniques that facilitate identifying and 
removing the faults during the development stage as well as during 
the operational life of a system. 
• Fault forecasting: the techniques that are applied to predict fault 
occurrence and evaluate their possible consequences on the system 
behavior. 
• Fault tolerance: the techniques that ensure that the system can 
continue to deliver its services even in the presence of faults. 
Since our thesis focuses on studying methods for achieving fault tolerance, 
below we give a detailed overview of the fault tolerance concept. 
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2.2 Fault Tolerance 
 
The main aim of fault tolerance [3] is to ensure that the system continues to 
provide its services even in the presence of faults. Typically, fault occurrence 
leads to a certain service degradation. However, it is important to ensure that 
the system behaves in a predictable deterministic way even in the presence of 
faults. 
The main techniques to achieve fault tolerance are error processing and 
fault treatment, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Fault Tolerance Techniques 
 
Error processing: Error processing comprises the measures applied while the 
system is operational. The purpose of error processing is to eliminate an error 
from the computational state and preclude failure occurrence. Error processing is 
usually implemented in three steps: error detection, error diagnosis, and error 
recovery [15]. 
 
• Error detection: determines the presence of error. 
• Error diagnosis: evaluates the amount of damage caused by the 
detected error. 
• Error recovery: aims at replacing an erroneous system state with 
the error-free state. 
 
There are three types of error recovery methods: backward 
recovery, forward recovery and compensation. 
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- Backward recovery: tries to return the system to some 
previous error-free state. Typically, backward recovery is 
implemented by checkpointing, i.e., periodically, during the 
normal system operation, the state of the system is stored in 
the memory. In the case of a failure, the system retrieves 
the information about the error-free state from memory and 
resumes its functioning from this state. 
- Forward recovery: upon detection of an error, the system 
makes a transition to a new error-free state from which it 
continues to operate.  Exception handling i s  a  typical 
example of forward error recovery. 
- Compensation: can be used when the erroneous state 
contains enough redundancy to enable its transformation to 
an error-free state. Compensations are often used in 
complex transactions. 
 
Fault treatment: aims at preventing faults from being activated again. Fault 
treatment is usually performed while the system is not operational, i.e., during 
the scheduled maintenance. Fault treatment comprises four steps: diagnosis, 
isolation, reconfiguration, and re-initialization. 
 
• Diagnosis determines the causes of errors and focuses on localizing 
a fault and determining its nature. 
• Isolation prevents faulty components from being used or activated 
in further system operations. 
• Reconfiguration replaces the faulty components with the fault-free 
ones to provide an acceptable but possibly degraded service. 
• Re-initialization is an update performed after the new configuration 
has taken place. 
To implement fault tolerance, it is important to understand the types of 
faults that might occur in the system. Faults can be characterized as nature, 
duration or extent. 
• Nature: We distinguish between random and systematic faults. The 
random faults are associated with hardware components. For the 
components that are the subjects of random faults, we can use the 
statistical analysis and estimate various characteristics, e.g., such as 
mean time between failures. Systematic faults are typically 
associated with the design errors, e.g., mistakes in the system 
specification or implementation. Since an error will occur each 
time the erroneous state is reached, statistical methods cannot be 
applied to the systematic faults. Systematic faults should be 
prevented by the use of fault avoidance and fault removal 
techniques. 
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• Duration: Faults can be classified regarding their duration into 
permanent, transient, and intermittent faults. 
- Permanent faults: once they have occurred, they remain in 
the system during its entire operational life, if no corrective 
actions are performed. 
- Transient faults can appear and then disappear after a short 
time. 
- Intermittent faults: can appear, disappear and then reappear 
at a later time. 
• Extent: Faults can be categorized according to their effect on the 
system as localized and global ones. 
 
- Localized faults affect only a single hardware or software 
module. 
- Global faults permeate throughout the system. 
 
Hardware faults can be due to either random component failure or mistakes 
in the design. The faults can be permanent, transient, or intermittent and can 
have a global or local extent. Software faults are systematic. They occur due to 
mistakes in the design of the system. These faults can have an unlimited number 
of forms, e.g., coding faults, stack overflows or underflows, logical errors in 
calculations, use of uninitialized variables, etc. 
To detect and recover from faults, we have to introduce some form of 
redundancy into the system design. Redundancy can be defined as the use of 
resources or components that would not have been needed if the systems were 
fault free. Next, we overview different forms of redundancy. 
 
Hardware redundancy is defined as the use of additional hardware to detect or 
tolerate faults. Static, dynamic and hybrid redundancy are the three basic forms 
of hardware redundancy. 
• Static redundancy allows the designers to implement fault masking, 
i.e., it allows the system to nullify the effect of fault occurrence. 
• Dynamic redundancy: this form of redundancy allows the system to 
detect the faults and then perform reconfiguration to deactivate 
faulty components. 
• Hybrid redundancy: This form of redundancy combines static and 
dynamic techniques. Fault masking is used to prevent the error 
propagation within the system, whereas fault detection and 
reconfiguration are used to remove faulty components from the 
system. 
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Information redundancy: The use of additional information that is required to 
implement a given function for the purpose of detecting or tolerating faults. The 
use of parity bits, checksums, and error detecting or correcting codes are 
the examples of this kind of redundancy. 
 
Temporal redundancy: The use of additional time that is required to implement 
a given function for the purpose of detecting or tolerating faults. Temporal 
redundancy is used to tolerate transient faults, e.g., by repeating the failed 
computation. 
 
Software redundancy can be defined as the use of additional software for the 
purpose of detecting or tolerating faults. Designing software that controls fault 
tolerance-related functionality is one of the main topics of our research work. 
 
In this thesis, we consider static and dynamic forms of redundancy. The 
static redundancy relies on a voting mechanism that compares the outputs of 
some redundant modules and produces a  majority view. This mechanism 
allows the system to mask an occurrence of faults. In practice, static redundancy 
is often implemented as the triple modular redundancy arrangement, as shown 
in  
Figure 2.3. The arrangement consists of three identical modules and one 
voting element. If the system is fault free, then each module produces the same 
output. Any difference between the outputs represents a failure in the module. 
A voting element nullifies the effect of any single failure by comparing the 
outputs and generating the output corresponding to the majority view. 
Therefore, the system can tolerate the failure of any single module. 
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Figure 2.3: Triple Modular Redundancy 
 
Dynamic forms of redundancy employ fault detection instead of fault 
masking approach. These systems attempt to detect faults and then to 
reconfigure to continue an error-free function. The effectiveness of the fault 
detection process determines the success of the dynamic redundancy. This 
approach minimizes the required number of redundant components because only 
two modules are required to cope with a single fault and three modules to cater 
for two faulty units. The examples of dynamic redundancy include a standby 
spare and a duplication pattern, as shown in  
Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 respectively. 
 
• Standby spare: In the standby spare arrangement, one module is in 
the operational state, while the other is in the standby state. A  
f ault detection system is used to detect the faults and control the 
switch. In case the system is fault free, the switch generates the 
output corresponding to the output from the single operational 
module. When a fault is detected, the switch will reconfigure the 
system and generate the output corresponding to the output 
produced by the standby module. 
• Duplication pattern: In the duplication pattern, the same input 
signal is fed into two identical modules. The comparator compares 
the outputs from both modules and generates a failure detection 
signal in case a discrepancy is detected. One of the module’s 
output is then passed to the next stage. 
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Figure 2.4: Dynamic redundancy: standby spare 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Dynamic redundancy: duplication pattern 
 
In modern computer-based systems, fault tolerance is often implemented by 
software. The software is responsible for detecting faults, initiating error 
recovery and performing reconfiguration. To design software, which is 
responsible for implementing fault tolerance, we should analyze some factors 
including the nature of faults, possibility to introduce hardware redundancy in 
the system design, timing and memory constraints, and availability of 
information and timing redundancy, etc. Therefore, the basic concepts that 
we have described above constitute an important background for designing 
fault- tolerant systems. However, redundancy and corresponding functionality 
required to control it inevitably introduce additional complexity into the system 
design. Since complexity is commonly perceived as one of the main 
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dependability threat, we should employ a disciplined software development 
process and formal reasoning to ensure functional correctness of fault-tolerant 
software-intensive systems. 
In the next chapter, we overview the methodologies that we used in our 
thesis to design software that is responsible for fault tolerance assurance. 
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3 Design and Verification Methods 
 
To cope with the complexity of modern software-intensive systems, we should 
rely on structured and rigorous approaches for software development. Such 
approaches allow us to build robust system architectures and ensure functional 
correctness of system behavior. 
The range of modeling techniques is broad and spans from graphical 
notations to formal mathematical languages. Visual modeling frameworks are 
widely used in industry. However, in the safety-critical domain, formal 
approaches are also used to verify critical system functions. Since, in our thesis, 
we aim at proposing a practice-oriented approach to development and 
verification of fault-tolerant systems, in our work we adopt both graphical and 
formal modeling techniques. Next, we overview them and present various 
examples of modeling fault tolerant aspects. 
 
3.1 UML 
 
Unified Modelling Language (UML) [16, 19] is a framework for visualizing 
and documenting software systems. It has become de-facto industry standard 
graphical notation for describing software analysis and designs. UML employs 
object-oriented style and is independent of a specific programming language 
[23]. 
UML supports model-driven software development. It is a part in a variety 
of applications including complex distributed systems. The language 
employs a set of specific symbols to graphically represent various components 
and relationships between them [16, 19]. There are several automated 
environments that support modeling in UML. Some of them also offer a 
possibility to generate the program code from the defined graphical models. 
The most useful UML diagrams are use case diagram, class diagram, 
sequence diagram, state diagram, activity diagram and component diagram. In 
our thesis, we mainly used a subset of them that comprises use case diagram, 
class diagram, state diagram and sequence diagram. We describe them next. 
A use case represents a unit of functionality provided by the system [9]. 
The main goal of the use-case diagram is to support the development teams in 
visualizing the functional requirements of a system and defining the 
relationships with actors – the human users or other subsystems interacting with 
the modeled system. An example of a use case diagram is shown in  
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Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Example of a Use Case Diagram 
 
The diagram shows two actors User1 and User2 that interact with the 
system while it provides a functionality called Service. Often the use case 
diagram represents the essential system processes and relationships among 
different use cases. Typically, a use-case diagram shows a group of use cases — 
either all use cases of the system under construction or a particular subset of use 
cases with related functionality. 
The class diagram [11] shows how system entities relate to each other, 
i.e. it defines the static structure of the system [9]. The class diagrams are 
usually used to display the classes about the real-world purpose of the 
system, so called logical classes. The class diagrams also depict the 
relationships between the classes, such as inheritance or association. 
In our work, we aim at making the fault tolerance aspect explicit during 
system modeling, design, and verification. Hence, we propose a number of 
generic patterns that allow the designers to represent system behavior not only 
in the nominal conditions but also in the presence of faults. 
An example of a class diagram with an explicit representation of fault 
tolerance aspect is given in Figure 3.2. The diagram shows three classes called 
SD, SC, and ER. The classes are defined to explicitly represent the steps of fault 
tolerance-aware service architecture. The class SD is responsible for the 
communication with the user. Moreover, it orchestrates the work of the service 
executing component  SC  and error handler  ER.  SC implements the main 
functionality of the service. Since service execution might fail or succeed, the 
SC class contains attributes failure and success. The ER class implements error 
recovery functionality that again might succeed or fail, as designated by the 
corresponding attributes rec_result and unrec_failure. The dynamics of the class 
interactions is explained in the accompanying sequence diagram. 
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Figure 3.2: Example of a Class Diagram 
 
A sequence diagram [10] shows a detailed flow of control that is 
typically defined for a specific use case (Service in our case). The sequence 
diagrams show the calls between the objects in a sequence. A sequence 
diagram has two dimensions – the vertical and horizontal. The vertical 
dimension shows the sequence of messages/calls in the time order that they 
occur. The horizontal dimension shows the object instances to which the 
messages are sent. 
The top of the diagram contains the identities of the class instances 
(objects).  To show that a class instance sends a message to another class 
instance, we draw a line with an open arrowhead pointing to the receiving class 
instance and place the name of the message/method above the line. The returned 
message is drawn with a dotted line with an arrowhead pointing back to the 
originating class instance. It is labeled with the return value above the dotted 
line. 
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An example of a sequence diagram is given in Figure 3.3. Here we again 
demonstrate how to explicitly introduce handling of faulty behavior into the 
service design.  We define three processes – Service Director (SD), Service 
Component (SC) and Error Recovery (ER) as the corresponding parallel vertical 
lines. The interactions between the processes are carried out according to the 
communication between the service and its user in a time sequence. 
SD plays two roles: it handles the user communication with the service and 
controls the service execution flow. The user sends a request to execute a 
service. The request is received by the service director SD. SD initiates service 
execution by sending a message send_req(request) to SC. SC tries to execute the 
requested service. In case it completes its execution, it returns the message 
success to the service director. In case it fails, it sends a  failure message to 
ER, i.e., requests to initiate error recovery.  ER notifies SD about success 
rec_result or failure unrec_failure of error recovery. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Example of a Sequence Diagram
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Another diagram representing the dynamic system behavior is the state 
diagram. The state diagrams represent the different states that a class or the 
entire system can be in and define the transitions from state to state. The state 
diagram has five basic elements: the initial starting point (a solid circle), a 
transition between states (a line with an open arrowhead), a state (a rectangle 
with rounded corners), a decision point (an open circle) and one or several 
termination points (a circle with a solid circle inside it). 
An example of a state diagram defined on a system level is shown in 
Figure 3.4. The model depicts the communication between the service and its 
user. To request the service execution, the user generates an event request 
that is received by the service. The request is always replied either with success 
in the case of error-free system or failure in the case of error occurrence during 
the service provisioning. 
In Figure 3.4 (a), the possibility of failed response is represented explicitly. 
This corresponds to the error detection step of fault tolerance implementation. 
The next extension would be to explicitly define the error recovery stage, as 
shown in Figure 3.4 (b). If the system is fault-free, then the service execution 
terminates normally and produces the required results together with the 
notification of success. If an error occurs, the system makes a transition to the 
recovery state. If the error recovery is successful, the system continues to 
operate normally; otherwise the unrec_failure event is generated designating 
that an unrecoverable error has occurred in the system. 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.4: Examples of State Diagram (a) with explicit representation of failure 
(b) with explicit representation of failure and error recovery 
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UML helps to analyze, visualize and discuss the design of software 
systems with different stakeholders. It is widely accepted in the industry due to 
its readability. However, as a graphical notation, it lacks formality. 
Nevertheless, it is a useful front end for a more rigorous notation, such as 
SystemC that we discuss next. 
 
 
3.2 SystemC 
 
SystemC [12, 13] is a widely used system-level modeling language [14] that 
allows the designers to represent the system design at different abstraction levels 
as well as use various design methodologies. The SystemC specifications can 
contain a mixture of abstract models and implementation-level code. The 
specifications are executable. Moreover, the framework supports simulation that 
allows exploring not only functional but also architectural alternatives. 
SystemC provides us with a unified language to define both hardware 
and software components. SystemC-based design platforms help to cope with 
the complexity of system-level design and often result in reducing system 
development cost and time. SystemC has become de-facto verification standard 
in real- time embedded systems such as MARTE [17]. It is extensively used in 
industrial sectors such as electronic systems, semiconductor technologies, 
electronic design automation and embedded software. 
SystemC is a high-level, powerful design language written in standard 
C++. SystemC uses C++ Class libraries and C/C++ Compiler (such as bcc, gcc, 
etc.). It introduces timing, concurrency and structure-related constructs to model 
system architecture. It provides capabilities similar to VHDL (Very-High-Speed 
Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language) and strong simulation kernel 
that also supports hardware/software co-simulation. 
The language of SystemC includes the following constructions: modules, 
ports, data types, processes, channels, interfaces, and events. 
Modules are the basic building blocks of the language.  They allow a 
designer to partition system design into smaller parts that encapsulate internal 
data representation and algorithms from the rest of the system.  Hence, a 
SystemC model usually consists of several modules. 
A typical module contains ports via which the modules communicate with 
each other, processes describing the functionality of a module, internal data, 
and channels representing model state and communication between processes. 
A template for representing a module in SystemC is given in Figure 3.5.
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SC_MODULE(Name) { 
// ports, processes, internal data, etc 
 SC_CTOR (Name) { 
// body of construction: 
//process declaration, event sensitivities etc. 
} 
}; 
 
Figure 3.5: Definition of simple SystemC module 
 
The SC_MODULE macro designates that the class Name is derived from 
the library class sc_module. The macro SC_CTOR declares a constructor, 
which maps the membership functions to processes and declares event 
sensitivities. The argument should be the name of the module that is currently 
declared. 
Modules can be instantiated, i.e., there might be several instances with the  
identical  structure  and  functionality  that  are  described  by  one  common 
module definition. 
SystemC uses interfaces, ports, and channels to provide the abstract 
modeling primitives for representing communication between modules. 
Channels are used to model the actual data transmission; interfaces describe the 
sets of operations that the channel provides. Finally, ports are the proxy objects 
that facilitate access to the channels through the interfaces. Often one can say 
that the port is bound to the channel through an interface. 
An interface consists of a set of operations. For each operation, it specifies 
the operation’s name, parameters and returns value. The abstract base class 
sc_interface is used to derive interfaces in SystemC. It also provides a virtual 
function register_port(), which is called to connect a channel with the port via 
the interface. 
Let us consider an example of a simple interfaces sc_signal_in_if<S>. It 
is derived from sc_interface and parametrised by the datatype S. As such, it 
provides a virtual function read() that returns constant reference to S. Similarly, 
the interface sc_signal_inout_if<S> provides a virtual function write() that 
takes as parameter a constant reference to S. Since sc_signal_inout_if<S> is 
derived from sc_signal_in_if<S>, it also inherits the function read(). The 
semantics of these functions is to read from and write to the channel that 
implements the corresponding interface. 
Interfaces significantly improve reusability of the modules that we create. 
The next step is supporting reusability to provide modules with the ports that 
allow them to connect and communicate with the rest of the system. 
Ports correspond to interfaces and represent the objects derived from an 
abstract class sc_port_base. Figure 3.6 shows a template class for creating 
ports. 
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template<class IF, int N=1> 
class sc_port : … // class derivation details 
{ 
public: 
IF* operator ->(); 
//member function, member variables 
}; 
 
Figure 3.6: SystemC template for creating ports 
 
The template class sc_port has two parameters: an interface IF through 
which the ports may be connected and an optional integer N denoting the 
maximum number of interfaces that may be attached to the defined port. The 
method of the port is operator ->(). It returns a pointer to the interface with 
which the port is associated. 
For instance, we can map the following declaration of the port p into the 
definition of the module SC_MODULE  given in Figure 3.5: 
 
sc_port<sc_signal_inout_if<int> > p 
 
The port accesses a channel [18] through the interface 
sc_signal_inout_if<int>. Since the interface provides the read() and write() 
methods, we can read the value of the channel and write to it using the 
expressions p->read() and p->write(). 
Process is a basic unit of functionality that is comprised of a module. 
Processes provide us with the means to simulate concurrent behavior, since in 
embedded fault-tolerant systems many activities are run in parallel. 
A process is a member function of a module and is defined in the module 
construction. A defined process accesses external channels through the ports 
of its containing module.  There are two kinds of processes:  method process 
declared with the macros SC_METHOD and thread process declared 
correspondingly as SC_THREAD. 
Figure 3.7 shows an example of a module with a method process 
declaration. 
 25 
 
SC_MODULE(Maximum) {  
sc_in<int> n1; 
sc_in<int> n2; 
sc_out<in>       max_n1_n2; 
 
void find_max() { 
if (n1>n2) then max_n1_n2 = n1 
      else max_n1_n2 = n2; 
} 
 
SC_CTOR (Maximum) { 
SC_METHOD (find_max);  
sensitive << n1 <<n2; 
} 
        }; 
 
Figure 3.7: Example of a module with a method process declaration 
 
When the membership function find_max is invoked, it calculates the 
maximum of the inputs n1 and n2 and writes the result to the output max_n1_n2. 
However, the member function does not create a process as such. The process 
is created inside the constructor by the statement SC_METHOD(Maximum), 
which maps the member function to a method process by registering it with the 
scheduler. The next statement defines that this process is sensitive to changes in 
the values of signals that will be connected to the input ports, i.e., when n1 and 
n2  change, the value of max_n1_n2 is recalculated. 
Next, we show how to describe the proposed architectural and behavioural 
the pattern for fault tolerance-explicit service design described in Chapter 3-1 
in SystemC. The fragment of the code in Figure 3.8 illustrates that as a 
reaction to a service request received from a user, the service director sends a 
request to the service component. The service component can either succeed 
or fail to execute a service, i.e., it produces outputs success or failure. 
The class1 module can only call member functions of SD interface. 
Similarly, the class2 module can only call member functions of SC interface. 
The process describes the functionality of the SD and SC in each respective 
module blocks. The SC receives a command from SD according to user’s 
request (i.e., request). SC class generates output (i.e., result in the case of 
success, or failure in case of error). In the case of failure, error recovery is 
carried out, i.e., ER class produces rec_result in the case of recoverable error 
and unrec_failure otherwise. In the absence of faults, the service returns success. 
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class SD: public sc_interface { // SD class 
public: 
int request; }; 
class SC: public sc_interface { // SC class  
public: 
int result = 1; int failure = 0; int out_; 
void output(const SD &sd){ 
if (sd.request == 1) 
out_ = result;  // error-free 
else 
out_ = failure;  // fault 
}; 
class ER: public sc_interface { // ER class 
public: 
int failure = 0; int rec_result = 1; 
int unrec_failure = 0; int out_; 
void error(const SC &sc){ 
if (sc.out_ == failure) 
out_ = rec_result;  // recovered fault 
else 
out_ = unrec_failure; };   // unrecoverable fault  
SC_MODULE(class1)  { // module declaration 
public: 
sc_port<SD> req;  // port 
SC_CTOR(class1) {  // constructor 
SC_THREAD(main); } 
void main(){   // process  
req.request = 1;}}; 
SC_MODULE(class2)  { // module declaration  
public: 
sc_port<SC> out;  // port 
SC_CTOR(class2) {  // constructor  
SC_THREAD(main);} 
void main(){   // process 
out.output();}}; 
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SC_MODULE(class3) { // module declaration 
  public: 
sc_port<ER> out;  // port 
SC_CTOR(class3) {  // constructor  
SC_THREAD(main);} 
void main(){   // process 
out.error();} }; 
SC_MODULE(top) {   // top level serving module 
  public: 
SC S_C; SD S_D; ER E_R; 
class1* service_director;class2* service_component;  
class3* error_recovery; 
SC_CTOR(top) {  // constructor 
service_director = new class1(“Service_Director”); 
  service_director -> req(S_C); 
service_component = new class2(“Service_Component”); 
  service_component -> out(S_D); 
error_recovery = new class3(“Error_Recovery”); 
error_recovery -> out(E_R);}; 
 
Figure 3.8: SystemC Implementation of Fault Tolerant Service Pattern 
 
SystemC provides us with a systematic framework for modeling complex 
fault tolerant systems. However, as we have discussed previously, fault 
tolerance introduces additional complexity in the system design and hence 
increases the likelihood of design mistakes. To ensure correctness of fault 
tolerance mechanisms, we should employ the techniques used for fault 
avoidance, i.e., use formal verification. The most widely formal verification 
technique is model checking. Next, we describe it in details and present an 
example of properties that should be verified to guarantee the correctness of 
fault tolerant systems. 
 
3.3 Model Checking Fault-Tolerant Systems 
3.3.1 Model Checking: Introductory Background 
 
Model checking is a verification technique for verifying functional properties of 
computing systems [98, 99, 100, 101,102]. Model checking takes as an input a 
finite-state model of the system and the desired property and systematically 
checks whether the given model satisfies this property. Typically, the properties 
that we are interested in checking include deadlock freedom, invariants, and 
request- response properties. 
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Model checking is an automated technique that allows us to check the 
absence of errors (i.e., property violations) in the system, i.e., to establish that 
the system under consideration has certain properties. In the majority of 
distributed systems including fault tolerant systems, we would at least be 
interested in establishing that a system never reaches a situation in which no 
progress can be made. In other words, more often than not, we are interested at 
least in verifying that no deadlock scenario can be found in the specification of 
the system. 
Since the system specification defines the behavior of the system under 
consideration, the specification constitutes the basis for any verification activity. 
The system is correct only if it satisfies all properties derived from its 
specification. Once a state is found that does not satisfy one (or several) of the 
specification’s properties, we can claim that we have discovered an error in the 
design. Therefore, correctness as such is relative to a specification. 
Model checking is a verification technique that explores all possible 
system states in a brute-force manner. State-of-the-art model checkers can 
handle state spaces containing up to 109 states. The use of optimizing algorithms 
and abridged data structures sometimes allows the model checkers to tackle 
models containing up to 1020 states. 
The system model is usually automatically generated from a model given  
in  some  programming  language  like  C  or  modeling  language  like 
SystemC or Promela (which we present later). The model checker examines all 
system states to check whether they satisfy a particular property. If the model 
checker encounters a state that violates the property under consideration, it 
generates a counterexample indicating how the undesired state can be reached. 
Essentially, the counterexample shows an execution path leading from the initial 
system state to a state that violates the verified property. 
A standard way to represent a model is by a transition system – a 
directed graph where nodes represent states and edges model transitions, i.e., 
state changes. A state represents some information about a system at a 
certain moment of its behavior. Formally, a transition system TS is defined as 
a tuple (S,Act,→,I,AP,L) where 
 
• S is a set of states, 
• Act is a set of actions, 
• →⊆S×Act×S is a transition relation, 
• I⊆ S is a set of initial states, 
• AP is a set of atomic propositions, and 
• L:S→2AP is a labeling function. 
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TS is called finite if S, Act and AP are all finite. In our definition, we describe the 
transition systems with the action names for the transitions (state changes) and 
the atomic propositions for the states. Intuitively, the behavior of a transition 
system is as follows: the system starts in some initial state s0∈I and evolves 
according to the transition relation →, i.e., if s is the current state, then a 
transition s → α s’ originating from s is selected non-deterministically and 
taken. This means that the action α is performed and TS evolves from state s 
into the state  s’.  The procedure repeats until a  state that does not have 
outgoing transitions is reached. 
The labeling function L relates a set L(s) ∈ 2AP of atomic propositions to 
any state s, i.e., L(s) identifies only those atomic propositions a∈ AP, which are 
satisfied by state s. For a given propositional logic formula Φ, s satisfies the 
formula Φ if the evaluation induced by L(s) makes the formula Φ true, i.e., 
 
s|=Φ  iff  L(s) |=Φ 
 
Let us consider a simple example – a road crossing. We have two traffic 
lights regulating the car movement in the orthogonal direction. Both traffic lights 
have two states: red and green. Both traffic lights are described by the similar 
transition systems consisting of two states: red and green and two transitions: a 
and b indicating the change of the light. For the first traffic light red → a green 
and green → b red. For the second traffic light red → b green and green → a red 
correspondingly. The crossing can be represented as a parallel composition of 
two transition systems. Both traffic lights synchronize using the actions a and b 
indicating the change of the light. Let us assume that the initial state for both 
of them is red. Since the first traffic light is waiting to be synchronized on 
action a, the second light is blocked because it is waiting to be synchronized 
with action b. It represents deadlock and an obvious mistake in the system 
design. 
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) provides an intuitive but mathematically 
rigorous notation for expressing properties about state labels in the model 
execution. LTL formulae over the set AP of atomic propositions are formulated 
using the following grammar: 
 
φ :: = true  | a | φ1˄ φ2 | ¬ φ | Ο φ  | φ1 ∪ φ2 
 
where a ∈ AP. 
The until operator allows us to derive temporal modalities ◊ eventually, 
“sometimes in the future” and □ always, “from now on forever” as follows: 
 
◊φ =true ∪ φ and   □ φ = ¬ ◊¬φ 
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For instance, let us express the property that two processes P1 and P2 never 
simultaneously access their critical section (a shared resource): 
□ (¬crit1 ∨ ¬crit2). 
This formula expresses that always □ at least one of the two processes is not in 
its critical section (¬criti). This is an example of a safety property.  Another 
type of properties – liveness properties – describe the progress of the system. For 
our example of the critical section, the liveness property states that each process 
Pi is infinitely often in its critical section: 
(□◊ crit1) ∧ (□◊crit2) 
There is a variety of general and specific model checkers that automate 
verification. Though they vary in their performance and underlying algorithms, 
they follow the same verification process as shown in Figure 3.9. The 
preprocessor extracts a state transition graph from a program, model checker 
takes the state-transition graph and a LTL formula and determines whether the 
formula is true or false. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Model Checking Process 
 
One of the popular model checkers is SPIN. Next, we give its overview 
and present examples of models of fault-tolerant systems. 
3.3.2 SPIN PROMELA 
SPIN [22, 66] is a model checker that has been initially developed to verify 
communications protocols but quickly became popular for verification of 
distributed and concurrent systems in general. The system models verified by 
SPIN are written in PROMELA – Process Meta Language. Correspondingly, 
SPIN stands for Simple PROMELA Interpreter (SPIN). It is a simulator and 
verifier for the properties of PROMELA models. 
A program in PROMELA consists of a set of processes that can have 
parameters. SPIN compiles and executes PROMELA programs in the simulation 
mode.  PROMELA adopts the syntax and semantics of C programming language 
to define expressions. The control statements are defined using the notion of 
guarded commands, which is particularly suitable for expressing 
Preprocessor Model 
Checker 
Program LTL 
Formula 
Satisfied 
Counter 
Example 
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nondeterminism inherent in distributed communication systems. There are five 
control statements: sequence, selection, repetition, jump, and unless. 
The PROMELA programs can contain assertions – the statements 
containing predicates that are evaluated during the execution. When an assert 
statement is executed during a simulation, the predicate expression is evaluated. 
If it evaluates to true, execution proceeds normally, otherwise, the program 
terminates and gives an error message. Though assertions are useful for 
verification, it is limited to a verification of properties at specific control points in 
the processes. 
To check the correctness of a model, we should verify that the desired 
properties hold through all possible execution paths. For the distributed and 
concurrent programs, it means that we have to verify all possible interleaving of 
the statements. When SPIN simulates a program, it creates one computation by 
interleaving the statements of all the processes. Typically, the design errors 
occur due to unforeseen interferences between processes. The use of LTL can 
significantly help in finding hidden interferences and debugging complex 
distributed and concurrent fault-tolerant systems. 
SPIN supports verification of a standard set of temporal operators: 
eventually ◊ (denoted as <>), always □ (denoted as []), and until  U (denoted as 
U). 
 
Figure 3.10 presents the PROMELA model of the fault tolerant service 
architecture described in Chapter 3-1. SD process defines request command for 
SC and SC process generates the respective output depending on the 
request. If the output is a success, the system is error free. In the case of error, 
the error recovery is initiated. If error recovery succeeds, then rec_result is 
generated otherwise, unrec_failure is produced. 
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bool request, success, failure;  
bool rec_result, unrec_failure;  
bool ack = true; 
active proctype SD() { 
if 
:: ack == true -> request = true; 
:: else 
#ifdef FIX 
-> break 
#endif 
fi; 
} 
active proctype SC() { 
if 
:: ack == true -> { 
success = false; failure = true; 
if 
:: failure != false -> { 
bool error_flag = true; run ER(error_flag);} 
fi;} 
:: else 
#ifdef FIX 
-> break 
#endif 
fi; } 
proctype ER(bool e) { 
e = false; 
if 
:: e == false -> rec_result = true; 
:: e == true -> unrec_failure = true; 
:: else 
#ifdef FIX 
-> break 
#endif 
fi;} 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Promela Implementation of Fault-Tolerant Service 
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State-vector 24 byte, depth reached 14, errors: 0 
37 states, stored 
22 states, matched 
59 transitions (= stored+matched) 
0 atomic steps 
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved) 
 
Stats on memory usage (in Megabytes): 
0.001 equivalent memory usage for states 
(stored*(State-vector + overhead)) 
0.290 actual memory usage for states 
64.000 memory used for hash table (-w24) 
0.343 memory used for DFS stack (-m10000) 
64.539  total actual memory usage 
 
Figure 3.11: Example of SPIN output 
 
In our case, the verification was successful. In the case of deadlock, the 
output file shows a counterexample. The output file also depicts the number of 
states and transitions. 
SPIN allows us to verify various properties expressed as LTL formulae. For 
instance, we can verify that eventually, service execution succeeds as follows: 
 
◊(success = true) 
 
Model checking is a popular verification technique. Its main advantages are 
as follows: 
• It does not require sophisticated mathematical knowledge from 
the user. The user enters a description of the program to be 
verified and specifications to be checked. The checking process is 
an automatic “push-button” technology. 
• Model checking is fast compared to other rigorous techniques such 
as proof-based verification. 
• The model checker generates a counterexample in the case of 
property violations. A counterexample is a concrete execution 
trace that shows the error. The counterexamples are helpful in 
debugging complex systems. 
• Model checking can be utilized during the design of a 
complex system with partial specifications. We do not have to 
wait until the design phase is complete. 
• Temporal Logics can easily express many concurrency properties 
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However, as any brute-force technique, model checking suffers from the 
scalability problem known as state explosion. 
In our work, we extensively relied on model checking to verify various 
aspects of fault tolerance.  In particular, we used it to verify the functional 
correctness of mode-rich systems – a large class of systems that we overview 
next. 
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4 Fault Tolerance in Mode-Rich System 
 
 
The notion of modes is widely used to structure the behavior of complex 
computer- based systems. Often analyzing system fault tolerance, we identify 
normal and degraded operational modes. This is an example of a very 
simple mode logic. For a large class of systems, mode logic is much more 
complex and is defined by a variety of internal and external conditions. In 
this chapter, we discuss the problems associated with designing fault-tolerant 
systems with complex mode transition schemes. 
 
 
4.1 Modes 
 
Modes are defined as mutually exclusive sets of system behaviors. Modes are 
extensively used to structure the dynamic behavior of systems [4] from different 
domains such as automotive, avionic and space. 
The system modes are introduced based on the operational conditions of the 
system. Designing mode-rich systems is a complex engineering task. Firstly, the 
mode logic should be designed in such a way that the conditions triggering 
mode transitions are deterministic, and modes themselves are 
deterministically deducible from the states of the components. Secondly, for each 
mode, we should explicitly define mode entering conditions and mode 
invariant, which is preserved all the time while the system remains in this 
particular mode. Finally, mode logic should unambiguously define 
relationships between the modes at different layers of the system architecture. 
Often structuring the system design according to the operational modes 
provides us with a suitable basis for introducing fault tolerance mechanisms. The 
main principle is to define the mode logic in such a way that every time upon 
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the occurrence of a component failure the system makes a transition to a 
more degraded mode in which the failed component is inactive. 
While designing the mode logic according to this principle, we introduce 
two types of transitions: forward and backward. The forward mode transitions 
bring the system from the current mode to the mode in which the system 
provides more advanced functionality. Correspondingly, backward mode 
transitions occur when an error occurs, and the system should be put into 
the more degraded mode compared to the current one. 
Figure 4.1 illustrated the general principle described above. Since we 
present an excerpt from the overall mode logic, we assume that we start in the 
mode current. When there is no error in the current mode, then next mode 
is reached as a result of the forward transition. In the case of failure, in the 
current mode, the backward transition occurs that brings the system to a more 
degraded mode (previous mode) in which the failed component is not used, and 
hence the effect of its error is masked. 
From the architectural point of view, we need to introduce the dedicated 
components that orchestrate mode transitions – we call such components Mode 
Managers (MM). MM monitors the states of other system components that are 
controlled by unit managers (UM). When the conditions for entering another 
mode are satisfied, Mode Manager MM sends the commands to Unit Managers 
to make the transitions to the corresponding mode. 
Typically, each particular Unit Manager UM controls several units 
(components). Often the unit consists of two branches – redundant and nominal, 
i.e., there are two components – the nominal and a spare. UM is responsible for 
managing the state transition of unit branches. 
Let us assume that the initial system mode is Powering. It takes place when 
the unit branch state switches from off to on. Similarly, un-powering is carried 
out when the unit branch  state switches  from on to  off.  Failure Detection, 
Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) Manager handles the errors of the units and 
provides an error recovery algorithm to recover from faults. In the case of a 
nominal unit branch error, FDIR initiates unit reconfiguration by switching 
the failure branch (nominal) to backup branch (redundant). After unit 
reconfiguration, MM executes forward mode transition. When an error occurs in 
the redundant branch of the unit, the corresponding notification is sent to the 
FDIR manager, and the backward mode transition is trigged by MM. 
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Figure 4.1: Mode Logic of Fault-Tolerant System: a General Principle 
 
In the case of the centralized mode management, a single mode 
manager is responsible for controlling mode transitions. However, in the 
distributed mode management, several mode managers (i.e.; MM1, MM2, etc.) 
communicate with each other to implement the desired mode logic. The generic 
architecture of a fault tolerant with a distributed mode management is shown in 
Figure 4.1.2. Next, we consider two cases: a simpler one with one mode 
manager, i.e., the case of the centralized mode management and then a more 
generic one – with the distributed mode management. 
 
4.2 Mode-Rich Fault-Tolerant Systems: 
Centralized Mode Management 
 
We discuss the architecture and properties of a mode-rich fault-tolerant system 
with the centralized mode management by an example -- Attitude and Orbit 
Control System (AOCS) [5] [7]. The purpose of the Attitude and Orbit 
Control System (AOCS) is to acquire and maintain the attitude of a 
spacecraft throughout its mission. AOCS is activated upon the spacecraft 
separation from the launch vehicle. AOCS is an example of mode-rich systems 
with a complex mode transition scheme. AOCS is a generic component of 
different kinds of spacec r a f t s . Its development and verification have been 
undertaken by various teams, including the EU project DEPLOY [6]. AOCS 
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performs multiple tasks such as sensor data processing, control computation and 
actuator commanding [8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Generic Architecture of Mode Rich Systems 
 
The main functionality of AOCS is to control the attitude and the orbit 
of a satellite. The satellite is continuously changing its positioning due to 
various environmental disturbances. However, to perform the scientific 
measurements, the satellite should maintain a certain accurate position for some 
period. Therefore, the attitude needs to be monitored and adjusted accordingly. 
AOCS consists of several components that manage the attitude and the orbit of a 
satellite as well as carry out scientific measurements specific to the particular 
mission of the satellite. AOCS instantiates the generic architecture given in 
Figure 4.2 as follows: there are four managers -- AOCS Manager, Unit 
Manager (UM), Mode Manager (MM) and FDIR Manager (FM).  
Figure 4.3 represents the version of the architecture of AOCS with the 
centralized mode management. 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Centralized AOCS Architecture 
 
The main operations of MM in AOCS are to check preconditions of mode 
transition, execute mode transitions, and manage the controllers and units. 
AOCS logic contains the following modes: Off (A), Standby (B), Safe (C), 
Nominal (D), Preparation (E), and Science (F) [8, 31]. The UM in AOCS is 
responsible for checking the states of the nominal branch (branch A) and 
redundant branch (branch B) of the units, to manage the state transition 
executions, and to handle the unit reconfigurations. Control Pointing Controller 
(CPC) and Fine Pointing Controller (FPC) are two control algorithms that are 
used to control computations. AOCS Manager manages them as well. Fault 
Manager – FM – handles errors of branch state transition and attitude 
errors. FM monitors error occurrence and initiates error recovery. An informal 
description of mode logic is given below: 
 
1) All unit branches are put into the inactive state after a 
successful completion of mode transition to mode Off or mode 
Standby. 
2) In mode Safe, the particular branches, i.e., Earth Sensor (ES), 
Sun Sensor (SS) and Reaction Wheel (RW) are set to ‘on’ state, 
while remaining branches go to ‘off’ state. Only Coarse Pointing 
Controller (CPC) is active in this mode. 
3) In mode Nominal, GPS is set to ‘coarse’ state. While the 
particular branches, i.e., RW, Star Tracker (STR) and Thruster 
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(THR) are set to ‘on’ state and remaining branches go to ‘off’ 
state. Only Fine Pointing Controller (FPC) is active in this mode. 
4) In mode Preparation, Global Positioning System (GPS) is set to 
‘fine’ state and Payload Instrument (PLI) to ‘standby’ state, while 
the remaining unit branches and controllers maintain the same state 
as in the previous mode D. 
5) After successful completion of mode Preparation, the satellite 
enters in mode Science. Only PLI is set to ‘science’ state in this 
mode, and remaining unit branches and controllers maintains the 
same state as in previous mode Preparation. 
 
To visualize the AOCS mode logic, we use UML state diagrams. The 
detailed description of it is given in papers VI and VII included in part II of the 
thesis. Figure 4.4 shows the UML state diagram for GPS. The diagram depicts 
the transition from mode D to mode E and includes forward and backward 
transitions as well as unit reconfiguration. 
GPS activation starts from mode D. If the GPS state is ‘coarse’ and there are 
no errors in other components, then forward mode transition occurs. If the 
GP S  is in mode D, it remains ‘off’ for some period. If it does not change its 
state to ‘coarse’, then branch A and branch B of the GPS unit will be checked. 
When an error occurs only in branch A, then unit reconfiguration is carried out 
by deactivating the branch A and activating the branch B. After successful 
completion of unit reconfiguration, mode D is changed to mode E. The 
backward mode transition (change to mode C) takes place when both branches 
of the GPS have failed. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Centralized Mode-Rich Fault-Tolerant System: Example of GPS unit 
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The state diagram serves as a middle hand between the informal 
description of AOCS and its formal representation. Since AOCS is an example 
of a complex fault-tolerant embedded system, we used SystemC to implement 
and subsequently, verify it. The general pattern for modeling mode transitions 
in SystemC is given in Figure 4.5. For a given mode, it includes mode 
transition, error detection, and error recovery. We have chosen to illustrate it 
by the GPS example. The variable declarations include modes, statuses of GPS 
and its branches as well as the set of the UM commands to GPS. The status of 
GPS unit is checked according to the current mode. When the status of GPS 
satisfies the condition of the current mode, then MM switches the mode to the 
next mode. If it detects the branch state errors, then two cases are considered. In 
the first case, if the failure of branch A occurs but branch B is healthy, then 
the unit reconfiguration is performed. In the second case, if both branches 
have failed then backward mode transition is initiated. 
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Variables 
prev_mode: {A, B, C, D, E, F} 
curr_mode: {A, B, C, D, E, F} 
next_mode: {A, B, C, D, E, F} 
GPS_status: int 
Branch_A_status: int 
Branch_B_status: int 
 
Begin 
 
if GPS_status of curr_mode satisfied 
then initiate a forward transition to next_mode 
according to the predefined scenario; 
 
if GPS_status of curr_mode failed 
then check the nominal branch A and redundant 
branch B of GPS; 
 
if Branch_A_status of GPS failed 
then initiate unit reconfiguration of curr_mode 
and proceed to next_mode according to the 
 predefined scenario; 
 
if Branch_B_status of GPS failed 
then initiate a backward transition to prev_mode 
according to the predefined scenario and the 
choice of previous mode depends on the current 
mode and its fault; 
 
End 
 
 
Figure 4.5: A general pattern for defining Mode Transition in SystemC (GPS 
instance) 
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To verify the correctness of our SystemC implementation, we used SPIN. 
Figure 4.6 illustrated the verification procedure. Upon powering UM, MM 
sends its current mode acknowledgment to UM, then UM sends a command to 
GPS to perform the necessary actions. As soon as they are completed, UM sends 
an acknowledgment. If the current mode is mode C and mode transition to mode 
D is going to take place, then UM authorizes it to send the powering request to 
GPS. In case GPS powering is true, then both branches (i.e., A and B) change 
their state to ‘coarse’ according to the mode D and proceed to the next mode E. 
In the case of a fault, error recovery is initiated. 
SPIN checks the absence of deadlocks and livelocks. As it is easy to see, 
to implement the desired mode logic, AOCS relies on a complex communication 
scheme. The use of model checking allows us to verify the correctness of its 
implementation and significantly improves our confidence in the validity of the 
developed system. 
 
 
 
// initial status of GPS unit N_GPS = off; 
R_GPS = off; 
Powering = true; // powering for Mode D 
if 
::(N_GPS == coarse && R_GPS == coarse){ 
error_flag = 0; 
run go_to_modeE(N_GPS, R_GPS); } 
::(N_GPS != coarse && R_GPS == coarse){ 
error_flag = 1; 
run reconfiguration(N_GPS, R_GPS); 
run go_to_modeE(N_GPS, R_GPS); } 
::(N_GPS != coarse && R_GPS != coarse){ 
error_flag = 1; 
run go_to_modeC(N_GPS, R_GPS); } 
:: else 
#ifdef FIX 
break 
#endif fi; 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Example of Mode Transition Verification 
 
We have considered the case of a centralized mode management. In this 
case, the architecture contains one dedicated component – Mode Manager – 
that has a “global” view on the system state and hence is capable of making 
the decisions about mode transitions. 
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Often satellite systems are composed of several rather independent 
subsystems. Each of the subsystems has its mode manager. Therefore, to 
make the decisions about “global” mode transitions, the mode managers, which 
are distributed across the system, should communicate with each other and agree 
on a common decision regarding the next mode. 
Next, we consider this case, i.e., discuss fault tolerance of mode-rich 
systems with the distributed mode management. 
 
4.3 Mode-Rich Fault-Tolerant Systems: 
Distributed Mode Management 
 
Distributed mode management introduces additional complexity into the design 
of fault-tolerant systems. Let us consider the following scenario. We have two 
subsystems, and each of them has its mode manager. Assume that each 
subsystem has reached the conditions to switch to a more advanced operational 
mode. However, while making such a transition, an error occurs in one of the 
systems, and as a result, its local mode manager issues a command to switch to a 
more degraded mode. Obviously, the system would be left in an inconsistent 
state if before issuing a command to switch to a new mode the local mode 
managers would not agree on the common mode transition. 
Such an agreement is often called a handshake protocol. The handshake is a 
process in which connection is established between two modules, and the 
information is transferred from one module to another. As a result, two modules 
agree on a common action (or data). 
Let us discuss how to use the handshake protocol to ensure the correctness 
of mode logic of fault tolerant systems with the distributed mode management. 
We consider a system that consists of two identical modules [32]. When one of 
the components of the first module fails, the system switches to the use of the 
second module. However, if at a certain point in time, some component of the 
spare module fails too, then none of the models remains operational. To avoid 
failure of the entire mission, the system should employ healthy components of 
both modules and define the desired control flow over them by introducing a 
communication between the modules and their corresponding mode managers. 
Let us consider a modified version of AOCS – Distributed Attitude and 
Orbit Control System (D-AOCS). In D-AOCS, mode transitions and error 
recovery involve a sophisticated synchronization between mode managers – the 
synchronization that is implemented using a complex handshake protocol.  
D-AOCS contains two mode managers – MM1 and MM2, which manage 
mode transitions in their respective parts. The mode managers execute mode 
transitions in parallel and use handshaking to synchronize on the phases of 
changing between modes. 
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The mode managers proceed according to the following generic behavioral 
pattern. Assume that the conditions for entering next mode are satisfied in 
module 1. Mode manager MM1 sends a request to MM2 with a proposal to enter 
the next mode. The Mode manager of the second module, MM2, checks the state 
of the module. If the conditions for entering the proposed mode are satisfied, 
then it sends a reply-designating that it has agreed on the transition to the 
proposed mode. Upon receiving the reply, the first mode manager issues the 
command to the components of module 1 to make the transition to the desired 
mode. Moreover, it sends the acknowledgment to MM2 that the transition to the 
next mode has been initiated. Upon receiving such an acknowledgment, MM2 
issues the command to the components of Module 2 to make the corresponding 
mode transition. Then it sends the acknowledgment to MM1. Therefore, both 
modules agree (i.e., “handshake”) on the mode transition. As a result, the 
components of both modules are managed in a synchronized way. 
Both forward and backward mode transitions follow the behavioral pattern 
described above. The only difference is that the mode manager of the module 
that has experienced an error initiates the backward mode transition. Informally, 
the requirements of D-AOCS can be described as follows: 
 
1) When both modules enter mode A or B, all units and controllers 
have inactive/idle status. MM1 and MM2 periodically 
communicate with each other to notify that there is no error 
occurred, and the given modes are maintained. After successful 
acknowledgment, both managers switch their current mode to the 
next mode. 
2) When mode transition to mode C is commanded by the managers, 
all units except ES, SS, and RW remain in ‘off’ state, and only 
CPC is activated. After that, both mode managers confirm error-
free state to each other. MM1 and MM2 go to next mode after a 
successful handshake. 
3) Upon successful transition to mode C, the modules should try to 
achieve mode D. The units – RW, STR, and THR are set to ‘on’ 
state, GPS is put in ‘coarse’ state. FPC is activated. When the 
desired states are reached in both modules, the mode managers 
handshake and become ready to progress to the next mode. 
4) To enter mode E, only GPS and PLI should change their status to 
‘fine’ and ‘standby’ respectively and the remaining units and 
controllers maintain the same status as in mode D. Then managers 
check that conditions for entering mode E are satisfied. Upon 
confirming that the conditions have been indeed achieved, the 
mode managers handshake and make a transition to the next mode. 
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5) In the case of the mode F, the PLI unit operates with ‘science’ state. 
All other units and controllers keep the states reached in mode E. 
MM1 and MM2 both update each other regarding the success of 
mode transition and stay in this mode until all desired operations of 
the satellite’s mission are accomplished or an error occurs, and a 
backward transition is initiated. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: State Diagram of D-AOCS (GPS example) 
 
The state diagram shown in Figure 4.7 defines the dynamic behavior of the 
GPS unit of D-AOCS. The diagram shows the mode transition from mode D to 
E and from mode D back to C. GPS activation starts from mode D by both 
managers. If GPS status in mode D of MM1 or/and MM2 remain inactive, then 
branches of GPS unit will be checked to detect the faulty branch. Mode 
transition cannot be made until error recovery (reconfiguration) is completed. 
Upon that the mode managers handshake and proceed to the next mode. 
If an error occurs only in branch A, then unit reconfiguration is carried out 
by switching off branch A and activating branch B. Backward mode transition 
takes place in MM1 or/and MM2 to mode C when branch B of GPS has failed. 
After successful completion of unit reconfiguration or backward mode transition, 
the mode managers send the response notification, and the handshake protocol is 
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initiated. As a result, the mode transition from mode D to mode E can be 
initiated by both mode managers. The detailed modeling and verification of 
the handshake protocol in D-AOCS are described in Paper III. 
A fragment of the general scheme implementing distributed mode 
management using the handshaking protocol is given in Figure 4.8. If GPS state 
in each module fulfills the requirements for entering the next mode, then 
mode managers notify through handshake procedure that the modules are in the 
error-free state and transition can be initiated. It results in the forward mode 
transition. If GPS error occurs in any of the modules, then the mode manager 
responsible for controlling the failed unit initiates an error recovery, i.e., the 
backward mode transition or the unit reconfiguration. The other mode 
manager waits until the error recovery of the failed unit is completed. After 
the successful error recovery, both mode managers proceed to the next mode 
simultaneously using the described handshake protocol. The detailed modeling 
and implementation of handshaking protocol in case of Control and Data 
Management Unit (CDMU) are explained in Paper IV. 
The implementation of the handshake procedure for D-AOCS is verified 
using SPIN. We have checked the correctness of backward mode transition 
scenarios, forward mode transition scenarios, unit reconfiguration scenarios and 
handshake procedure. 
Figure 4.9 presents an excerpt of the model describing the behavior in 
mode D. If GPS maintains the required state in both modules, then mode 
managers notify each other through the handshake procedure and initiate 
forward mode transition to the next mode E. If an error occurs during a mode 
transition in any module, then the mode manager responsible for controlling 
failed unit initiates  an  error  recovery,  i.e.,  the  backward  mode  transition  
or  the  unit reconfiguration. Verification demonstrates that the system can 
deadlock if error recovery does not terminate. To ensure that the deadlock is 
excluded, we can introduce a deadline to guarantee that the error recovery 
cannot proceed indefinitely. 
In this section, we described our approach to modeling and verification of 
mode-rich fault- tolerant systems. Such an approach can be used in developing 
distributed embedded systems where we can define a finite set of states for each 
component. Another large class of distributed systems is service-oriented 
systems. The use of mode-based modeling would be cumbersome for such kinds 
of systems, since the behavior of services is described via their inputs and 
outputs rather than states. Hence, to develop service-oriented fault-tolerant 
distributed system, we need to rely on other techniques. We describe them in 
the next chapter. 
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    Variables 
    prev_mode: {A, B, C, D, E, F} 
    curr_mode: {A, B, C, D, E, F} 
    next_mode: {A, B, C, D, E, F}  
    MM1_GPS_status: int  
    MM2_GPS_status: int 
    MM1_Branch_A_status: int 
   MM2_Branch_A_status: int 
   MM1_Branch_B_status: int 
   MM2_Branch_B_status: int 
 
Begin 
 
if MM1_GPS_status and MM2_GPS_status of curr_mode satisfied 
then initiate a forward transition in MM1 and MM2 to next_mode according to the 
predefined scenario after handshaking; 
 
if MM1_GPS_status or MM2_GPS_status of curr_mode failed 
then check the nominal branch A and redundant branch B of GPS in current modes of 
MM1 and MM2; 
 
if MM1_Branch_A_status of GPS failed 
then MM2 maintains the current mode and MM1 initiates unit 
reconfiguration according to the predefined scenario and after reconfiguration 
both managers initiate a forward transition after handshaking; 
 
if MM2_Branch_A_status of GPS failed 
then MM1 maintains the current mode and MM2 initiates unit 
reconfiguration according to the predefined scenario and after reconfiguration 
both managers initiate a forward transition after handshaking; 
 
if MM1_Branch_B_status of GPS failed 
then MM2 maintains the current mode and MM1 initiates backward transition to 
prev_mode according to the predefined scenario. The choice of previous mode 
depends on the current mode and its fault. After error recovery in MM1, both 
mode managers initiate a forward transition after handshaking; 
 
if MM2_Branch_B_status of GPS failed 
then MM1 maintains the current mode and MM2 initiates backward transition to 
prev_mode according to the predefined scenario. The choice of previous mode 
depends on the current mode and its fault. After error recovery in MM2, both 
mode managers initiate a forward transition after handshaking; 
End 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Distributed Mode Management (GPS example) 
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Powering = true; //powering for Mode D in MM1 & MM2 
// GPS1 denotes for MM1 and GPS2 denotes for MM2 
if 
::(GPS1 == coarse && GPS2 == coarse){ 
MM1_error_flag = 0; 
MM2_error_flag = 0; 
run handshake(MM1_error_flag, MM2_error_flag); 
run go_to_modeE(GPS1, GPS2); } 
::(GPS1 != coarse && GPS2 == coarse){ 
MM1_error_flag=1; 
MM2_error_flag=0; 
run handshake(MM1_error_flag, MM2_error_flag); 
if 
::(N_GPS1 != coarse && R_GPS1 == coarse){ 
run reconfiguration(N_GPS1, R_GPS1);} 
::(N_GPS1 != coarse && R_GPS1 != coarse){ 
run go_to_modeC(N_GPS1, R_GPS1); 
run go_to_modeD(N_GPS1, R_GPS1);  
MM1_error_flag = 0;} 
fi; 
run handshake(MM1_error_flag, MM2_error_flag); 
run go_to_modeE(GPS1, GPS2); } 
::(GPS1 == coarse && GPS2 != coarse){ 
MM1_error_flag = 0; 
MM2_error_flag = 1; 
run handshake(MM1_error_flag, MM2_error_flag); 
if 
::(N_GPS2 != coarse && R_GPS2 == coarse){ 
run reconfiguration(N_GPS2, R_GPS2);} 
::(N_GPS2 != coarse && R_GPS2 != coarse){ 
run go_to_modeC(N_GPS2, R_GPS2); 
run go_to_modeD(N_GPS2, R_GPS2);  
MM2_error_flag = 0;} 
fi; 
run handshake(MM1_error_flag,MM2_error_flag); 
run go_to_modeE(GPS1, GPS2); } 
fi; 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Distributed Mode Management: Verification of Handshake 
Procedure (Mode D example) 
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5 Fault Tolerance in Service-Oriented 
Distributed Systems 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the problem of ensuring fault tolerance of service- 
oriented systems. This is a large class of distributed systems, which includes a 
variety of networked applications. Ensuring reliable operation of such systems 
relies on dedicated architectural solutions as well as systematic analysis of 
failure modes of system components. In this section, we discuss our approach to 
developing fault tolerant service-oriented systems. 
 
5.1 Fault Tolerance in Service Oriented 
Architectures 
 
While ensuring fault tolerance, modern software should cope with an inherent 
heterogeneity of networked systems that often work over diverse platforms and 
rely on a  variety of protocols as well as interact with a wide range of 
devices. Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) enables seamless integration of 
heterogeneous components and provide the developers with a powerful 
mechanism to cope with the complexity of such heterogeneous environment. 
SOA is an architectural style that relies on loosely coupled interacting 
software components providing services. A service can be defined as a piece of 
functionality that is offered by a service provider to a service consumer. All 
service-oriented systems follow the same behavioral pattern: a service 
consumer sends a service request to a service provider, the service provider, 
either by itself or in cooperation with other service providers, executes the 
requested service to produce the required result and responds to the service 
consumer. 
SOA relies on two main architectural principles to support loose coupling 
of the components. Firstly, interfaces should be defined for all interacting 
services. The interfaces should be available for all service providers and service 
consumers. Secondly, all messages are described via an extensible scheme; all 
messages are delivered through the interfaces. 
The service interface can be seen as a contract defining the functionality of 
the service in a generic platform-independent manner. Therefore, the invocation 
mechanism including the protocols, service descriptions, and service discovery 
facilities should follow the predefined common standards. 
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Services should be self-describing, i.e., they should publish their 
capabilities, interfaces, behavior, and quality attributes. The description of the 
interface should include a  service signature that includes its input, output, 
and error messages. The quality of service (QoS) attributed typically 
describes non-functional attributes, such as average response time, failure rate, 
etc. Moreover, it often includes a description of security policy. 
While developing the methods allowing us to guarantee fault tolerance of 
service-oriented systems, we should take into account the following constraints. 
Firstly, the services are stateless, i .e., we cannot assume that the current 
conditions or internal states of a service are known. Secondly, since the 
services are loosely coupled, they do not share common modules. Finally, 
services should be location-transparent, i.e., we cannot assume that a certain 
service would be available locally. 
SOA supports the construction of the complex services by coordinated 
aggregation of lower level services (subservices). The service director 
communicates with subservices. It orchestrates the execution flow of the service 
and coordinates error recovery, as explained in Chapter 3. 
The important goal of introducing fault tolerance in the service architecture 
is to prevent a propagation of faults to the service interface level (i.e., to avoid a 
service failure [90, 91]). While we cannot observe the states of the subservices, 
we can monitor their responses and, in the case of subservice failure, rely on 
redundancy to mitigate the effect of error occurrence. 
As we described in Chapter 2, to achieve fault tolerance, we always have to 
introduce some form of redundancy into the system architecture. We propose 
three types of architectural patterns for introducing redundancy into the 
architecture of complex aggregated services, as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Architectural Patterns for Introducing Redundancy 
 
The duplication pattern relies on introducing a redundant service 
component that provides the (sub)service that is identical to a certain subservice 
included into the service architecture. Both services can be executed in parallel. 
A successful execution of a service by any of two service components is 
sufficient to guarantee the reliable execution of the aggregated service. 
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The triple modular redundancy pattern implements the principle described 
in Chapter 2-2. The precondition for applying this pattern is that there are at least 
three service components available over the network that provide an identical 
(sub)service. To use the triple modular redundancy pattern, we also have to 
introduce a specific voting service into the architecture of the aggregated 
service. To execute a triplicated (sub)service, the request is sent to all three 
service providers. The results of the service execution are sent to a voting 
element – a dedicated software component that performs a  comparison of 
the results and produces the final result. 
The Stand-by spare pattern is an example of dynamic redundancy. It 
assumes an availability of a spare service component providing the desirable 
service. The spare is used only if the execution of the service by the main 
component fails. If the main service component succeeds in executing a service, 
the spare service component remains inactive. 
The dynamic behavior of an aggregated service with the integrated fault 
tolerance mechanisms is shown in Figure 5.2.  Here S1, S2,....Sn designates 
services from which the service is composed. IN and OUT correspond to a 
service request and service result. The execution flow might include repeated 
execution of a certain subset of subservices as well aborting the whole service. 
If a transient error occurs in the service execution, then the service director 
can recover from the error by re-executing the failed subservice. If the 
error is unrecoverable and there are no possible redundant service providers 
available, then the service director aborts the entire service execution, and a 
failure response is returned. Service execution in case of individual service Si 
(where i is 1 to n) might include parallelism, though overall high-level service 
execution flow is considered sequential [36]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Service Execution Flow 
 
To ensure that fault tolerance mechanisms are introduced into the service 
architecture in an appropriate way, we should support a systematic analysis of 
possible failure modes of the service. We propose to use Failure Modes and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA) technique to achieve this goal. 
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FMEA [76, 77, 78, 84] is an inductive analysis method that provides 
information about possible failure modes of the system and its components. It 
supports a systematic description of the error detection and recovery procedures. 
FMEA is used to investigate the causes of faults, their effects on the entire 
architecture and the means to cope with them. The results of FMEA are usually 
presented in the tabular form. Typically, an FMEA table contains the 
following fields: component name, failure mode, possible cause, local effect, 
system effect, detection, and remedial action. 
FMEA can be performed at different levels, e.g., system level (focusing on 
global functions) or component level (inspecting functions of the individual 
component). The content of an FMEA table may vary. For example, it may take into 
account the probability of failure occurrence, severity, risk level, etc. 
Figure 5.3 depicts the main fields of an FMEA table and their description. 
 
 
Component Component name 
Failure mode Potential failure modes 
Possible cause Reason associated with supposed failure mode 
Local effects Changes in the performance of a component 
System effects Changes in the performance of a system 
Detection Methods for failure mode detection 
Remedial action Actions to tolerate the failure 
 
Figure 5.3: Generic Form of FMEA Table 
 
Let us exemplify our approach to applying FMEA to systematically analyze 
failure modes in the context of SOA. Let S1 be a subservice in the composite 
service S. Moreover, we assume that the failure modes of S1 can be either a 
transient silent failure (no response) or detectable failure (failure response). In 
the case of the transient silent failure, the failures can be detected by timeout. 
The other failures are detected by receiving the failed response from the service. 
To mitigate the failure of S1, we can use the triple modular redundancy 
pattern. However, we should check that there are two other service components 
available that provide services identical to S1. Figure 5.4 illustrates an analysis 
of the transient silent failure. 
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Component S1 
Failure mode Transient silent failure 
Detection Timeout 
The use of redundancy Available 
Available redundancy S11, S12 
Redundancy pattern Triple modular redundancy arrangement. 
Effect of redundancy Result is produced upon timeout 
Recovery Masking failure by use of triple modular 
 
redundancy arrangement. In case of 
simultaneous failure of S1, S11 and S12 
repeat execution 
 
Figure 5.4: Example of Failure Analysis using FMEA 
 
 
In our approach to architecting fault tolerant services, we have focused on 
analyzing input/output behavior of the services and demonstrated how to 
augment service architecture with various redundancy arrangements. In such an 
approach, the decision about embedding fault tolerance is done at the design 
time. However, often, during system development, our knowledge about system 
behavior is incomplete. By integrating capabilities to monitor system behavior at 
run-time and introducing the possibility to dynamically adapt system 
architecture, we can achieve a more flexible and efficient implementation of 
fault tolerance. Next, we discuss an architectural pattern that we proposed to 
develop adaptive fault tolerant systems. 
 
5.2 Adaptive Fault-Tolerant Systems 
 
Modern distributed systems should have a high degree of reliability, while 
efficiently utilizing the available resources. This is achieved by endowing the 
systems with the capabilities to dynamically adapt to changing external and 
internal conditions at run time. To ensure that the system architecture has a high 
degree of plasticity and can dynamically re-configure, we have to integrate into 
the system design the capabilities to monitor its behavior and environment at 
run-time, recognize symptoms of upcoming failure and proactively reconfigure 
to preclude failure occurrence of mitigating the failure impact. 
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The idea of proactive fault tolerance [82] comes from different domains 
such as autonomous computing, adaptive memory management and classic 
research on reliability engineering. Proactive fault tolerance encompasses 
three main steps: failure prediction, proactive reconfiguration, and recovery. 
Failure prediction aims at spotting precarious situations, i.e.,  the states of the 
systems that will probably evolve into a failure. Failure prediction produces an 
estimate of how likely the current situation will result in a failure. 
Proactive reconfiguration relies on the outcome of failure prediction. 
Based on the results of failure prediction, the system should make a decision 
about implementing the countermeasures that should be executed to rectify the 
problem. Usually, such decisions utilize some objective function that takes 
into account the cost of the actions (in terms of time, computational resources, 
memory and so on),  the confidence in the prediction,  and the effectiveness 
and complexity of the actions. As a result, it allows the system to determine the 
optimal trade-off. The generic problems associated with implementing the 
planned actions include the online reconfiguration of globally distributed 
systems, data synchronization of distributed data centers, and much more. 
Recovery enables graceful degradation of services in case the resources 
are insufficient for precluding the failures. For example, if the proactive 
reconfiguration progresses more slowly than expected, then the system should 
compensate for the insufficient resources. Another example would be 
unexpected multiple failures of several components due to sudden adverse 
change in the environment. 
To enable a systematic development of adaptive fault tolerant systems, we 
propose the pattern depicted in Figure 5.5 that ensures architectural plasticity 
and supports dynamic reconfiguration. The patterns allow us to define the 
system structure in a layered manner [83]. Each layer is responsible for a certain 
aspect of the system behavior. 
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Figure 5.5: Architecture of an Adaptive Fault-Tolerant System 
 
The physical layer represents the environment whose state should be 
monitored. It might be a complex control system that uses logical sensors to 
monitor the health of its components. Another example might be a sensor 
network that monitors the desired parameters of the system environment using 
physical sensors. 
The fault tolerance layer performs the data aggregation and evaluation of 
the quality of monitoring. This information is supplied to the adaptation layer 
that is responsible for defining the proactive adaptation policy. 
The aim of the application and fault tolerance layer is to continuously 
supply the application with the monitoring data of an acceptable quality. The 
design of the application is defined by its purpose – it varies from the 
complex control functions to collecting data intelligence. 
Each (logical or physical) sensor produces data about the monitored 
parameter that includes the measurement and timestamp, i.e., the reference to the 
time when the measurement is taken.  By supplying each measurement with the 
time stamp, we can detect “stuck at value” type of the sensor failure. By 
introducing a feasibility check, i.e., checking that the value falls within a certain 
physically reasonable range, we can detect the “incorrect value” type of the 
sensor failures. 
The fault tolerance manager periodically reads the sensor data, filters out 
faulty data and computes the average value over the valid data set. Moreover, it 
defines 
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the quality level of the produced data. Essentially, it checks that the 
computations of the estimate of a certain parameter are performed over the 
sufficiently large set of data. There are certain thresholds, i.e., the data sizes that 
allow the fault tolerance manager to estimate the quality level. 
The adaptation manager and deployment manager constitute the 
adaptation layer. Their task is to determine whether the decline in quality 
of data are temporal or permanent. In the first case, no reconfiguration 
actions should be performed. In the second case, the reconfiguration actions 
should be initiated. Moreover, their scale is determined by the quality level of 
the produced data set. 
The dynamic behavior of the system can be structured using the notions 
of modes introduced in Chapter 4. The generic representation of the mode 
transition logic is given in Figure 5.6. 
 
 
Procedure ModeTransition 
Variables 
last_mode: {Normal, Adapt, Adapt_Compl, Adapt_activ} 
next_target: {Normal, Adapt, Adapt_Compl, Adapt_activ}  
prev_target: {Normal, Adapt, Adapt_Compl, Adapt_activ} 
            level: int 
 
Begin 
if adaptation completed 
then  initiate  a  forward  transition  to  next_target  according  to 
the predefined scenario; 
 
if level dropped 
then initiate a backward transition to next_target adaptation mode 
The choice of target mode depends on severity of level decrease; 
 
if the conditions for entering the target mode are satisfied 
then complete a transition to next_target mode and become stable ; 
 
if neither the conditions for entering 
the next global mode are satisfied nor the level dropped 
then maintain the current mode 
End 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Transitions between Adaptation Modes 
59 
 
 
The main principle that underlies the mode transition is as follows: the 
mode is stable and unchanged until a fluctuation in the quality level is registered. 
The algorithm describes next_target and prev_target modes in such a way that if 
adaptation procedure is completed, then the current mode switches to 
next_target. Similarly, if the quality level has dropped, then the current mode 
switches to prev_target, i.e., performs a backward transition. In the case of 
the quality level deterioration, the adaptation manager starts the remedial 
actions. When the system achieves an appropriate level of quality, then 
last_mode is reached, and the system becomes stable. 
The proposed approach allows the designers to derive a clean architectural 
structure and achieve a separation of concerns. The information flow in the 
proposed layered architecture enables adaptation and guarantees a continuous 
delivery of service with an acceptable quality level. To preclude disruption in the 
provision of the services, an adaptive fault tolerant system structured according 
to the proposed architectural pattern performs a preventive reconfiguration. 
In Chapters 2-5, we have presented a general overview of the methods 
and techniques that we used for the development and verification of fault-
tolerant systems and described our contribution to creating a fault-tolerance 
explicit development approach. Next, we give an overview of the original 
publications in which the presented research has been reported. 
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6 Summary of the Original Publications 
 
The chapter presents a brief summary of the publications included in the second 
part of this thesis. 
 
Paper I: Implementation of SPIN Model Checker for Formal Verification 
of Distance Vector Routing Protocol 
 
This paper presents the approach to modeling and verification of Distance Vector 
Routing (DVR) Protocol in the SPIN model checker. We demonstrate how to 
model the protocol and verify its correctness. The paper discusses the general 
methodology for implementing the distributed protocols relying on distance 
routing calculation. The DVR protocol is specified in PROMELA. The 
verification of correctness of DVR relies on the use of the SPIN model checker. 
The evaluation results suggest that the performance of the implemented protocol 
can be enhanced by reducing storage space requirements. Moreover, the 
reliability of the protocol can be improved by utilizing timing redundancy in 
case of failure of calculations, i.e., repeating the calculations in case of a 
transient error. Moreover, to improve protocol security, integration of 
mechanisms for message encryption and authentication can be implemented. 
The main goal of this paper has been to study the principles of modeling 
and to verify complex distributed systems in SPIN. This paper has been 
specifically focusing on modeling the communication aspect of distributed 
systems. 
 
Paper II: Designing a Fault-Tolerant Satellite System in SystemC 
 
The paper presents an approach to designing fault-tolerant satellite systems in 
SystemC. Our goal was to study the principles of implementing mode-rich 
systems in SystemC. The paper gives a detailed description and implementation 
of an Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS). AOCS controls the attitude 
and orbit of a satellite.  The system consists of a number of components with 
different functionality. Each component is represented by a corresponding 
module in SystemC. A dedicated component – Mode Manager which is 
responsible for monitoring the states of system components and coordinating 
mode transitions. 
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AOCS should implement a certain scenario defined in terms of mode 
transitions. The main goal is to reach and stabilize in the most advanced mode. 
In such a mode, the satellite can perform the scientific experiments and fulfill 
the goal of the mission. However, errors might trigger transitions to the more 
degraded mode, i.e., cause backward mode transitions. 
In our SystemC implementation, we demonstrate how to coordinate both 
forward and backward mode transitions as well as perform system 
reconfiguration. We propose the patterns for defining components of mode-rich 
systems, specifying mode managers and unit managers, which are responsible 
for unit reconfiguration. We show how to define the overall architecture of a 
distributed system and the communication between the components. Our 
SystemC implementation is used not only to describe the design of the system 
but also as an input for verification. 
 
Paper III: Modelling a Fault-Tolerant Distributed Satellite System 
 
In this paper, we continue a study of mode-rich fault tolerant systems. In paper 
II, we considered the case in which control over the mode changes is performed 
by a centralized mode managing component. 
In paper III, we consider the case of a distributed mode management. 
Ensuring mode consistency in the presence of distributed mode management is 
challenging. We should not only ensure that the components are put in the 
appropriate states, but also guarantee that mode managers agree and synchronize 
before each mode transition. We define and verify the handshake protocol that 
is implemented for synchronization of mode managers. 
The system is implemented in SystemC, which is again used to not only 
describe the  design but  also to  formally verify  the system.    The approach 
presented in this paper extends our earlier work on modeling the centralized 
mode rich systems. The main novelty of this paper is in the treatment of the 
distributed mode management problem and proposal of the handshake protocol 
that ensures synchronization of distributed mode managers. 
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Paper IV: A Case Study in Modelling a Fault-Tolerant Satellite System 
through Implementation of Dynamic Reconfiguration via Handshake 
 
To complete long-term missions, the satellite systems should be able to cope 
with unforeseen adverse conditions, such as improbable simultaneous failures 
of components in both the main and standby systems. In this paper, we study 
such a problem and investigate the principles of achieving fault tolerance via 
dynamic reconfiguration. 
The paper presents a case study in modeling and implementation of a 
generic subsystem of satellites Control and Data Management Unit 
(CDMU). The architecture of CDMU consists of processor modules, 
reconfiguration modules, and telemetry modules. If any of the components in 
both the main and spare CDMU fails, then the system should establish a new 
communication infrastructure over the healthy components to continue 
functioning. Such a dynamic reconfiguration can be achieved by introducing 
a sophisticated handshake protocol between two processor modules as well as 
the hierarchical Master – Slave coordination. 
Since the protocol is complex, we have formally specified it in 
PROMELA and used SPIN model checking to verify it.   Since the protocol 
introduced over the newly established communication infrastructure is complex 
and has a large number of different execution paths, verification of correctness 
by testing would be rather unfeasible. Formal verification by model checking 
provided us with great support for verification of such a complex fault tolerant 
system. 
 
Paper V: Towards Systematic Design of Adaptive Fault Tolerant Systems 
 
The complexity of modern large-scale systems requires solutions that ensure that 
systems autonomously adapt to the operating environment and internal 
conditions. In this paper, we propose a general pattern for architecting and 
developing the adaptive fault tolerant systems.  The proposed pattern supports a 
layered design approach that enables separation of concerns and facilitates the 
structured design of fault tolerance mechanisms. In our representation of the 
architectural pattern, we define the interfaces between the components at 
different levels of abstraction to ensure correct propagation of fault tolerance 
related data. 
The high-level coordination of the fault tolerance mechanisms is 
implemented by an adaptation manager – a component that is responsible for 
implementing predictive fault tolerance. To specify the adaptation manager, we 
propose an algorithm that allows the adaptation manager to monitor the state of 
the system at the run time and implement proactive adaptation. Such an 
approach ensures that the overall system would continuously deliver the 
services with the acceptable quality. We believe that the proposed approach 
ensures a systematic development of adaptive fault tolerant systems. 
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This work demonstrates how the deployment of the predictive 
adaptation allows us to ensure that the system would be able to deliver its 
services with the acceptable quality despite the occurrence of component 
failures. 
 
Paper VI: A Structured Approach to Architecting Fault Tolerant Services 
 
 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a widely used software engineering 
framework. To enable a rapid service composition, services define their 
properties in a standard and machine readable format. It enables service 
discovery, selection, and binding. Service composition introduces the 
orchestration of the basic services to build applications. However, usually, 
research on service orchestration focuses on defining the language for service 
composition that does not support reasoning about such essential features as 
fault tolerance. Such reasoning can  be supported by dependability analysis and 
architectural modeling. 
We demonstrate how to graphically model the architecture of composite 
services and augment it with various fault tolerance mechanisms. We propose 
static and dynamic solutions for introducing fault tolerance into the service 
composition. The structural solutions rely on the availability of redundant 
service providers that can be requested to provide services in case of failures 
of the main service providers. This mechanism allows the designers to mask 
failures of the individual service providers. The dynamic solutions rely on 
re-execution of failed services to recover from the transient faults of services. 
To facilitate the design of complex fault- tolerant services, we introduce a 
systematic approach to analyzing possible failure modes of services and 
defining fault tolerance measures. Our approach is inductive and relies on 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. It progressively analyses one component 
after another in the service execution flow, explores possible fault tolerance 
alternatives and systematically introduces them into the service architecture. 
We believe that our approach supports structured guided reasoning about 
fault tolerance and enables efficient exploration of the design space. 
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7 Related Work 
 
In this chapter, we give an overview of related approaches to development and 
verification of distributed fault- tolerant systems. Development and verification 
of fault-tolerant distributed systems is an area of active research in these days. 
To start with, we consider fault tolerance in the context of mode-rich systems. 
Then, the related work of mode modeling is described. Finally, we discuss the 
approaches that demonstrate the modeling and verification of fault-tolerant 
distributed systems in general. 
 
7.1 Modes and Fault Tolerance 
 
In the existing literature, various approaches relying on the concept of modes 
have been presented. The fault tolerance is a major requirement of the control 
systems. AGATA (autonomous satellite demonstrator) and formation flying 
satellites [93] are two innovative projects in the area of space [53] that 
validate the FDIR strategy in the mode-rich system. 
A fault-tolerant control scheme for satellites is presented in [30] that deals 
with the actuator faults. The authors have proposed an algorithm for error 
recovery that utilizes a sliding mode control (SMC) method through finite 
reaching a time in case of actuator faults and external disturbances. This 
fault tolerant control system can be used for various actuators (i.e., THR and 
RW). The work presented in [33, 34] have also proposed the SMC approach 
which is used to reconfigure the operation of control systems to confirm 
accuracy and robustness of the designed controller. In all cases, authors 
present the verification of the SMC method through numerical solutions. 
Another approach for fault tolerance in satellite’s system has been 
presented in [37]. This work demonstrates the effectiveness of the fault tolerant 
control with an on-line control allocation method through numerical solutions. 
The on-line control allocation method shows that faults can be recovered 
without reconfiguring the controller. In [38, 39], the authors have presented 
a decentralized system for the accommodation of actuator faults in the case of 
the faulty satellite by utilizing SMC and fuzzy logic. They have validated 
their work by modeling of architecture and presenting the numerical solutions 
confirming the effectiveness of the used approach. 
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In this thesis, we have proposed an approach for fault tolerance in the mode 
rich system. In contrast to [30, 34, 37, 38, 39], our approach is not limited to 
actuators of satellites. It is a generic approach that deals with faults of all units of 
satellites such as sensors, actuators, and payload instrument. However, we do 
not provide the numerical solutions for system validation in contrast to above 
approaches, but we present architectural modeling of the fault tolerance 
mechanism for the development of the mode-rich system. For verification of the 
proposed approach, formal verification has been carried out to examine the 
consistency of a mode logic. The formal verification has been used to verify the 
correctness of both centralized and distributed mode management. 
To ensure synchronization of mode managers controlling mode transitions, 
we model and verify the handshake procedure that is an essential part of the 
implementation of dynamic reconfiguration of satellite systems. The 
reconfiguration process and the handshake procedure enable an efficient 
handling of errors in complex distributed system. Our approach is different from 
on-line control allocation [37] as it provides dynamic reconfiguration 
implementing error handling. 
The researcher's work [29, 35] has presented the formal development of 
the mode-rich AOCS system by refinement in Event B. The authors have 
explained the concept of mode and mode transitions and have also defined 
specifications and refinement patterns for development and verification of 
mode consistency. In particular, the work has focused on the formal 
development of a layered mode-rich system and formalization of the mode 
stability property, which is important for the systems with non-instantaneous 
mode transitions. The authors have verified the consistency of the modes in the 
layered reconfigurable systems [26] by deriving the mode logic [25] using 
refinement in Event-B. This approach has aimed at enabling proof-based 
verification of mode-rich systems modeled in Event- B. Recent development 
[92] represents a much more complex model containing a large set of 
invariants describing in detail the relationships not only between modes and 
phases but also the effect of failures at different stages of communication. The 
researchers [51, 52, 95] have studied mode-rich systems to examine the 
problem of mode confusion and automation surprises. They showed 
retrospective analysis of mode-rich systems to spot the inconsistencies 
between the mental picture of the mode logic and the actual system mode 
logic. The approaches [48, 96] utilized theorem proving in PVS, while most 
of the approaches [51, 52, 95] rely on model-checking. 
Our approach focuses on designing fully automatic systems and ensuring 
their mode consistency. In contrast to [51], our approach emphasizes the 
complex relationships between the mode logic and system fault tolerance. Unlike 
[29, 35, 92], in our approach, we relied on design in SystemC and formal 
verification by model checking in SPIN that is better suited for modeling 
distributed architectures.  Namely, we have designed complex mode-rich 
systems in SystemC and have verified its correctness via model checking. 
 67 
 
 
7.2 Model-Driven Engineering and 
Verification of Fault-Tolerant Systems 
 
Let us now discuss the related work in connection to the chosen development 
frameworks –SystemC, UML, and SPIN Promela. 
SystemC provides data types for hardware modeling.  In [46, 13], the 
authors have illustrated that SystemC is a suitable core language for the 
complex distributed network that builds the system with the highest level of 
abstraction (functional level) to develop and analyze a model. In [45], the 
authors have explained the SystemC-based approach for modeling the 
network-embedded  systems. SystemC verification standard provides an 
application-programming interface for transaction- based verification,   
constrained and weighted randomization, exception handling, and other 
verification tasks [20, 21]. In [91], the researchers use a Concurrent and 
Comparative Simulation (CCS) technique to insert faults in SystemC models 
to verify the system behavior in the presence of faults. 
Model-driven development of complex distributed systems have been 
discussed in [41, 43, 44]. In [42], UML state chart diagram has been used 
to model the complex system such as hybrid dynamic systems. Modeling in 
UML allows us to represent in a compact way the complex interdependencies 
of mode-rich systems. UML profiles have been obtained by using constraints, 
stereotypes and tagged values [85]. Stereotypes describe the new types of 
modified meta-models, constraints define new properties of the proposed model 
and tagged values present qualified properties of stereotypes. There are various 
UML profiles to support the development of dependable systems. UML profile 
for modeling quality of service and fault tolerance characteristics and 
mechanisms [86] focuses on the design of the complex fault tolerant system that 
ensures high quality in the analysis model and supports additional functional 
requirements in the software architecture. Another work [87] has presented fault 
forecasting by using a  specific UML annotation that enhances the system 
reliability and determines the failure rate of the components. The UML profile 
for component-based development of dependable systems [88] renders the 
safety-related requirements in the UML models. The UML profile for 
dependability analysis of real-time embedded systems [89] has included the 
dependability requirements in the model definition. 
Formal verification is an essential part of ensuring the correctness of 
complex fault-tolerant distributed systems. In [54], the authors have 
investigated the use of different techniques for model checking and 
simulations.   In [28], the authors have proposed an abstraction framework 
based on PROMELA that reduces the complexity of the model checking formal 
verification by reducing the number of generated states [53]. In [70], the 
authors have demonstrated how to use a SPIN model checker to verify 
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security properties and propose an approach to translating UML models to 
PROMELA. Another work focuses on proposing the general rules for 
translation of UML and SystemC models into SPIN PROMELA [40, 55]. 
In this thesis, we have used SystemC as a system design language, UML as 
a graphical modeling language, and SPIN PROMELA as our verification 
framework. Our work further extends the approaches presented in [85, 86, 87] 
and demonstrates how to explicitly represent fault tolerance in model-driven 
development. 
Verification of a distributed protocol in SPIN has also been presented in 
[70]. However, in our work, we deal with a different class of protocols. The use 
of SPIN also differentiates our work from the research presented in [53]. 
 
 
 
7.3  Centralized Mode Management in
 Fault-Tolerant systems 
 
In the centralized mode management, a single node obtains information from 
the rest of the system and controls the mode transitions of the entire system. In 
the existing literature, there is a number of approaches that discuss fault 
tolerance in mode-rich systems. The related work on mode-rich systems with the 
centralized mode management is presented in this section. 
In [49], the mode logic operations such as flight phases and on-board 
instruments operations for space and avionics systems have been presented and 
analyzed. The work in [48] presents PVS formal verification to capture the 
process of formalizing by considering formal specifications of avionics 
subsystems. The authors have focused on the mode characterization of the 
real-time environment that tackles the problem of defining requirements for 
mode transitions [50]. The authors [47] have studied the specifications of a 
mode-rich system typical in such domains as space and transportation, the 
notion of the refinement process of these systems, and its realization. These 
ideas have been further applied for architecting fault tolerance techniques [97]. 
According to this approach, a mode-centric specification of the system neither 
defines how the system operates while it is in some specific mode nor how 
mode transitions occur. It rather imposes restrictions on concrete 
implementations. Such an approach complements traditional modeling but does 
not replace it. The authors [50] have described how consistency can be 
automated in terms of static analysis. The method has been illustrated by 
verifying small parts of a system after decomposition of functional 
sp ecifications. This work has been presented using the state chart machine and 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II software. Other 
researchers [4, 52] have presented a scheme that deals with mode confusion 
problems by analyzing the system behavior and uses analysis methods that 
search the models for predictable error forms. Another approach [75] has 
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indicated that several types of faults can be tolerated in degraded modes for 
extended architecture. The authors  have  utilized quantitative capability to 
structure the method. In [63], the authors have presented online failure 
prediction methods that exhibit less recovery time because of preventive 
treatment of faults. However, the approaches to proactive fault tolerance are not 
well integrated into the system development process. 
Unlike ours, the work presented in [48] and [49] does not address formal 
verification. However, we do not use a  refinement process, but we structure 
the mode specifications and requirements using UML. Unlike [97], we have 
taken an integrated view and analyzed how to combine reasoning about the 
system mode logic and its functioning. Another method [4, 50] has studied 
inconsistency of automation due to lack of an error recovery mechanism in the 
mapping of requirement specifications. 
Reliance of UML as a front end of more formal models, allows us to 
alleviate this problem. Another implemented approach [50] has described the 
occurrence of mode transition, but the authors have not relied on formal 
modeling. In contrast to [75], our approach does not work for quantitative 
analysis of fault tolerance. Therefore, we can extend our proposed work with 
quantitative aspects such as error rates, etc. However, the proactive fault 
tolerance presented in [63] is not well integrated into the system development 
process. As a result, we have addressed this problem by proposing an 
architectural approach of an adaptive fault tolerant system. The main mechanism 
of achieving proactive fault tolerance is adaptation [82]. 
 
7.4 Fault Tolerance in Distributed Systems 
 
In this section, we overview various methodologies related to the distributed 
fault tolerant systems. 
Virginia Tech [56, 57] has proposed DSACSS that implements many types 
of distributed control techniques by using Object Oriented Programming in C++. 
DSACSS has been used to test both developments of centralized and distributed 
control components. This scheme delivers non-linear compensation for a failed 
component through mathematical modeling. The dynamically reconfigurable 
multi-agent systems [59] represent distributed systems in which agents of 
distributed nodes collaborate to fulfill the system requirements according to 
the specifications. In this scheme, the authors have proposed a formal 
approach to check the validity of the multi-agent system using the Event-B 
method. The authors [60] have also presented the working of distributed 
environment by incorporating the embedded programming methodology (i.e., 
Giotto and the object-oriented AOCS Framework) with real-time requirements. 
The authors have presented the main steps,  which  are involved in the design 
of an optimal feedback control in the satellite formation flying controller (i.e., 
stabilization and optimization of distributed controller). The authors have 
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provided mathematical solutions and computer-based simulations by using 
Matlab to describe that distributed systems require less bandwidth and less 
control energy as compared to centralized systems. The authors have 
implemented a decentralized control system that deals with the tracking of the 
robots and maintains formation during the transitions [62]. They have 
provided mathematical solutions for implementing the decentralized control 
system, but they have not covered the fault tolerance mechanism. The formal 
development of a distributed system has been presented by researchers along 
with mathematical modeling [58]. This work explains the program that is 
executed to fulfill the requirements of the targeted network infrastructure by 
assuming middleware behavior. The HATS project [81] has provided abstract 
behavioral specification modeling and verification for analysis of highly 
configurable adaptive distributed software systems. This technique has been 
implemented at the system level by using ABS defined tools. 
The simulator in [56, 57] has been used to test or verify the system 
components, but it does not provide architectural modeling of fault tolerance. 
Although the authors i n  [59] have described the formal refinement process 
and sufficient redundancy in case of failures they have not given details for 
ensuring safety through architectural modeling of reconfiguration or fault 
tolerance mechanism. In contrast to [58], we have formally modeled and 
developed the code of fully operational distributed control system. The approach 
used in [60, 61, 62] does not provide a formal implementation of error 
recovery, whereas we have proposed a detailed architectural modeling of fault 
tolerance in distributed systems and also formal verification has been carried out 
to verify the operation of system components. In contrast to [81], our work 
enables design space exploration at the early development stages and 
facilitates explicit representation of mechanisms for proactive fault tolerance. 
In [68], the authors propose fault tolerant service architecture [80] by using 
SOAP for middleware behavior of a  service approach named FT-SOAP. It 
extends the standard WSDL by proposing a new element to describe the 
replicated web services. An active UDDI mechanism [69] enables an extension 
of UDDI’s invocation API to enable fault-tolerant and dynamic service 
invocation, but the authors do not provide formal modeling and verification of 
the fault tolerance mechanism. The authors present composite service 
architectures by providing a  fault tolerance mechanism to develop new 
distributed applications [74]. The work presented in [64] describes the 
reliability and availability analysis of service-oriented architectures in the case 
of possible failures by using BPEL process and formal language SCA-ASM. 
Web services [65] are comparatively new technology that has obtained wide 
acceptance as an important implementation of the service-oriented architecture. 
In contrast to [68, 69, 74], we have FMEA to facilitate a structured analysis 
of failure modes.  
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The integration of FMEA is also discussed in [14, 76, 77]. Other authors 
[67, 79] demonstrate how to use FMEA for analyzing safety. In [27], a set of 
generic patterns has been defined for representing formal specifications in 
Event-B derived from FMEA safety analysis. This work facilitates elicitation of 
requirements and also supports traceability of safety and fault tolerance 
requirements into the formal development process in Event-B. A formal 
approach [67, 71] to introducing fault tolerance to the service architecture by 
incorporating results of FMEA has been proposed in [72, 73]. In [24], the work 
focuses on deriving, formalizing and verifying the correctness of the mode 
transitions in the fault- tolerant control system. The authors have performed 
FMEA of each particular mode transition to systematically design error-free 
mode transition scheme. In recent research [94], an FMEA technique is extended 
with considering all security risks in distributed industrial measurement systems. 
Our work is different from [24, 27] because we focus on using FMEA to 
introduce fault tolerance into the service architecture. 
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8 Conclusion and Future Work 
 
This chapter outlines the main contributions of the thesis, discusses limitations 
of the proposed work and indicates the future research directions. 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
 
Nowadays computer-based systems provide a majority of services critical for 
our society. Therefore, development of the methodologies enabling the design of 
reliable fault tolerant systems constitutes an important research goal. In our 
thesis, we have contributed to achieving this goal by proposing a number of 
approaches facilitating the design of complex fault-tolerant systems. 
In our work, we aimed at creating approaches that can be potentially used 
in industrial practice. Since model-driven development is widely used in 
modern software engineering, in our thesis, we studied the problem of an 
explicit representation of fault tolerance in the model-driven systems 
development. We demonstrated how to represent different aspects of fault 
tolerance in the UML models. 
UML provides us with a convenient graphical notation for representing 
the static architectural aspects of the system as well as its dynamic behavior. In 
our work, we have proposed a number of patterns allowing us to introduce fault 
tolerance into the service architecture, explicitly represent the impact of fault 
tolerance on the execution dynamics as well as define the communication 
between system components during error detection, recovery, and 
reconfiguration. 
UML plays an important role in visualizing system requirements, including 
the requirements introduced by fault tolerance. In our work, we used UML as 
a graphical front-end to representing the formal models and system design. 
In particular, we have used it to visualize the requirements of complex mode-
rich systems – a large class of distributed fault- tolerant systems that we have 
studied in our thesis. 
The notion of modes constitutes an important mechanism for structuring 
the behavior of fault-tolerant systems.  Typically, the fault-tolerant control 
systems have a complex mode logic. The correctness of their behavior, as well 
as overall system reliability, depend on whether the mode transitions are 
performed in consistent way by all system components. In our thesis, we have 
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proposed a number of architectural and behavioral patterns for design and 
verification of mode-rich systems. We have demonstrated how to design mode 
managers – the dedicated components orchestrating mode transitions, structure 
system reconfiguration required to mask errors and specify the requirements 
for the forward and backward mode transitions. 
In our study of mode-rich systems, we have also proposed the solutions for 
designing the systems with the distributed mode management. Ensuring 
consistency of the mode logic in such systems is especially challenging, 
because the decisions about the mode transitions are made by several 
independent mode managers. In our work, we have proposed a handshake 
protocol allowing the mode managers to synchronize the mode transitions. In 
our thesis, we presented SystemC implementation of several mode-rich 
systems and demonstrated how to formally verify various aspects of their 
behavior using SPIN model checker. 
Since an error recovery often requires system reconfiguration, in our thesis 
we have studied the problem of dynamic reconfiguration of control and service- 
oriented fault tolerant systems. To ensure the reliability of the systems that 
perform long-term autonomous missions, we have to ensure that the system 
can cope with unforeseen adverse conditions, such as improbable simultaneous 
failures. In our thesis, we have proposed an approach that allows a system to 
recover from such errors by establishing a new communication infrastructure 
over the healthy components and adopting a specific handshake protocol to 
resume service provisioning. 
In the context of service-oriented fault tolerant systems, we have 
demonstrated how to structure the system to achieve an architectural plasticity 
and efficient propagation of fault tolerance related information between the 
architectural layers. The proposed architectural pattern provides a basis for 
implementing proactive fault tolerance that ensures a maintenance of a certain 
quality level in service provisioning. 
To facilitate the design of fault tolerant services, we have also proposed 
a number of patterns allowing to introduce different redundancy and error 
recovery mechanisms into the service architecture. Moreover, we have 
demonstrated how to systematically study possible failure modes of services and 
explore the feasibility of using different error recovery solutions. 
We believe that the approaches proposed in this thesis can be potentially 
applied in the current software engineering practice to facilitate the disciplined 
and structured development of complex fault-tolerant systems. 
Though we believe that our work has made a contribution to the area of 
model-driven development and verification of fault-tolerant systems, it is not 
free of several limitations. Firstly, in our work, we have used the generic 
development frameworks and tools. The absence of a specialized support 
automating the proposed approach constitutes a limitation of our research. 
Secondly, in our work, we have focused on modeling logical (qualitative) 
aspects of fault tolerance. However, the efficiency of introduced fault tolerance 
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measures is usually evaluated by computing system reliability, i.e., using 
quantitative models.  Our work does not provide support for quantitative 
modeling, which constitutes another limitation of the proposed approach. 
 
8.2 Future Work 
 
The limitations mentioned above lead to possible directions for future work. In 
the future, it would be interesting to create an integrated engineering 
environment that automates augmenting the system architecture with various 
mechanisms for fault tolerance. Moreover, it would also be useful to automate 
the translation of graphical models to the models used to represent the system 
design and perform formal verification. 
Another interesting future research direction is to define the notion of 
architectural refinement to facilitate validation of system properties at different 
architectural layers. 
Finally, it would also be interesting to define a mapping between the 
system models augmented with the proposed patterns for representing fault 
tolerance and probabilistic models. Such a mapping would enable a quantitative 
assessment of reliability and facilitate exploration of the system design space. 
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Abstract—Distributed systems and computing requires routing 
protocols to meet a wide variety of requirements of a large number 
of users in heterogeneous networks. DVR is one of many other 
employed protocols for establishing communication using routes 
with minimum cost to different destinations from a given source. 
Research work presented in this paper focuses on implementation 
of DVR in SPIN and provides formal verification of correctness of 
DVR behaviour covering all required aspects. Simulation results 
clearly show a proof of the established paths from each router to 
different destinations in a network consisting of six routers and a 
number of links. 

Keywords: Formal Verification, DVR Protocol, SPIN Model 
Checker, Distance Vector Routing, Implementation in PROMELA 

I. INTRODUCTION 
A computer network consists of a number of routers which 
have the capability to communicate with each other. Routing 
Information Protocol (RIP) is widely used for routing packets 
from a source to its destination in computer networks. RIP 
requires information about distance and direction from source 
to destination. Each router, in the Distance Vector Routing 
(DVR) methodology, keeps updated record of distances and 
hops of its neighbours. Various techniques are used to gather 
useful routing table information for each router. In one 
approach, special packets are sent by each router and are 
received back after having time-stamped by the receivers. 
Chromosomes have been employed in the Genetic Algorithm 
[1] to select the most optimal path by utilizing its fitness 
function, selection of next generation and crossover operation 
for updating the routing tables in an efficient manner. Thus, all 
routers keep refreshing their routing tables and maintain latest 
information about other neighbouring routers in order to 
provide optimized performance in the available network [1-3]. 

Mahlknecht, Madni and Roetzer [4] has presented an 
efficient protocol that uses hop count and cost information in 
its Energy Aware Distance Vector (EADV) routing scheme 
and makes use of shot-multi-hop routing for consuming lesser 
energy in the wireless sensor networks. EADV can do well for 
long lasting battery-powered sensor nodes while using the 
lowest cost path towards the selected sink node. An algorithm 
is considered the most effective if it contains the correct and 
latest information about its neighbours in its DVR table.  An 
effort has been made by Liwen He by devising a computational 
method to protect a network from internal attacks (such as mis- 
configuration and compromise) through the use of verifying 
routing messages in the DVR protocols [5]. Formal verification 
of standards for DVR protocols has also been comprehensively 
presented by Bhargavan, Gunter and Obradovic [6] using three 
case studies. The researchers have used HOL (an interactive 
theorem prover and SPIN (model checker) to verify and prove 
salient properties of DVR protocols. HOL and SPIN have been 
employed by these researchers for providing a proof of 
convergence for the RIP [7]. 

The remaining paper is organized as follows. DVR protocol 
is presented in Section II and Section III describes the use of 
SPIN tool and PROMELA language for formal verification. 
System design and implementation has been discussed in 
Section IV covering network topology, implementation details 
and operation of DVR protocol. Formal verification of 
simulation results has been illustrated in Section V and finally 
conclusions and future work is given in Section VII. 

II. DISTANCE VECTOR ROUTING PROTOCOL 

A. General Methodology 
A routing table is required to be maintained for each router 
in the network for the purpose of working of a DVR scheme. 
Routing table information is used to determine the best path 
(i.e. having minimum cost in terms of distance or hops) from a 
source to destination. Links are needed to connect concerned 
routers for establishing communication. An optimal DVR 
protocol has to exchange frequent messages in order to update 
the routing table of each router. So, exchanging information 
among neighbours is carried out on regular intervals. 

Routing table of every router keeps necessary information 
(i.e. id of neighbouring routers, most suitable outgoing link to 
be used for the destination, distance, hops (number of routers 
on the route), time delay, number of queued messages on the 
link). The process of making forwarding decision for selecting 
the best optimal path from source to destination is based on a 
combination of these parameters. The objective of routers is to 
send packets to hosts connected to the networks for 
heterogeneous requirements of a large number of users. In this 
way, efficient DVR schemes ultimately establish good global 
paths by connecting hosts in a distributed environment 
covering very long distances. Those routers are taken as 
neighbours which have links/interfaces to a common network. 

B. Routing Information Protocol 
RIP [8,9] is a widely used protocol for finding the optimal 
path to the destination in a network. Each router has a routing 
table and all routers periodically updated their routing tables by 
using advertising approach. All routes of a router are advertised 
through the mechanism of broadcasting RIP packets to all the 
neighbouring routers in the network. Every router checks the 
advertised information of neighbouring nodes and changes 
information only in its routing table if the new route to the 
same destination further improves the existing route length. In 
other words, the updated routing table information now takes to 
the best available route so far for the relevant destination. 

The number of hops in the RIP are kept low (up to 15) for 
the route length for faster convergence [6,7]. RIP methodology, 
however, prevents formation of loops between pairs of routers 
in order to minimize convergence time as well as permitted 
route length. Timer expiry record is also maintained in every 
routing table and is normally set to 180 seconds whenever a 
routing table is updated. As routers advertise after every 30 
seconds, the destination is considered unreachable if a router is 
not refreshed for 180 seconds. It further waits for another 120 
seconds. If the router remains un-refreshed during this time as 
well, then its route is removed from the routing tables of the 
concerned routers. This requirement is incorporated to cater for 
broken links, faulty networks and congestions. 

III. USE OF SPIN AND PROMELA 

A. Formal Verification 
A number of new systems and methodologies are being 
devised by the researchers in different areas of science, 
technology and engineering as a result of meaningful R&D 
work being undertaken by academic and research institutes all 
over the world. Every proposed system requires a proof of its 
correctness by gathering results using simulation and testing 
techniques. Formal verification terminology [10,11] is in fact a 
process of actual demonstration of the system in order to check 
its correctness under the defined boundaries and valid 
conditions of used parameters/variables. 

Precision and accuracy of the system is verified by running 
the programming modules by employing required algorithms in 
the model checking approach. Errors occurred (if any) are 
properly identified under varying conditions so that such errors 
can be easily located by the users and are later on 
repaired/tackled by adjusting specifications of the model. 
Afterwards, the model description is fine tuned to achieve 
required model specifications for verification of correct results 
of the system. 

B. SPIN Tool and PROMELA High Level Language 

SPIN [12,13] is a open-source software tool and is widely 
used for the formal verification of software systems working in 
the distributed environment. Inspiring applications of SPIN 
include the verification of the control algorithms for various 
applications, logic verification of the call processing software 
for a commercial data communication, critical algorithms for 
space missions, operating systems, switching systems, 
distributed & parallel systems and formal verification of 
various routing protocols. This tool also supports interactive, 
random and guided simulations for a wide variety of 
applications. Spin can be used in four main modes (i.e. as a 
simulator, as an exhaustive verifier, as a proof approximation 
system and as a driver for swarm verification). 

Spin provides efficient software verification and supports 
the PROMELA (PROcess MEta LAnguage) high level 
language to specify systems descriptions [14]. It is a SPIN’s 
input language which is used to build detailed PROMELA 
models for complete verification of system designs. It provides 
a way for making abstractions of distributed systems. Different 
assumptions are used in SPIN to  verify each model. After 
checking correctness of a model with SPIN, it can then be used 
to build and verify subsequent models of the system so that the 
fully developed system  produces the  required behavior. 
PROMELA programs consist of processes, message channels, 
and variables. 

IV. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 

A. Network Topology 
The network topology shown in Figure 1 has been used for 
implementation of DVR protocol. There are six routers (A, 
B, C, D, E & F) and seven links (edges). Each link 
connects two routers. Weight values range from 2 to 23 for 
different links and these values indicate distances between 
routers. Integer values have been used and distance units 
can be chosen  during actual implementation of the 
network. For example, the distance between routers A and 
C via B is 6 using 2 hops and via D, E and F is 33 using 4 
hops. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Network Topology 

B. System Implementation 
SPIN’s PROMELA language has been used to construct 
complete model of DVR protocol on a Pentium machine. 
Packets from the source to destination travel using links 
provided by routers by making use of their routing tables for 
the  given  distributed  environment  of  the  network.  After 
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Figure 2: System Flowchart 

initialization of the variables, distance is calculated from each 
router at time period T=0, T=1, T=2, T=3, T=4 and T=5. At 
each stage it checks whether the measured distance forms a 
new shortest path or not. Whenever the shortest path is found 
from the source to destination, routing table entry for the 
concerned router is automatically updated to make good 
forwarding decision in order to ensure optimal path, having 
minimum distance, for faster communication. Thus, each router 
updates its routing  table after each  time period. The main 
objective of the DVR protocol is to provide the current best 
route (path) from source to destination for each 
communication. Flowchart of the modeled system in 
SPIN/PROMELA is shown in Figure 2. 


For the given network, the PROMELA program has six 
processes (one for each time period) to find distance based 
upon the time period conditions (0 to 5). The found distance 
from a particular source to destination for each time period is 
compared with all the available alternate routes. Router’s table 
is only updated if the new distance is minimum between the 
selected source and destination. The new shortest path is 
recorded after each calculation. If the determined route does 
not find minimum distance during the given time period, then it 
ignores its path without updating any entry in the routing table. 
Routers improve their routes whenever a router advertises its 
routing table to its neighbours. So, new routes are determined 
purely based on their length measured in distance. For timely 
convergence, the number of hops involved in the length  is 
limited to 15 as already highlighted by Bhargavan et. al. [7]. 

C. Operation of DVR Protocol 
DVR protocol works independently for every destination 
and it is assumed that there is no topology change for 
protocol’s convergence during every time period. The router 
broadcasts after every 30 seconds and the destination is taken 
as inaccessible if it is not refreshed for 180 seconds. The route 
is removed from the tables of concerned routers if the 
particular router fails to refresh itself for 300 seconds. 
 Via  Via  Via 
 From A A B C D E F From B A B C D E F From C A B C D E F 


T=0 
A       A 3      A      
B  3     B       B  3    
C       C   3    C      
D     23    D       D      
E       E     5  E      
F       F       F      3 


T=1 
A       A       A  6    
B       B       B      
C  6     C       C      
D       D 26     10   D      
E  8  28   E       E  8    5 
F       F   6  7  F      


T=2 
A       A     33  A      
B    33   B       B      10 
C       C     10  C      
D   13      D       D  13     10 
E       E 31  8    E      
F  9  30   F       F  10    


T=3 
A       A       A  36     13 
B       B       B      
C   13   33   C       C      
D       D   13    D      
E  11     E       E  34    
F       F 33      F      


T=4 
A       A   36    A      
B    36   B       B      36 
C       C 36      C      
D   16      D       D      36 
E       E       E      
F    39   F       F  36    


T=5 
A       A       A      
B       B       B      
C       C       C      
D       D       D      
E       E       E      
F       F       F      

Table1: Calculated Distance from Routers A, B and C for Different Destinations at Time Periods T=0 to T=5 


Although the PROMELA’s built model can be used for any 
number of routers but its operation is restricted only to the 
topology given in Figure 1. For the purpose of explanation of 
the model, it is assumed that every router operates without any 
problem and updates its routing table during regular intervals 
of time. 

At Time=0, it calculates distances to neighbouring routers 
from each router having maximum one hop. Thus, distance 
from A to B is 3 & A to D is 23from router A; from router B it 
is 3, 3 & 5 for routers A, C & E respectively; and distances are 
5, 5 & 2 for routers B, D & F respectively from router E. These 
distances can be observed in Tables 1 and 2. Now two hops 
from the current router are taken for T=1. So, distance from A 
to C via B is 6; A to E via D 28; and A to E via B is 8 as given 
in Table 1. 

When T is taken as T=2, three hop lengths are counted for 
determining the distance from each router. From router D, 
measured distances are 13 via E to A, 29 via A to C, 10 via E 
to C and 31 via A to E. Same can be seen in Table 2. Hop 
length is four when T=3, distance covered to B via E, D via C 
and D via E is 33, 16 and 33 respectively from router F as 
shown in Table 2. Similarly, routes have distances of 36 (B via 
F), 36 (D via F) and 36 (F via B) from router C (for T=4) as 
given in Table 1. Both Tables 1 and 2 clearly indicate that no 
routes are available from any router when T=5 (six hops) for 
network configuration of Figure 1. 
 Via  Via  Via 
 From D A B C D E F From E A B C D E F From F A B C D E F 


T=0 
A  23       A       A      
B       B  5     B      
C       C       C   3   
D       D    5   D      
E     5  E       E     2 
F       F      2 F      


T=1 
A       A  8  28   A      
B 26     10   B       B   6  7 
C       C  8    5 C      
D       D       D     7 
E       E       E      
F     7  F       F      


T=2 
A      13   A       A   9  10 
B       B    31  8 B      
C 29     10   C       C     10 
D       D  31     D      
E 31      E       E   11   
F       F  11     F      


T=3 
A       A      11 A      
B     13  B       B     33 
C       C    34   C      
D       D       D    16   33 
E       E       E      
F 32     16   F       F      


T=4 
A      16   A       A   39   
B       B       B      
C 36      C       C     36 
D       D      34 D      
E 34      E       E   37   
F       F    37   F      


T=5 
A       A       A      
B       B       B      
C       C       C      
D       D       D      
E       E       E      
F       F       F      

Table 2: Calculated Distance from Routers D, E and F for Different Destinations at Time Periods T=0 to T=5 


V. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF SIMULATION RESULTS 
The implemented system in PROMELA programming 
language has been tested exhaustively and obtained simulation 
results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Spin model checker has 
been used to verify all the results. The developed model 
ensures that all the routers correctly maintain and update their 
tables as and when new routes are searched and visited. The 
broadcast mechanism works well at different time periods and 
the system provides correct and optimized results from each 
router to various destinations depending upon network 
topology, layout of routers and links connecting different 
routers in the network. 

The SPIN’s verification model successfully checks all the 
available  routes  via  different  routers  and  permits  only  the 
shortest path from the available options. It is evident from the 
following decisions (only four out of many are presented here): 

1) At T =1, the route length from E to C via B is 8 where 
as it is 5 via F. So, E router adopts F router’s path to 
reach C. 
2) The distance between routers B & E via A and via C is 
31 and 8 respectively. SPIN’s checker confirms that 
minimum distance is covered for reaching to C from E 
when T=2. 
3) When T=3, the path cost determined by the model is 
13 from C to A via F, E & B but another path for 
connecting the same two router via B, E & D is 36, 
each  path  makes  use  of  four  hops.  Of  course,  the 
longer path is simply ignored. 
4) Similarly, route length from F to D through C, B & A 
is 32 and it is 16 via routers C, B & E. A saving of 16 
is noted while using the most economical path. 

A careful analysis of the simulation results shown in Tables 
1 & 2 clearly indicates that the modeled system in PROMELA 
operates correctly and provides the best possible routes 
involving minimum distances using DVR protocol on the given 
network environment. The system works efficiently under all 
conditions and the SPIN model checker has guarantees 
correctness of all results. It means that all the routing tables are 
timely updated while messages are being sent to various 
destinations from a particular source. Now, this can be 
extended to bigger networks in the distributed environment for 
efficient and correct functioning using SPIN tool. 

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Many researchers have implemented DVR protocols for 
various applications. In this  research work, PROMELA 
language has been used to implement DVR protocol on a six 
router model. Formal verification of DVR protocol properties 
has been shown through the use of SPIN checker model. The 
simulation results amply demonstrate correctness  and 
reliability of DVR protocol under varying conditions. 
Performance of the implemented has been extremely well and 
it can further be improved to make it more efficient in terms of 
reducing storage space requirements, incorporating security 
mechanism for safer communication, minimizing congestion at 
peak loads and making it fault-tolerant for enhancing its 
reliability and flexibility. 
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Abstract—Designing fault-tolerant satellite systems is a
challenging engineering task. Often behavior of satellite 
systems is structured using notion of modes. Ensuring 
correctness of mode transitions is vital for guaranteeing safe 
and fault-tolerant functioning of a satellite. In this paper, we
propose an approach to designing fault-tolerant satellite 
systems in SystemC. We demonstrate how to develop Attitude 
and Orbit Control System in SystemC and verify its 
correctness via model checking.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Designing a system controlling a spacecraft is a
challenging engineering task. The system should satisfy a
large number of diverse functional and non-functional
requirements. In particular, the designers should aim at
building a fault-tolerant system, i.e., the system that should
cope with faults of various system components. Often
behavior of satellite systems is structured using the notion
of modes – mutually exclusive sets of system behavior.
Fault-tolerance is achieved by putting the system to some
downgraded mode when an error occurs. In this paper, we
consider an Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) – a
generic subsystem of a spacecraft [1]. We demonstrate how
to achieve fault-tolerance via backward mode transitions.
AOCS is a complex control system consisting of several
components. To ensure correctness of mode transition, we
need to guarantee that all components reach a certain state.
Moreover, when a component fails we need to guarantee
that all other components make an appropriate backward
transition.
In this paper, we propose an approach for designing
more-rich system in SystemC programming language. We
propose an algorithm defining mode-transition scheme of
AOCS. To confirm correctness of our algorithm, we have
converted it into Promela [6,7] and the results have been
verified using SPIN model checker [7,8].
Section II presents architecture of the system. Unit
branch state and state transitions have been explained in
Section III and the controller phases & phase transitions of
the AOCS are described in Section IV. Mode transitions and
fault-tolerance procedures for correct functioning of the
satellite under faulty conditions are illustrated in Sections V
and VI respectively. Section VII explains verification of the
implemented system and the paper is summarized in Section
VIII besides giving direction for the future work.
 
 
II. ARCHITECTURE
The main purpose of AOCS is to control attitude and
orbit [1] of a satellite. AOCS consists of a number of
components -- AOCS Manager, FDIR (Failure Detection,
Isolation and Recovery) Manager, Mode Manager and Unit
Manager. The AOCS manager plays key role while dealing
with the processing of sensor data, managing actuator
movements relating to the units of Reaction Wheel (RW)
and Thruster (THR) and doing computation for various
controls. The responsibility of FDIR is to timely deal with
such tasks as failure detection, isolation and recovery. Mode
transitions are handled by the Mode Manager whereas the
Unit Manager deals with unit reconfigurations and unit level
state transitions [2,3]. Mode and Unit Manager
Architectures are further elaborated in the following
paragraphs.
 
A. Mode Manager
The responsibilities of mode include checking of mode
transition preconditions, execution of mode transitions,
management of controller phases and partially management
of related units. There are six different types of controlled
modes (i.e. Off, Standby, Safe, Nominal, Preparation and
Science) in the mode manager and each mode has its own
well-defined unique function. A brief summary of these
modes is given below:
1) Off Mode: The satellite is immediately switched in
the off mode  as soon as the AOCS software booting is
completed from the central data management unit.
2) Standby Mode: It is important to check and ensure
successful separation of the spacecraft from the launcher
and this work is continuously monitored and completed by
the software process during the standby mode.
3) Safe Mode: Satellite enters this mode when the
separation from the launcher is done. As soon as the system
is in the safe mode, the relevant portions of Earth Sensor
(ES), RW (Reaction Wheel) and Sun Sensor (SS) are
switched to on state, the coarse pointing controller goes in
the running phase and fine pointing controller is put in the
idle phase. Initially the satellite acquires a stable attitude
and then it achieves the coarse pointing.
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4) Nominal Mode: When a mode transitions to nominal,
the coarse pointing controller becomes idle and the fine
pointing controller is set to the running phase. The selected
branches of RW, Star Tracker (STR) and THR are switched
to on state. In this mode, the satellite utilizes fine pointing
control so that the Payload Instrument (PLI) in the AOCS is
properly used for measurements.
5) Preparation Mode: The moment the mode is
transitioned to the preparation, the concerned portion of
Global Positioning System (GPS) is set to fine state, the
relevant branch of PLI is switched  to standby state and
needed processes of RW, STR and THR go to on state.
Thus, this mode ensures that the fine pointing control is
reached and PLI gets ready for fulfilling its required tasks.
6) Science Mode: In science mode, the selected branch
of GPS remains in the fine state, the concerned branch of
PLI goes in the science state and the relevant parts of RW,
STR and THR maintain their on state. Therefore, the PLI in
this mode is ready to perform the tasks for which it has been
designed. It stays in this mode till the completion of planned
tasks.
 
B. Unit Manager
The AOCS consists of seven different units and internal
state changes in these units are controlled by the unit
manager. Mode manager controls the components of unit
manager. Seven different controlled units are ES, SS, STR,
GPS, RW, THR and PLI. Their brief description is as
under:
 
1) ES is a device that measures the direction to the
earth in the sensor’s field of view. ES’s internal state is
either on and off.
2) SS is a tool to measure the direction to the sun in the
sensor’s field of view. It is also in the on or off state.
3) STR is an optical device that measures the position of
stars in its field of view and performs pattern recognition on
these stars in order to identify the portion of the sky at
which it is looking. Two possible STR’s operational states
are on and off.
4) GPS is a sophisticated gadget that receives readings
related to the satellite position and makes calculations to
determine satellite’s attitude. Two possible states of GPS
operation are coarse navigation and fine navigation.
5) RW is a rotating wheel which is essentially required
in order to apply the required torque to the satellite. It is
achieved by accelerating or breaking the wheel. RW’s state
can be either on or off.
6) THR is a position actuator that is used to force the
satellite to change its position and its orbit by emitting gas.
It can also be in either on or off state.
7) The PLI is an instrument which provides required
measurements pertaining to the specific mission. It can
operate in standby or science state.
III. UNIT BRANCH STATE AND STATE TRANSITIONS
Every unit is implemented as a pair of identical devices
to maintain the nominal branch and the redundant branch.
For each unit, one and only one branch is selected at a time.
Every selected branch is in on state and its status is locked.
In other words, a branch in the off state is always allocated
an unlocked status.
 
In total, there are six states of unit components (i.e. on, off,
coarse, fine, standby and science). Whenever an unit state
goes from off to on, the powering takes place. Similarly,
when the unit switches from on to off state, un-powering
takes place. Powering and un-Powering are associated with
the states and state transitions of a branch of ES, SS, STR,
RW or THR. Occurrence of such states and state transitions
is shown in Figure 1. For the GPS unit, unit state goes from
off to coarse state and coarse to fine state, then powering
and upgrading is carried out respectively. In case of fine to
off state transition, first downgrading is performed then un-
powering is done. States and State Transitions of a Branch
of GPS are depicted in Figure 2.
 
 
Figure 1: States and State Transitions of a Branch of ES, 
SS, RW, STR or THR [1]
 
In case of PLI unit, when the unit state goes from off to
standby and from standby to science state, then powering
and upgrading is achieved respectively. In case of science to
off state transition, first downgrading occurs and then un-
powering takes place. Figure 3 demonstrates states and their
transitions of a branch of PLI.
 
 
Figure 2:States and State Transitions of a Branch of GPS [1]
 
 
Figure 3: States and State Transitions of a Branch of PLI [1]
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State transitions are very fast to accommodate time
constrains for real-time satellite operations. Hence, any state
transition to powering, un-powering, upgrading or
downgrading takes less than one AOCS cycle. However,
every state transition to off takes minimum three and
maximum four AOCS cycles. Any state transition to on,
coarse, fine, standby or science has a success condition if
the transition gets completed during the first AOCS cycle
when the condition is observed to hold. However, any state
transition to on, coarse, fine, standby or science is
overridden if the associated success condition is not
observed to hold within a predefined number of AOCS
cycles from start of the transition.
 
IV. CONTROLLER PHASES AND PHASE TRANSITIONS
The AOCS has two controllers -- Coarse Pointing
Controller (CPC) and Fine Pointing Controller (FPC). The
main objective of these two controllers is to direct the line
of sight with a specified coarse accuracy and fine accuracy
respectively. It is an essential requirement and must be met
within given time limits. The following rules have to be
observed during the controller phase transitions when a
certain operational mode is reached:
 
1) Both controllers go to idle phase when the mode
transition is set to off or standby state.
2) When the mode transition is switched to safe state,
the CPC enters the running phase and the FPC remains in
the idle phase.
3) When the mode transition shifts to nominal,
preparation or science, the CPC goes in the idle phase and
the FPC moves in the running phase.
 
 
Only one controller can be in non-idle phase at any point of
time. When a controller phase has to switch from idle to
running, first of all it is set to preparing. After predefined
number of AOCS cycles, the controller is set to ready phase.
Finally, the phase of controller is shifted to running as
indicated in Figure 4. It can also be noticed that the
controller can directly move to the idle phase from any of
the other three phases (preparing, ready and running).
 
 
Figure 4: Phases and Phase Transitions of a Controller [1]
 
V. MODE TRANSITIONS
The following rules are imposed on mode transitions in
order to ensure correct satellite function in nominal (fault-
free) and faulty conditions:
1) When a mode transition to off or standby is
completed, it is ensured that every branch in every unit is
put in the off state.
2) On reaching to the safe mode, the selected branches
of ES, RW and SS are set in the on state and all other
branches pertaining to different units go to the off state.
3) In case of a transition to the nominal mode, the
selected branch of GPS is turned in the coarse state, the
concerned branches of RW, STR and THR are set to on
state, and remaining every branch in every unit is put in the
off state.
4) Completion of a mode transition to preparation
ensures that the relevant branch of GPS is in the fine state,
the chosen branch of PLI is in the standby state, the selected
parts of RW, STR and THR are in the on state, and rest
every branch in every unit is in the off state.
5) A mode transition to science requires that the needed
branch of GPS is in the fine state, the selected branch of PLI
is in the science state, the concerned branches of RW, STR
and THR are in the on state, and all other branches
pertaining to different units remain in the off state.
 
 
VI. FAULT TOLERANCE
Fault-tolerance should guarantee that the system
continues to operate in predictable way even in case of
failure of any of its components. Recovery from errors in
fault-tolerant systems can be characterized as either roll
forward or roll back. Forward error recovery aims at
bringing the system to a new error-free state. Backward
error recovery rolls back the system to some previous state
before an error occurrence. In mode-rich systems, the
backward error recovery is achieved via backward mode
transition, i.e., mode downgrading. The mode down-
gradation depends on various errors, which are explained
below:
 
A. Branch State Transition Errors
A branch state transition error means that when some unit
transitions to on state, the mode coarse, fine, standby or
science gets overridden due to timeout condition. Because
operation and state transition delays have to be avoided, we
should time each mode transition. If a step of transition is not
completed within a specified time limit, timeout signal is
generated to get into a safe condition. The important error
checks concerning to the branch state transitions are:
 
1) A branch state transition error on the redundant
branch of ES, RW or SS causes a mode transition to off.
2) A mode transition to safe takes place when there is a
branch state transition error on the redundant branch of
GPS, STR or THR and there is no branch state transition
error on the redundant branches of ES, RW and SS.
3) When a branch state transition error on the redundant
branch of PLI occurs, it results into a mode transition to
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nominal provided that there is no branch state transition
error on the redundant branches of ES, SS, GPS, RW, STR
and THR.
 
B. Phase Transition Errors
A phase transition error or an attitude error may arise
during the computations done by the selected controller. An
attitude error is generated when there is a problem in the
execution of an AOCS algorithm. It means that an error
occurs only when one of the two controllers (i.e. CPC and
FPC) is in the running phase. The key factors relating to the
attitude errors are:
 
1) If the current mode is safe, then a non-ignored
attitude error causes a transition to the off mode.
2) In case the existing mode is nominal and a non-
ignored attitude error occurs, a mode transition to safe takes
place.
3) A mode transition to nominal takes place when the
current mode is preparation and a non-ignored attitude error
is generated.
4) The generation of a non-ignored attitude error moves
the mode transition to preparation with the condition that the
existing mode is science.
 
C. Unit Reconfiguration
Each logical unit consists of two hardware units known
as nominal and redundant. Initially, the nominal unit works
in the active role and provides all the necessary support for
normal operation of the system. The redundant unit serves
as a backup resource. When an error is detected in the
nominal unit, it becomes “reconfigured”. It means that the
nominal unit is switched off and the redundant unit takes
over the operational tasks.
 
The important errors that take place during the unit
reconfiguration are:
 
1) A branch state transition error on the nominal branch
of ES, SS or RW causes a reconfiguration of the unit if there
is no branch state transition error on the redundant branches
of ES, SS and RW.
2) A branch state transition error on the nominal branch
of GPS, STR, THR or PLI causes a reconfiguration of the
unit if there is no branch state transition error on the
redundant branches of ES, SS, GPS, RW, STR and THR.
 
Figure 6 shows detailed flow chart of the implemented
system.
 
VII. VERIFICATION
We have implemented mode-transition algorithm in
SystemC language. The SystemC Verification Standard
provides API for transaction based verification, constrained
and weighted randomization, exception handling, and other
verification tasks [4,5]. SystemC supports the use of special
data types which are often used by the hardware engineers.
It comes with a strong simulation kernel to enable the
designers to write good test benches for easy and speedy
simulation. It is extremely important because the functional
verification at the system level saves a lot of money and
time.
 
The system architecture that is implemented in SystemC
is verified in the SPIN model checker. SPIN [6,7,8] is often
used to verify behavior of distributed and parallel systems.
PROMELA (PROcess MEta LAnguage) is a high level
language which is widely used to specify systems
descriptions and is fully supported by SPIN for the purpose
of verification of software-based applications. SPIN
PROMELA is used to carry out detailed testing and
verification of design and architecture of various systems.
 
The simplified system architecture for AOCS is shown in
Figure 5.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: System Architecture [1]
 
An example of an interfaces between the FDIR Manager,
Mode Manager and Unit Manager shown in Figure 5 are
given below.
When failure occurs in the system, FDIR detects the
error and issues the requests of mode transition, and then
Mode Manager is responsible for mode transitions to the
downgraded mode on the basis of error type. The following
part of the code represents the Interface I scenario for
Science Mode.
if (Mode==F) // Mode F: Science Mode
{ if (ES==off && SS==off && GPS==fine && STR==on &&
RW==on && THR==on && PLI==science && CPC==idle
&& FPC==run)
{/* The associated code describes that the conditions are valid 
for Science Mode. The current mode is Science. */}
else if ((ES!=off || SS!=off || RW!=on) && STR==on &&
GPS==fine && THR==on && PLI==science && CPC==idle
&& FPC==run)
{/* The associated code describes that the conditions are not
valid for Science Mode as error occurs on the unit branch of ES,
SS or RW. It causes the mode transition to Off Mode. */}
else if ((GPS!=fine || STR!=on || THR!=on) && ES==off &&
SS==off && RW==on && PLI==science && CPC==idle &&
FPC==run)
{/* The associated code describes that the conditions are not
valid for Science Mode as error occurs on the unit branch of 
GPS, STR or THR. It causes the mode transition to Safe Mode.
*/}
else if (ES==off && SS==off && GPS==fine && STR==on
&& RW==on && THR==on && PLI!=science && CPC==idle
&& FPC==run)
{/* The associated code describes that the conditions are not
valid for Science Mode as error occurs on the unit branch of
PLI. It causes the mode transition to Nominal Mode. */}
else if (ES==off && SS==off && GPS==fine && STR==on
&& RW==on && THR==on && PLI==science &&
(CPC!=idle || FPC!=run))
{/* The associated code describes that the conditions are not
valid for Science Mode as error occurs in the phase of Coarse or
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else
Fine Pointing Controller. It causes the mode transition to 
Preparation Mode. */}
else
{/* The associated code describes that no transitions take place.
*/ } }
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Abstract— Ensuring correctness of a complex distributed and
mode-rich collaborative satellite system is a challenging task
that requires formal modeling and verification. In this paper,
we propose a model of a distributed Attitude and Orbit
Control System. Mode transitions in such systems are
governed by a sophisticated synchronization procedure. We
demonstrate how to model and verify such a procedure in
order to ensure mode consistency.
 
Keywords-distributed mode-rich systems; satellite software; fault
tolerance; synchronization
 
I. INTRODUCTION
Behavior of satellite systems is often structured in terms
of modes. Modes – mutually exclusive sets of system
behavior define different functional profiles of the system
[4,5]. An important problem associated with designing
mode-rich satellite systems is to ensure correctness of mode
transitions.
In this paper, we propose an approach to modeling and
verification of distributed Attitude and Orbit Control System
– D-AOCS [1,2]. D-AOCS is a typical example of a mode-
rich collaborative system. It consists of two independent
mode managers that should negotiate and coordinate their
actions. Collaboration between mode managers is not trivial
– faults of components might prevent the mode managers
from following the agreed course of actions. As a result new
negotiations would be initialized to achieve synchronization
under the new conditions.
The proper synchronization is paramount for ensuring
mode consistency. In general mode consistency can be seen
as a high-level guarantee of a proper functioning of a
distributed system deployed on the space craft. The complex
collaboration procedure precedes each mode transition step.
We demonstrate how to model and verify handshaking
protocol ensuring that modes are changed consistently. An
important part of our modeling is fault tolerance. We
demonstrate how to ensure consistency of not only nominal
but also backward mode transitions, i.e., transitions to the
degraded modes that are responsible for error recovery. The
novelty of the proposed approach is in treating fault
tolerance of collaborative systems as a problem of ensuring
mode consistency.
Section II explains the state-of-the-art of AOCS structure.
Section III presents AOCS architecture covering unit
manager, mode manager, and fault tolerance. Handshake
protocol is explained in detail in Section IV and the proposed
system design using handshake is discussed in Section V.
Finally, Section VI provides a brief summary of conclusions
and future work.
 
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART STRUCURE
Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) is extensively
used in the design and development of modern satellites. The
major objective of an AOCS is to ensure controlled
movements of the satellites in order to maintain required
attitude and remain in the given orbit. As disturbance of the
atmosphere tends to change orientation of the satellites, there
is a serious need to continuously control and monitor its
attitude. A number of sensors are employed to collect data
for the purpose of controlling attitude. Appropriate corrective
measures are taken by the actuators to keep the right path
and orbit whenever there is change detected in the data sent
by the sensors. This requirement is very essential for
supporting needs of payload instruments as well as for the
fulfillment of satellite’s mission.
The top level schema of an AOCS is shown in Figure 1.
 
 
Figure 1: Top Level Schema of AOCS
 
The AOCS manager consists of three components (i.e.,
sensor data processing, control computation and actuator
commanding). Control computation part handles all the data
and measurements using state-of-the-art control algorithms
and gives commands to the actuators for ensuring correct
path and attitude. Different types of controllers are required
for completion of specific mission stages. Normally, two
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control algorithms are used during the operational mode of
the satellites.
Each unit of the satellite has a unique status (i.e., free,
reserved, or locked) for its usage while avoiding conflicts
during reconfiguration [10]. An actuator, payload or sensor
remains free when it is idle in any mode. The reserved status
means that a sensor/actuator/payload is to be used shortly but
it is not yet ready. When any unit is allocated and is being
used for its required operation, then it is turned into the
locked status.
 
III. ARCHITECTURE
In this paper, we consider a distributed version of
Attitude and Orbit Control System. Attitude and Orbit
Control System (AOCS) [1] is a generic component of a
spacecraft. Behavior of AOCS is structured using the notion
of modes – mutually exclusive sets of system behavior. The
complexity of designing distributed AOCS lies in the fact
that mode management is decentralized, i.e., it is performed
by several mode managers. Distributed AOCS (D-AOCS)
has a complex architecture. It consists of AOCS Manager,
Unit Manager, Several Mode Managers and FDIR (Failure
Detection, Isolation and Recovery) Manager. AOCS
Manger deals with two controllers -- Control Pointing
Controller (CPC) and Fine Pointing Controller (FPC). The
purposes of CPC and FPC are to direct line of sight as well
as to provide coarse and fine accuracy. Unit level state
transitions and mode transitions are managed by Unit
Manager and Mode Manager respectively. FDIR Manager
ensures handling of branch state transition errors and
controller phase transition errors [2]. Two managers --
Mode Manager 1 (MM1) and Mode Manager 2 (MM2) are
responsible for the global mode logic of D-AOCS. The
architecture of Unit Manager and Mode Managers is
described below.
 
A. Unit Manager
The Unit Manager in D-AOCS organizes the internal
states of the units. The components of Unit Manager are
supervised by the Mode Manager. The controlled units
include Earth Sensor (ES), Sun Sensor (SS), Star Tracker
(STR), Global Positioning System (GPS), Reaction Wheel
(RW), Thruster (THR) and Payload Instrument (PLI). All
unit components are responsible for mode synchronization,
decision making on unit states, performing branch state
transitions and unit reconfiguration [4,5]. SS, STR, GPS,
RW and PLI provide data to the AOC Manager. RW and
THR execute the commands from AOC Manager. These
units are also responsible for detection and reporting the
branch state transition errors [1].
 
Every unit consists of two identical branches -- the
nominal and redundant ones. At any instance of time only
one branch is active. A unit branch in the ‘on’ state is
always assigned locked status and the unit branch in ‘off’
state has unlocked status. There are six states of unit
components -- on, off, coarse, fine, standby and science.
The internal states of ES, SS, STR, RW and THR are either
‘on’ or ‘off’. Three possible GPS’s operational states are
‘off’, ‘coarse’ and ‘fine’. PLI’s state can be in ‘off’,
‘standby’ or ‘science’ [3].
 
B. Mode Managers
The global mode transitions are managed by the two
mode managers -- MM1 and MM2. Each mode manager’s
controls different units. Each mode manager is responsible
for checking the preconditions of mode transitions,
managing the controllers and the units, and initiating and
completing the mode transitions. The global modes are
correspondingly Off, Standby, Safe, Nominal, Preparation,
and Science [10]. Below we give a brief description of each
mode:
Off: After the central data management unit completes
booting of AOCS software, the satellite instantly goes into
the off mode.
Standby: The process of separation of the satellite from
the launcher is monitored during the standby mode.
Safe: After successful separation from the launcher, the
satellite switches to the safe mode. The satellite obtains a
stable attitude and the CPC is activated.
Nominal: After transition to this mode, FPC is activated,
while CPC is switched off. PLI is actoviated to provide
measurements for FPC.
Preparation: FPC is achieved in the preparation mode
and PLI gets ready to perform the necessary tasks.
Science: PLI carries out the required tasks and stays in
science mode till the desired tasks are completed.
 
MM1 and MM2 communicate with each other to
synchronize on mode transitions that are performed in
parallel. Let us describe the scenario of mode transitions.
After a mode transition to off or standby is done, every unit
branch goes to off state and both controllers are idle. After
that, both mode managers communicate with each other. If
there is no error then transition to the next mode is executed.
When the mode is switched to safe, the selected branches of
ES, SS  and RW are  turned to ‘on’ state  and only FPC
remains idle. Both mode managers send messages to inform
each other that no error occured in the given modes. After a
handshake, they perform the mode transition to the nominal
mode. In a mode transition to the nominal mode, the
required branches of RW, STR and THR are put to the ‘on’
state and GPS is put into the‘coarse’ state. The messages
sent and received by the mode managers notify each mode
manager that no unit or controller error has occured. Then
the preparation mode is reached, the concerned branches of
RW, STR & THR are in the ‘on’ state and GPS & PLI are in
the ‘fine’ state and ‘standby’ state respectively. They ensure
the correctness of the modes in MM1 and MM2 and make a
transition to the science mode. In case of the science mode,
the preffered branch of PLI operates with ‘science’ state. All
other units keep their previous state. When a   mode
COLLA 2012 : The Second International Conference on Advanced Collaborative Networks, Systems and Applications
Copyright (c) IARIA, 2012. ISBN: 978-1-61208-206-6 37
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
transition goes to nominal, preparation or science mode,
only CPC remains idle. MM1 and MM2 both inform each
other regarding success of mode transition.
 
C. Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance aims at providing the system with the
means to continue its function in spite of errors of its
components. In the D-AOCS backward error recovery is
adopted, i.e., if an error occurs, the system gets back to
some previous state to handle the error. The roll back error
recovery is implemented by the backward mode transitions.
The mode roll-back depends on branch state transition
errors and phase transition errors.
 
There are different aspects relating to the branch state
transition errors. When a branch state transition error on the
redundant branch of ES, RW or SS occurs and there is no
error in the remaining redundant branches, then the mode
goes back to off mode. If the redundant branch of GPS,
STR or THR gets corrupted, it results a mode transition to
safe. A mode transition to nominal takes place when there is
a branch state transition error on the redundant branch of
PLI.
 
The important error checks are incorporated to deal with
the attitude or phase transitions. When the current mode is
safe and a non-negligible phase error is produced, it results
in a mode transition to off. If the phase error is generated in
the nominal, then it goes back to safe. In case the existing
mode is preparation and a phase error occurs, a mode
transition to nominal takes place. A mode transition to
preparation takes place when a phase error occurs in the
science mode [3].
 
In case of unit reconfiguration, a branch state transition
error on the nominal branch of any unit causes a unit
reconfiguration if there is no branch state transition error on
the redundant branches of that particular unit.
 
If the mode task is not completed within a given time
interval or multiple errors occur in the unit branches and
controller phases, then timeout signal is produced for safe
condition.
 
IV. HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL
 
Handshaking is a process in which connection is
established among two processes and information is
transferred from one process to another without the need for
human involvement to set constraints. MM1 and MM2 do
handshake with each other to update the condition of their
modes. Different scenarios of handshake protocol are
explained covering the following key points:
 
If all conditions of unit states and controller phases
within each mode of MM1 and MM2 fulfill their
requirements, then mode managers pass the ‘no error’
message to notify that the mode is in the error-free state. It
results in the forward mode transition, i.e., the mode
manager switches the current mode to the next mode as
described in Section III.
If an error occurs during a mode transition of MM1 and
there is no error in the mode of MM2, then MM1 sends an
‘error’ message to MM2. MM1 executes error recovery, i.e.,
starts backward mode transtion according to the Section III.
Until the error recovery of MM1 is not completed, MM2
keeps on waiting. After the successful error recovery, both
mode managers proceed to the next mode.
When an error occurs only in the mode of MM2, then
MM1 receives an ‘error’ message from MM2. MM1 waits
until error has been recovered in MM2. The mode managers
switch to next mode after receiving the information from
MM2 that the error is recoverd.
Upon receiving an ‘error’ message from MM1 and MM2
simultaneously, error recovery starts in both mode managers
as mentioned in Section III. The backward mode transitions
are executed in MM1 and MM2. After achieving the
successful recovery, mode managers move to the next
mode.
There are two types of errors -- the unit branch state
transition errors and controller phase transition errors.
Handshaking algorithm for handling such type of errors is
quite complex as specified below:
 
void handshake(int u_MM1, int u_MM2,int c_MM1,int c_MM2) {
// ‘u’ denotes unit error flag and ‘c’ denotes controller error flag
if (u_MM1==0&&u_MM2==0&&c_MM1==0&&c_MM2==0) {
/* The associated code illustrates that no error occurs in the unit
branchs of ES, SS, RW, GPS, STR, THR or PLI and controller
phase of CPC or FPC in the given mode of MM1 and MM2. It 
accounts the forward mode transition according to the Section
III. */}
elseif(u_MM1==1&&u_MM2==0&&c_MM1==0&&c_MM2==0) {
/* The associated code illustrates that an error occurs in the unit
branch of ES, SS, RW, GPS, STR, THR or PLI in the given 
mode of MM1. It accounts the backward mode transition 
according to the Section III. MM2 stays on waiting until an 
error is recovered. */}
elseif(u_MM1==0&&u_MM2==1 &&c_MM1==0&&c_MM2==0) {
/* The associated code illustrates that an error occurs in the unit
branch of ES, SS, RW, GPS, STR, THR or PLI in the given 
mode of MM2. It accounts the backward mode transition 
according to the Section III. MM1 stays on waiting until an 
error is recovered. */}
elseif(u_MM1==1&&u_MM2==1&&c_MM1==0&&c_MM2==0) {
/* The associated code illustrates that an error occurs in the unit
branch of ES, SS, RW, GPS, STR, THR or PLI in the given
mode of both mode managers. MM1 and MM2 account the
backward mode transition according to the Section III. */}
elseif(u_MM1==0&&u_MM2==0&&c_MM1==1&&c_MM2==0) {
/* The associated code illustrates that an error occurs in the
controller phase of CPC or FPC in the given mode of MM1. It 
accounts the backward mode transition according to the Section
III. MM2 stays on waiting until an error is recovered. */}
elseif(u_MM1==0&&u_MM2==0&&c_MM1==0&&c_MM2==1) {
/* The associated code illustrates that an error occurs in the
controller phase of CPC or FPC in the given mode of MM2. It
accounts the backward mode transition according to the Section
III. MM1 stays on waiting until an error is recovered. */}
elseif(u_MM1==0&&u_MM2==0&&c_MM1==1&&c_MM2==1) {
/* The associated code illustrates that an error occurs in the
controller phase of CPC or FPC in the given mode of both mode
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managers. MM1  and  MM2  account the   backward  mode
transition according to the Section III. */}
else {
/* The associated code describes that it is an invalid condition.
Program is terminated.*/} }
 
V. PROPOSED SYSTEM DESIGN USING HANDSHAKE
The proposed system design has been implemented
using SystemC. SystemC can be used at system level for
functional verification. The framework also supports event
driven simulation environments [6]. It offers application
program interface for transaction based verification,
handling exceptions and verification tasks [7]. The system
model consists of six defined modes named as A (Off), B
(Standby), C (Safe), D (Nominal), E (Preparation) and F
(Science). Three different operations have been
implemented (i.e., forward mode transitions, backward
mode transitions, and unit reconfiguration). The flow chart
given in Figure 3 describes detailed design structure for only
one transition from Mode E to Mode F of the system. When
the system reaches to Mode E, it checks the error in the
Mode E of both mode managers. Figure 3 shows the
operations regarding error condition according to the
scenarios and backward mode transitions according to the
error types (Unit branch error (redundant/nominal) and
controller phase error) they are discussed in Section IV and
Section III respectively.
After necessary declarations of modes, units and
controllers, the verification of the system are described in
the following sections.
 
A. Verification of Forward Mode Transition
 
Figure 2: Forward Mode Transitions
When all the units are in off state, controller phases are
in the idle phase, and no unit reconfiguration is in progress,
then current mode is A in MM1 and MM2. The
unit/controller error flag is set to low and mode managers
exchange the information (‘no error’ message) of error-free
mode status. After this, the mode moves forward to the next
mode (i.e., Mode B) in MM1 and MM2. Hence, when all
conditions of unit states and controller phases within each
mode of each manager fulfill their requirements, mode
managers update each other about the error-free mode
conditions. Then the current mode switches to the next
mode within each mode manager until it completes its
operation after Mode F. Figure 2 illustrates the implemented
procedure that corresponds to the forward mode transition
for MM1 and MM2.
 
B. Verification of the Steps in the Backward Mode
Transition
The backward mode transition depends on the two types
of errors (i.e., unit branch state transition error and
controller phase transition error). Handshaking procedure
for handling these errors is given below.
 
1) Verification of the Steps in Unit Branch State
Transition Error
Following part of the code segment describes the unit
branch transition error in case of Mode E as shown in
Figure 2. If there is an error in ES, SS or RW of
MM1, MM1 switches to Mode A. If an error occurs
in GPS, THR or STR of MM2, MM2 return to Mode
C. However, if PLI gets an error in both mode
managers, MM1 and MM2 both go back to Mode D.
Before backward transition to the desired mode, the
messages exchange information between the effected
mode manager and the error-free mode manager to
acknowledge the error status.
// Variable declarations
int FPC1,CPC1,FPC2,CPC2,u_MM1,c_MM1,u_MM2,c_MM2;
// unit states
const int off=0;const int on=1;const int coarse=2;
const int fine=3;const int unit=0;const int Standby=4;
const int Science=5;const int idle=0;const int run=1;
const int A=1;const int B=2;const int C=3;
const int D=4;const int E=5;const int F=6;
/* Each unit has two branches i.e., Nominal and Redundant,
here we deal with redundant branch of the units. */
int ES1,SS1,GPS1,STR1,RW1,THR1,PLI1; // MM1 Units
int ES2,SS2,GPS2,STR2,RW2,THR2,PLI2; // MM2 Units
if(mode==E) {// Preparation Mode
if((ES1!=off || SS1!=off || RW1!=on) && STR1==on &&
GPS1==fine && THR1==on && PLI1== standby &&
CPC1==idle && FPC1==run && ES2==off &&
SS2==off && RW2==on && STR2==on &&
GPS2==fine && THR2==on && PLI2== standby &&
CPC2==idle && FPC2==run){
u_MM1=1;c_MM1=0;
u_MM2=0;c_MM2=0;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the
handshake protocol function on the basis of unit and
controller error flag, is mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else if(ES1==off && SS1==off && RW1==on &&
STR1==on  && GPS1==fine && THR1==on  &&
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PLI1==standby && CPC1==idle && FPC1==run &&
ES2==off && SS2==off && RW2==on && (STR2!=on ||
GPS2!=fine || THR2!=on) && PLI2==standby &&
CPC2==idle && FPC2==run){
u_MM1=0;c_MM1=0;
u_MM2=1;c_MM2=0;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the
handshake protocol function on the basis of unit and
controller error flag, is mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else if(ES1==off && SS1==off && RW1==on &&
STR1==on && GPS1==fine && THR1==on &&
PLI1!=standby && CPC1==idle && FPC1==run &&
ES2==off && SS2==off && RW2==on && STR2==on
&& GPS2==fine && THR2==on && PLI2!=standby &&
CPC2==idle && FPC2==run){
u_MM1=1;c_MM1=0;
u_MM2=1;c_MM2=0;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the
handshake protocol function on the basis of unit and 
controller error flag, is mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else{
/* The associated code describes that no transitions
take place. */ } }
else cout<<" Program is terminated.";
 
2) Verification of the Steps in Controller Phase
Transition Errors
 
When CPC and FPC do not fulfill the requirement of
mode of any mode manager, the error flag is set to
high and the affected mode manager is downgraded
to previous mode after utilizing the handshake
protocol by sending message to error-free mode
manager. In case the phase of controllers in the given
mode of both mode managers is corrupted, then both
managers do the backward mode transition at once
after acknowledging each other. The following
portion of the code represents the scenario of phase
transition for Mode E as illustrated in Figure 2.
//Variables are declared in the previous section.
if(mode==E) {// Preparation Mode
if(ES1==off && SS1==off && RW1==on &&
STR1==on && GPS1==fine && THR1==on &&
PLI1==standby && CPC1!=idle && FPC1==run &&
ES2==off && SS2==off && RW2==on && STR2==on
&& GPS2==fine && THR2==on && PLI2==standby &&
CPC2==idle && FPC2==run){
u_MM1=0;c_MM1=1;
u_MM2=0;c_MM2=0;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the
handshake protocol function on the basis of unit and 
controller error flag, is mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else if(ES1==off && SS1==off && RW1==on &&
STR1==on && GPS1==fine && THR1==on &&
PLI1==standby && CPC1==idle && FPC1==run &&
ES2==off && SS2==off && RW2==on && STR2==on
&& GPS2==fine && THR2==on && PLI2==standby &&
CPC2==idle && FPC2!=run){
u_MM1=0;c_MM1=0;
u_MM2=0;c_MM2=1;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the
handshake protocol function on the basis of unit and 
controller error flag, is mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else if(ES1==off && SS1==off && RW1==on &&
STR1==on && GPS1==fine && THR1==on &&
PLI1==standby && CPC1==idle && FPC1!=run &&
ES2==off && SS2==off && RW2==on && STR2==on
&& GPS2==fine && THR2==on && PLI2==standby &&
CPC2!=idle && FPC2==run){
u_MM1=0;c_MM1=1;
u_MM2=0;c_MM2=1;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the
handshake protocol function on the basis of unit and 
controller error flag, is mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else{
/* The associated code describes that no transitions
take place. */ }           }
else cout<<" Program is terminated.";
 
C. Verification of the Steps in Unit Reconfiguration
 
If error exists on nominal unit branch at any mode of
MM1 or MM2, then it is replaced by redundant unit branch
in the given  mode of mode manager. The unit
reconfiguration is done to complete the remaining operation
of the system. Unit reconfiguration is, however, a burden on
the system and takes some time while switching from
nominal branch to redundant branch of the unit. In case of
the nominal unit branch in the given mode of both mode
managers is corrupted, then unit reconfiguration is done in
both mode manager after exchanging the information
between the mode managers regarding unit reconfiguration.
 
The following piece of the code shows the scenario of
unit reconfiguration for Mode E as shown in Figure 2.
 
 
//Variables are declared in the previous section. In reconfiguration 
module, we also deal with nominal branch of the units. So, both 
branches of the unit are declared separately.
//Nominal branches of MM1 and MM2
int N_ES1, N_SS1, N_RW1, N_GPS1, N_STR1, N_THR1, N_PLI1; 
int N_ES2, N_SS2, N_RW2, N_GPS2, N_STR2, N_THR2, N_PLI2;
//Redundant branches of MM1 and MM2
int R_ES1, R_SS1, R_RW1, R_GPS1, R_STR1, R_THR1, R_PLI1;
int R_ES2, R_SS2, R_RW2, R_GPS2, R_STR2, R_THR2, R_PLI2;
if (mode==E) { // Preparation Mode
if((N_ES1!=off || N_SS1!=off || N_RW1!=on) && R_ES1==off &&
R_SS1==off && R_RW1==on && N_ES2==off && N_SS2==off
&& N_RW2==on   && R_ES2==off && R_SS2==off   &&
R_RW2==on ) {
u_MM1=1;c_MM1=0;
u_MM2=0;c_MM2=0;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the handshake
protocol function on the basis of unit and controller error flag, is
mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else if(N_GPS1==fine && N_STR1==on && N_THR1==on &&
N_PLI1==standby && R_GPS1==fine && R_STR1==on &&
R_THR1==on && R_PLI1==standby && (N_GPS2!=fine ||
N_STR2!=on || N_THR2!=on || N_PLI2!=standby) &&
R_GPS2==fine && R_STR2==on && R_THR2==on &&
R_PLI2==standby) {
u_MM1=0;c_MM1=0;
u_MM2=1;c_MM2=0;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the handshake
protocol function on the basis of unit and controller error flag, is
mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else if((N_ES1!=off || N_SS1!=off || N_RW1!=on) && R_ES1==off
&& R_SS1==off && R_RW1==on && (N_ES2==off || N_SS2!=off
|| N_RW2!=on) && R_ES2==off && R_SS2==off && R_RW2==on
) {  u_MM1=1;c_MM1=0;
u_MM2=1;c_MM2=0;
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Figure 3: System flow chart for Mode E to Mode F
COLLA 2012 : The Second International Conference on Advanced Collaborative Networks, Systems and Applications
Copyright (c) IARIA, 2012. ISBN: 978-1-61208-206-6 41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the handshake
protocol function on the basis of unit and controller error flag, is
mentioned in Section IV.*/}
else if((N_ES1!=off || N_SS1!=off || N_RW1!=on) && R_ES1==off
&& R_SS1==off && R_RW1==on && (N_ES2==off || N_SS2!=off
|| N_RW2!=on) && R_ES2==off && R_SS2==off && R_RW2==on
) {  u_MM1=1;c_MM1=0;
u_MM2=1;c_MM2=0;
/* The remaining part of the code, by calling the handshake
protocol function on the basis of unit and controller error flag, is
mentioned in Section IV.*/}
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[5] N. Leveson, L. D. Pinnel, S. D. Sandys, S. Koga, and J. D. Reese,
“Analyzing Software Specifications for Mode Confusion Potential”, 
Proceedings of Workshop on Human Error and System Development,
C.W. Johnson, Editor, Glasgow, Scotland, pp. 132-146, March 1997.
[6] N. Blanc, D. Kroening, and N. Sharygina, “Scoot: A Tool for the
Analysis of SystemC Models”. TACAS'08/ETAPS'08 Proceedings of
the Theory and practice of software, 14th international conference on 
Tools and algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 467–470, 2008.
else{  
/* The associated code describes that no transition takes place.
*/ } }
[7]   L. Singh, and  L. Drucker, “Advanced  Verification Techniques: A
SystemC Based  Approach  for Successful Tapeout”, Kluwer
else cout<<" Program is terminated.";}
 
Our verification efforts are focused on checking
correctness of mode syncornization and verification of the
proposed collaboration scheme. To obtain quantitative
measures of the performance of the discussed protocol we
would need to further refine our specification and to
integrate model of hardware platform in the loop. We are
planning to perform quantitative evaluation as a part of the
future work.
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we demonstrated how to model and verify
distributed satellite systems with complex mode transition
logic. Our approach is validated by a case study – design of
a distributed Attitude and Orbit Control System.
 
The proposed system has been implemented in SystemC
language. SystemC specification can be easily interfaced
with various model checking techniques to perform formal
verification. The work presented in this paper extends our
previous work done on modeling centralized mode-rich
system. In the current approach, we have put the main focus
on mode synchronization aspect and demonstrated how to
achieve mode consistency via handshaking protocol.
 
Our work complements research done on formal
modeling of mode-rich satellite systems. The formal
modeling proposed by Iliasov et al. [8,9] focused on proof-
based verification of centralized AOCS. Formal modeling of
the distributed architecture presented in our paper is a
completely novel aspect.
 
As a future work, we are planning to investigate how to
interface architectural modeling with our design approach.
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Abstract— Fault tolerance of satellite systems is critical for
ensuring the success of the space mission. To minimize
redundancy of the on-board equipment, the satellite systems
should rely on dynamic reconfiguration in case of failures of
some of their components. In this paper, modeling and 
implementation of a handshake procedure has been presented
that becomes a crucial part of the dynamic reconfiguration
process of a satellite subsystem for data processing. The model 
for handshake methodology is specialized software for quickly
and successfully recovering from the crisis and failure situation
of the satellite system.
 
Keywords – dynamic reconfiguration; fault tolerance; advanced
software for handshake procedure; modeling and verification.
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION
To ensure high reliability during long-term missions, the
satellite systems rely on redundancy to achieve fault
tolerance and guarantee that the system would be able to
deliver its services despite component failures. However,
the use of redundancy in the satellites is restricted by the
constraints put on the weight and volume of the on-board
equipment.
Despite a careful analysis performed to ensure the
desired degree of reliability, recently one of the satellites
has experienced a double-failure problem with a system that
samples and packages scientific data [6]. The system
consisted of two identical modules. When one of the
subcomponents of the first module failed, the system
switched to the use of the second module. However, after a
while a subcomponent of the spare module also failed, so it
became impossible to produce scientific data. In order to
avoid failure of the entire mission, the company controlling
the operation of the system has invented a solution that
relies on healthy subcomponents of both modules and
provides complex communication mechanism based on the
handshake procedure to restore functioning and to resume
production of scientific data.
In this paper, we present a case study in modeling and
implementation of Control and Data Management Unit
(CDMU) [1] - a generic subsystem of satellites. In
particular, we focus on modeling fault tolerance aspect of
the system that is implemented as a handshake procedure
between two redundant systems. This mechanism is
introduced to achieve the dynamic reconfiguration. For this
purpose, a formal model of the handshake procedure has
been designed and implemented in Promela. Handshake
modeling is an advanced software application to deal with
dynamic reconfiguration for ensuring fault-tolerance when
the mission-critical satellite system encounters faults in its
component and errors in data communication.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II describes
the state-of-the-art model of CDMU and Section III presents
the architecture of the control and data management unit.
Section IV describes the handshake procedure performed to
reconfigure the system from simple redundant two-module
architecture to the Master-Slave architecture. The proposed
system model for handshake is explained in Section V
covering all relevant details of master and slave modules.
Section VI discusses the handshake model between the two
reconfiguration modules that has been implemented and
verified using SPIN/PROMELA. Finally, conclusions and
future work are summarized in Section VII.
 
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART MODEL
CDMU is a state-of-the-art platform to monitor and
control the satellites system and to organize the collected
on-board data. The major objective of CDMU is to acquire
and transmit the data to the ground after carrying out
appropriate processing. Moreover, it also distributes and
decodes the given commands to its all redundant systems
consisting of processor, reconfiguration and telemetry
modules. Whenever any failure or data error takes place
during the operation of the satellite system, there is an
emergent requirement to dynamically reconfigure the
components of CDMU for its smooth and crisis-free control
and data management. Processing and storing of satellite
data at the right time is of top-most importance during the
working and recovery procedure of the proposed system. In
case of experiencing any failure, the implemented CDMU
structure and the developed model of handshake procedure
immediately adapts to the well-defined and specialized
switchover mechanism for shifting from one redundant
processor to another in order to reconfigure and provide safe
operation of the satellite system during its critical mission.
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III. ARCHITECTURE
The CDMU consists of two Processor Modules (PM1
and PM2), two Reconfiguration Modules (RM1 and RM2),
and two Telemetry Modules (TMM1 and TMM2). It their
own turns, each PM consists of Random Access Memory
(RAM), Integer Unit (IU), Floating Point Unit (FPU), and
Erasable Electrically Programmable Memory (EEPROM).
Each Reconfiguration Module (RM) has two components --
Mass Memory (MM)  and On-Board Reference Time
(OBRT). Telemetry Modules generate Telemetries (TMs)
that are processed by Processor Modules.
In CDMU, only one Processor Module (PM1 or PM2) is
in active mode and can access one or both RM1 and RM2.
TMs are received by the active processor module and
accumulated only in MM of its local RM. However, TMs
can be retrieved from the MM of partner RM after switching
is done from one processor module to another. When each
particular PM has experienced a failure, the Master and
Slave policy is introduced for error recovery. It aims at
ensuring that the CDMU functionality can be preserved
even when failures are present in the system.
In our case study, we consider the following two
consecutive errors in CDMU that might occur during the
execution of the system:
 
1) PM1 fails due to the failure in FPU.
2) TM ceases to function due to the failure in the link
between TMM2 and PM2.
 
The basis of the Master and the Slave is to prepare a
work-around in order to address above mentioned failures.
In this case, PM1 and PM2 are converted into the Slave and
the Master respectively. Similarly, Master and Slave
comprise of the functional program running in PM2 and
PM1 respectively and it is mainly established to execute the
system without the FPU and connection link.
At a time, both the Master and the Slave interface with
RM1 and RM2, respectively, as shown in the CDMU
structure. However, RM1 and RM2 are not capable to hold
simultaneous access to both of them.
Despite the error in the connection link of PM2, the PM2
is still in operational mode and stores TM in the MM.
Similarly, PM1 is also in operational mode by using only IU
program (without FPU) that recovers TM from the MM and
sends to the operator. The operator interacts with the Master
and the Slave by sending Tele-Commands (TCs). Figure 1
shows that each processor module is connected to both RM1
and RM2 and to both TMM1 and TMM2. The
TeleCommand (TC) receiver is also linked to both PM1 and
PM2.
 
 
Figure 1: CDMU Structure [1]
 
IV. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING IN HANDSHAKE
The important key factors that are involved in the
handshake procedure are as follows:
 
1) Time Event Register (TER) is used for messaging
between the Master and the Slave. As there is no
direct link between the Master and the Slave, so
TER is used as a shared device. Both can access
TER to read and write messages. RM1 and RM2
have their own TER devices.
2) The two interrupts -- Time Event Interrupt (TEI)
and Time Synchronization Interrupt (TSI) caused
by RM1 and RM2 are sent to the Slave and the
Master respectively. If the Master uses RM1 and
interrupt triggers, then interrupt is only sent to the
Slave because it is a local processor module of
RM1.
3) The interrupts can be used as a signal from the
Master to the Slave for the acknowledgement of
the messages because the Master has a charge of
the interrupt timing.
4) OBRT Status Register is used to find out that
interrupt has triggered in the system. The Master
holds the check of this register and clears the
interrupt flag for allowing the coming up
interrupts.
5) The Master and the Slave cannot use the same RM
at a time. However, both the Master and the Slave
are informed through handshake procedure in order
to choose required RM at a given time interval.
6) Handshaking is done through Communication
Channel (CCH) between the Master and the Slave.
RM1 or RM2 is used as CCH. The TER in the
CCH is expressed as Communication Time Event
Register (CTER).
7) The selection of RM1 or RM2 as CCH depends on
the Master as it utilizes both RM1 and RM2. On
getting the TC instruction from the operator, it
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switches to one module of RM (RM1 or RM2) and
releases the other RM for CCH. If the Master is
using only one RM module initially, the unused
RM will be selected as CCH. The Master can
switch the RM at the end of the handshake
procedure.
8) The handshake message contains the phase content
and timing of the message that is encoded in the
CTER. The timing of the interrupt is slightly
affected by the phase content that is encoded in the
four Least Significant Bits (LSB) of the CTER, but
this affect of interrupt timing is less than 0.3 ms
and is, therefore, ignored.
9) The phase content in the four least significant bits
of the CTER is as under:
i. When 4 LSB of CTER has value ‘1’, then
the Master informs the Slave to
communicate through RM1. Similarly,
when 4 LSB of CTER has value ‘2’, then
the Master informs the Slave to
communicate through RM2. This phase is
known as “Select Communication RM”.
ii. If the value is ‘4’ in the 4 LSB of CTER,
the Slave updates the Master to confirm the
communication through RM1. Likewise, if
the value is ‘5’ in the 4 LSB of CTER, then
the Slave informs the Master that it
confirms the communication through RM2.
This phase of the handshake procedure is
called “Confirm Communication RM”.
iii. Upon setting the value of ‘10’ in 4 LSB of
CTER, the Slave is informed by the Master
that if RM1 is not in use then switch to it
and use it. For the value ‘11’, the Slave has
to switch to use RM2. When the value is
‘14’, then the Master instructs the Slave to
release both RM1 and RM2. This phase is
named as “Command Slave”.
iv. The Master sends a message to the Slave in
which it verifies the RM1 or RM2 selection
by putting the value ‘8’ in 4 LSB of CTER.
This phase is entitled as “Confirm
Command”.
 
10) The encoding of the handshake messages is done
within one second (s) - Pulse Per Second (PPS).
The interrupts according to the PPS time slot are
given below:
i. When interrupts occur from 0.10 to 0.40 s,
RM1 and RM2 are not selected in this time
slot. It means that the Master instructs the
Slave to confirm the change to use no RM.
ii. For the selection of RM1, interrupts take
place in the time slot ranging from 0.42 to
0.70 s. The Master orders the Slave either
to communicate with RM1 or confirm
change to use RM1 during the handshake
procedure.
iii. In the 0.72 - 1.00 s time slot, interrupts are
taken into account. This selection is
encoded for RM2 where master notifies the
Slave either to communicate with RM2 or
confirm change to use RM2 during the
handshake procedure.
iv. The purpose of the remaining unused slots
0.00 – 0.10 s, 0.40 – 0.42 s and 0.70 – 0.72
s is to avoid overlaps. Any interrupts
appearing in these timing slots will be
ignored.
 
11) The minimum time between two TSIs is greater
than 0.3s to ensure that two TSIs do not trigger
during the same time slot. On the other hand,
interrupt can be triggered two times during the
same time slot.
 
V. PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL FOR HANDSHAKE
The handshake procedure [2] has been modeled for the
Master and the Slave as shown in Figure 2. Handshake is a
procedure in which the Master communicates with the Slave
to update the selection of RM1 and RM2. It is a complicated
process as there is no direct communication link between
them.
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Model of Handshake Procedure
 
A. Master Handshake Procedure
 
The handshake procedure that is executed by the Master
Module is shown in Figure 2. Below we give its brief
description:
Upon the reception of TC from the operator, the
handshake procedure is started by the Master. The Master
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informs the Slave that other RM will be used as CCH by
updating the value of 4 LSB TER. If the Master is using
RM2 and storing TM, then the Slave will be informed to
make RM1 as CCH. Likewise, if RM1 is operated by the
Master, then the Slave has to use RM2 as CCH. When CCH
is RM1, then system operation is performed from 0.42 to
0.70 s PPS slot. Similarly, for RM2, 0.72 to 1.00 s, PPS slot
is used for the system operation. System has to wait for
starting of the right PPS slot according to the CCH.
In order to send information to Slave, interrupts are
triggered from the Master after setting the value of OBRT
Status Register to zero. For accuracy, the value of TER for
the Slave RM is set to 0.04 s. The interval between two
interrupts is 0.06 s. The Master ensures by reading the
CTER value from the Slave that selection of CCH is done.
The Master can swap the CCH selection at the end of
handshake procedure. The Master commands the Slave by
setting the future CCH selection value in the 4 LSB CTER
and triggers a TEI only. The time value of TEI is not
relevant to the CTER, so the time slot of TEI makes no
changes in the end result of the system. Only operator is
responsible for the new RM selection and determining
which RM is used as CCH as stated in Section IV. In the
system, operator initially notifies the RM selection to the
Master, it changes CCH selection from used RM to other
RM according to the swapping information that is encoded
in 4 LSB CTER and also confirms the RM selection. The
confirmation message is also forwarded to the Slave by
sending two interrupts within the correct time slot. At this
moment, the Master ends the handshake procedure and
updates the operator for successful working by sending the
corresponding TM.
 
B. Handshake Procedure: Slave Behaviour
When the operator starts the handshake, the following
operations are carried out by the Slave as shown in Figure 2.
If the Slave is using RM1 or RM2, then it will deselect
the current RM on the reception of TC command from the
operator. When RM is discontinued from the Slave, then
OBRT Status Register will be set to zero and no more
interrupts will be triggered. The Slave waits for 0.03 s to get
the new command along with two interrupts (i.e. TEI and
TSI) which will be generated from the Master during the
expected PPS slot. When the Slave receives a message from
the Master, then it decodes it from the interrupts time slot as
mentioned in Section IV (para # 10). For verification, the
Slave also interprets the value of 4 LSB CTER as described
in Section IV (para # 9). If the values derived from the
interrupts time slot and 4 LSB CTER are the same, then the
Slave achieves the specified CCH selection. After that, the
Slave sends acknowledgement of confirmation to the Master
by setting the value of 4 LSB CTER according to Section
IV. Now, the Slave has to wait again for 0.02 s for the new
response or interrupt from the Master according to the PPS
slot. On the arrival of message from the Master, the Slave is
triggered by TEI. The Slave has no opportunity to change
the decision of new selection and waits for 10s for the
confirmation message from the Master. Again, the Slave
receives two interrupts with the CTER message and
compares the time slot of interrupts with previous CTER
value. If both are same, then the Slave begins the operation
with released RM. Finally, the Slave also completes the
handshake procedure by sending TM to the operator.
 
VI. VERIFICATION OF THE HANDSHAKE MODEL
The handshake model has been implemented by using
PROMELA (PROcess MEta LAnguage) high level
modeling language with SPIN model checker for verifying
the required results. SPIN [3,4] is extensively used in formal
verification of distributed and parallel processing systems.
SPIN has greatly facilitated the process of verification in the
areas of mission-critical algorithmic applications, message
and data communication in the client-server environment,
synchronization and coordination of large number  of
processes in the parallel and distributed systems, deadlock
handling methodologies in the modern multi-tasking
operating systems, verification of the mission-oriented
control models for space aircrafts, utilization of intelligent
models for determining most suitable and economical paths
over wide area networks, checking performance of routing
protocols [5], testing of fault-tolerant strategies and
implementation of a wide variety of switching techniques.
The literature review reveals that most of the software-based
systems/models are checked and verified by the SPIN model
checker.
The handshake model between two processors in control
and data management unit has been successfully
implemented and verified using SPIN/PROMELA. The
flow chart for handshake procedure model is shown in
Figure 3. The following algorithm along with description of
each condition of the processes shows part of the
implemented SPIN/PROMELA model.
/*Variable Declarations */
active proctype Slave_starts_HP()
{S_TC=true;
if
::(S_TC==true)->RM1=0;RM2=0;
::( S_TC!=true)-> printf("\n\nExit Handshake Procedure.\n\n"); 
fi
S_TM=true;}
 
The above code depicts that when TC command is
received to Slave from the operator, Slave starts handshake
procedure by deselecting the RM selection. After successful
execution of the TC command, Slave sends TM to operator
and waits for Master’s response. In any other condition,
handshake procedure will be terminated.
active proctype Master_starts_HP()// time value is taken in (ms)
{M_TC=true; RM1=0;RM2=1; // set by the operator
if
::(RM1==0 && RM2==1)->// I_time denotes timing of interrupts
{CTER_4_LSB=1;I_time=500;TEI=true;TSI=true;OBRT_SR=1;
run Slave_read_wrtie_operation(CTER_4_LSB,I_time,TEI,TSI);}
::(RM1==1 && RM2==0)->
{CTER_4_LSB=2;I_time=800;TEI=true;TSI=true;OBRT_SR=1;
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run Slave_read_wrtie_operation(CTER_4_LSB,I_time,TEI,TSI);} 
fi}
The code associated with the above process describes
that Master starts handshake on the operator command.
When operator selects RM2 for Master, then Master uses
RM2 and notifies Slave (by sending CTER and interrupts)
to use RM1 as CCH. Likewise, if operator selects RM1,
then Master uses RM1 and updates the Slave (through
CTER and interrupts) to use RM2 as CCH. After that, it
waits for Slave’s response.
proctype Slave_read_wrtie_operation(int CTER_4_LSB,I_time;bool
TEI,TSI)
{if
::((CTER_4_LSB==1) && (TEI==true && TSI==true) && (I_time>=420
&& I_time<=700))->
{CTER_4_LSB=4;run Master_decides_future_selection(CTER_4_LSB);}
::((CTER_4_LSB==2) && (TEI==true && TSI==true) && (I_time>=720
&& I_time<=1000))->
{CTER_4_LSB=5;run Master_decides_future_selection(CTER_4_LSB);}
::((CTER_4_LSB!=1) || !(I_time>=420 && I_time<=700))->
{printf("\n\nExit Handshake Procedure.\n\n");}
::((CTER_4_LSB!=2) || !(I_time>=720 && I_time<=1000))->
{printf("\n\nExit Handshake Procedure.\n\n");} 
fi}
The above piece of code illustrates that when timing of
interrupts is in line with the information that is encoded in
CTER 4 LSB, then Slave confirms the selection to Master
and waits for 0.02 s in order to get Master’s response. So,
when interrupts occurs between 0.42 to 0.70 s time slot and
CTER 4 LSB is ‘1’, it means Slave confirms to use RM1 as
CCH by encoding the value ‘4’ in CTER 4 LSB. Similarly,
if time slot for interrupt is 0.72 to 1.00 s and CTER 4 LSB is
‘2’ then RM2 is confirmed as CCH by the Slave through
updating the value ‘5’ in CTER 4 LSB. If timing of the
interrupts is not compatible with the encoded information in
CTER 4 LSB, handshake procedure exits at this stage.
proctype Master_decides_future_selection(int CTER_4_LSB)
{if
::(CTER_4_LSB==4)->
{OBRT_SR=0;CTER_4_LSB=11;TEI=true;OBRT_SR=1;
if
::(CTER_4_LSB==11)->
{RM1=1;RM2=0;aa= CTER_4_LSB;OBRT_SR=0;CTER_4_LSB=8;
I_time=800;TEI=true;TSI=true;OBRT_SR=1;M_TM=true;
run Slave_interprets_message(aa,I_time,TEI,TSI);}
::(CTER_4_LSB==14)->
{RM1=0;RM2=0;OBRT_SR=0;aa=CTER_4_LSB;CTER_4_LSB=8;
I_time=200;TEI=true;TSI=true;OBRT_SR = 1;M_TM=true;
run Slave_interprets_message(aa,I_time,TEI,TSI);}
fi;}
The above fragment of the code describes that when
Slave is using RM1, Master updates the up-coming
selection of RM by placing the value ‘11’ or ‘14’ in CTER 4
LSB with only TEI. If Master selects RM1, it releases RM2
to be used as CCH by putting the value ‘11’ in CTER 4
LSB. When Master picks RM1 and does not release RM2 to
be used as CCH, it writes the value ‘14’ in CTER 4 LSB.
After a half second to give the Slave sufficient time to read
value of CTER, the Master confirms the selection to the
Slave by encoding the value ‘8’ in CTER 4 LSB on the
specified time
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Flow Chart of Handshake Procedure Model  
slot according to Section IV and exits the handshake
procedure.
ICSEA 2012 : The Seventh International Conference on Software Engineering Advances
Copyright (c) IARIA, 2012. ISBN: 978-1-61208-230-1 49
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
::(CTER_4_LSB==5)->
{OBRT_SR=0;CTER_4_LSB=10;TEI=true;OBRT_SR=1;
The associated code with above condition illustrates this.
if
::(CTER_4_LSB==10)->
{RM1=0;RM2=1;OBRT_SR=0;bb=CTER_4_LSB;CTER_4_LSB=8;
I_time=800;TEI=true;TSI=true;OBRT_SR=1;M_TM=true;
run Slave_interprets_message(bb,I_time,TEI,TSI);}
::(CTER_4_LSB==14)->
{RM1=0;RM2=0;OBRT_SR=0;bb=CTER_4_LSB;CTER_4_LSB=8;
I_time=200;TEI=true;TSI=true;OBRT_SR = 1;M_TM=true;
run Slave_interprets_message(bb,I_time,TEI,TSI);}
fi;} 
fi}
nor RM2 as CCH. After then Slave exits the handshake
procedure. If interrupts timing is not in line with the
information that is encoded in earlier CTER 4 LSB,
handshake procedure exits at this stage too.
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a formal approach for
modeling a fault-tolerant satellite system that relies on the
handshake procedure for dynamic reconfiguration. We have
demonstrated how to create a Promela model of the
handshake and carry out its analysis. Since the handshake
The above part of the code shows that when the Master
is using RM1, it updates the up-coming selection of RM by
setting the value ‘10’ or ‘14’ in CTER 4 LSB with only TEI.
If the Master selects RM2, it releases RM1 to be used as
CCH by putting the value ‘10’ in CTER 4 LSB. When the
Master picks RM2 and does not release RM1 to be used as
CCH, it writes the value ‘14’ in CTER 4 LSB. After a half
second to give the Slave sufficient time to read value of
CTER, the Master confirms the selection to the Slave by
encoding the value ‘8’ in CTER 4 LSB on the specified time
slot according to Section IV and exits the handshake
procedure.
proctype Slave_interprets_message(int previous_CTER,I_time;bool 
TEI,TSI)
{if
::((I_time>=420 && I_time<=700) && (previous_CTER==10) &&
(TEI==true && TSI==true))->
{S_TM=true;}
::((I_time>=720 && I_time<=1000) && (previous_CTER==11) &&
(TEI==true && TSI==true))->
{S_TM=true;}s
::((I_time>=100 && I_time<=400) && (previous_CTER==14) &&
(TEI==true && TSI==true))->
{S_TM=true;}
::(!(I_time>=420 && I_time<=700) || (previous_CTER!=10))->
{ printf("\n\nExit Handshake Procedure.\n\n");}
::(!(I_time>=720 && I_time<=1000) || (previous_CTER!=11))->
{ printf("\n\nExit Handshake Procedure.\n\n");}
::(!(I_time>=100 && I_time<=400) || (previous_CTER!=14))->
{ printf("\n\nExit Handshake Procedure.\n\n");} 
fi}
init
{atomic// Atomic is used to reduce the complexity.
{run Slave_starts_HP(); 
run Master_starts_HP();}
}
procedure has a number of non-trivial properties caused by
the distributed nature of the system, such a model allows the
designers to ensure correctness of the handshake
implementation. In our future work, we are planning to
extend the proposed approach to derive the generic
modeling patterns. Moreover, it would be interesting to
explore the handshake in the presence of more complex
network architecture.
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The code given above indicates that after waiting for 10
s, Slave receives the confirmation message with two
interrupts from Master. The timing of interrupts is matched
with the information that is encoded in previous CTER 4
LSB as mentioned in Section IV. Therefore, when timing of
the interrupts lies between 0.42 to 0.70 s time slot and
previous CTER 4 LSB is ‘10’, it notifies that Slave uses
RM1 as CCH that is released by the Master. Similarly,
timing of the interrupts lies between 0.72 to 1.00 s time slot
and previous CTER 4 LSB is ‘11’, it notifies that Slave uses
RM2 as CCH that is released by the Master. Also, when
interrupts timing lies between 0.10 to 0.40 s and the value of
previous CTER 4 LSB is ‘14’, then Slave uses neither RM1
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Abstract—The development of modern distributed software
systems poses a significant engineering challenge. The system
architecture should exhibit plasticity and high degree of
reconfigurability to enable an automated adaptation to 
continuously changing operating conditions and component 
failures. Traditional engineering approaches are inefficient to 
cope with complexity of such systems to ensure their
robustness and fault tolerance. Therefore, there is a clear need
for the approaches explicitly addressing the problem of
designing adaptive fault tolerance mechanisms. In this paper,
we propose a systematic approach to the development of
adaptive fault tolerant systems. We discuss the main principles
of architecting such systems to enable plasticity and
reconfigurability. We demonstrate how deployment of the
predictive adaptation allows us to ensure that the system would
be able to continuously deliver its services with the acceptable
quality despite occurrence of component failures.
 
Keywords-adaptable systems; fault tolerance, predictive
adaptation; reconfiguration.
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
The complexity of modern large-scale systems requires
solutions that ensure that systems autonomously adapt to the
operating environment and internal conditions. Often, such
systems are put into a wide class of autonomic systems --
the software-intensive systems that, besides providing their
intended functionality, are also capable to diagnose and
recover from errors caused either by external faults or
unforeseen state of environment in which the system is
operating [3]. In this paper, we focus on the fault tolerance
aspect of such systems.
Fault tolerance is an ability of a system to deliver its
services in a predictable way despite faults [8]. The generic
principle underlying design of fault tolerant systems is to
detect a discrepancy between a model representing fault free
system behaviour and the observed state, and implement
error recovery [8] .
In this paper, we propose a general pattern for
architecting and developing the adaptive fault tolerant
systems. The proposed pattern supports a layered design
approach [6] that enables separation of concerns and
facilitates structured design of fault tolerance mechanisms.
In our representation of the architectural pattern, we define
the interfaces between the components at different levels of
abstraction to ensure correct propagation of fault tolerance
related data. The high-level coordination of the fault
tolerance mechanisms is implemented by an adaptation
manager – a component that is responsible for implementing
predictive fault tolerance. To specify the adaptation manager,
we propose an algorithm that allows the adaptation manager
to monitor state of the system at the run time and implement
proactive adaptation. Such an approach ensures that the
overall system would continuously deliver the services with
the acceptable quality. We believe that the proposed
approach ensures a systematic development of adaptive fault
tolerant systems.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II, we
overview the state-of-the-art in designing adaptive fault
tolerant systems. In Section III, we describe general
principles of achieving fault tolerance, and, in particular,
proactive fault tolerance. In Section IV, we present our
proposal for structuring adaptive fault tolerant system. In
Section V, we present our proposal for algorithms that
implement proactive fault tolerance. Finally, in Section VI,
we discuss the proposed approach and future work.
 
 
II. RELATED WORK
The need for high performance and continuous service
provisioning demands novel solutions for achieving system
fault tolerance. We are increasingly observing deployment
of proactive fault tolerance techniques that replace
traditional reactive approaches [10]. In modern large-scale
systems, error rate is increasing and reliance on traditional
“error-detection – error-recovery” pattern leads to poor
performance and prolonged system downtime, which is
often unacceptable. The approaches for proactive fault
tolerance are based on preventive treatment of faults aiming
at precluding failures and minimising recovery time [10].
The main mechanism of achieving proactive fault tolerance
is adaptation.
The problem of software adaptation has been extensively
studied at the implementation level, (see e.g., [2] for an
overview). However, there is a lack of approaches that
attempt to derive appropriate adaptation mechanisms from
system-level goals as well as support layered reasoning
needed to efficiently cope with system complexity. A
prominent work on formal modelling of adaptive systems
has been done within the HATS project [2]. In [13][14], an
approach to quantitative assessment of reconfiguration
strategy has been proposed. In our previous work, we also
investigated the impact of faults on dependability, as well as
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structured approach to designing fault tolerant distributed
systems [7][11].
Current engineering practice takes an architecture-
centric perspective on adaptive systems. Among the most
prominent examples are the Rainbow framework proposed
at Carnegie Mellon University [12] and the autonomic
computing initiative by IBM [3]. These frameworks outline
the main abstractions for describing and managing dynamic
system changes. However, currently, the approaches to
proactive fault tolerance are not well-integrated into the
system development process [10]. In this paper, we will
address this problem by proposing a structured approach to
architecting adaptive fault tolerant systems. Our approach
aims at facilitating design space exploration at the early
development stages and enabling explicit representation of
the mechanisms for proactive fault tolerance.
 
III. FAULT TOLERANCE
The main goal of introducing fault tolerance is to design
a system in such a way that faults of components do not
result in a system failure. A fault cannot be detected by a
system until the manifestation of the fault generates errors in
the component function. The first step in implementing fault
tolerance is error processing [10]. Error processing aims at
removing errors from the computational state.
The first step in error processing is error detection. An
error is a manifestation of a fault. The general mechanism of
error detection is to intercept outputs produced by a system
(or a component) and to check whether those outputs
conform to the specification of fault free behaviour.
Discrepancy between produced outputs and the specification
indicates an occurrence of an error. The next step in error
processing – damage confinement – is concerned with
structuring the system to minimise the spread of errors. Once
the damage is assessed and confined the error recovery can
be performed. Error recovery has two main forms – forward
and backward error recovery. The forward error recovery
mechanisms manipulate the current system state to produce a
new system state, which is presumably error free. The
success of error recovery strongly depends on how precisely
the error is located and how well it is confined. A typical
example of forward recovery is failsafe [1]. If a system has a
safe though non-operational state then it may be possible to
recover from an error by forcing the system permanently to
that safe state (obviously, this strategy is only appropriate
where shut down of the system operation is possible).
By analyzing actions to be undertaken for error
processing, we observe that error processing imposes
additional requirements on the system design. Namely:
 
- The system should be specified in such a way that
error occurrence conditions are easily deduced and
then explicitly checked;
- The system architecture should enable error
confinement;
- Error recovery procedures should be identified for
every output, which differs from the specified one.
Obviously, an incorporation of error processing in the
system design has a strong impact on all levels of the system
structure. Hence, fault tolerance should be an intrinsic part of
system development and should start from the early stages of
the system design.
To embrace  complexity challenge,  fault tolerance
community has been proposing new concepts that can be
seen from initiatives and research efforts on autonomic
computing [3] and various forums on self-healing [9] or
self-protection (see, e.g., [1]). These terms span a wide
range of research fields ranging from adaptive memory
management to advanced security mechanisms.
A promising direction among them focuses on
determining how computer systems can proactively handle
failures: if the system knows about a critical situation in
advance, it can try to apply countermeasures in order to
prevent the occurrence of a failure, or it can prepare repair
mechanisms for the upcoming failure, in order to reduce the
time-to-repair.
Such an approach can be called proactive fault
tolerance. It encompasses three main steps:
 
1. Failure prediction: it aims at identifying failure-
prone situations, i.e., the situations that will
probably evolve into a failure. The result of failure
prediction is an evaluation of whether the current
situation is failure-prone.
 
2. Proactive reconfiguration: based on the outcome of
failure prediction, a system should make a decision
and implement the countermeasures to be executed
in order to remedy the problem. These decisions
are based on an objective function taking into
account the cost of the actions, the confidence in
the prediction, and the effectiveness and
complexity of the actions to determine the optimal
tradeoff. Challenges for action execution include
online reconfiguration of globally distributed
systems, data synchronization of distributed data
centers, and many more.
 
3. Recovery: this stage enables graceful degradation
of services while the resources are insufficient for
mitigating the failures. For instance, the predictive
reconfiguration might not be completed as
promptly as expected and the system should
compensate for insufficient resources. Another
example would be a sudden simultaneous failure of
several components due to unexpectedly adverse
situations in the environment.
 
Each one of these stages is important for an efficient
implementation of the proactive fault tolerance. Hence,
novel architectural solutions, algorithms and development
approaches are needed to attain the goal of building adaptive
fault tolerant systems.
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To build a proactive fault tolerance solution that is able
to boost system dependability, the best techniques from all
fields for the given surrounding conditions have to be
combined.
In this paper, we consider the proactive fault tolerance to
be the main adaptation mechanism to achieve system
dependability. In the next section, we present our approach
to structuring an adaptive fault tolerant system. Then, we
focus on designing  the proactive adaptation mechanisms.
Our proposal aims at enhancing self-adaptation system
capabilities. Our goal is to design the mechanisms that allow
a system to autonomously adapt to changing operating
conditions without human intervention. Essentially, our
proposal follows a spirit of the autonomic computing
paradigm.
 
 
IV. ARCHITECTURE OF ADAPTIVE FAULT TOLERANT
SYSTEMS
 
In this paper, we propose to structure an adaptive fault
tolerant system in a layered manner [6]. The layered
architecture significantly simplifies the development of
complex software-intensive systems. Each layer becomes
responsible for a certain aspect of the system behaviour. It
facilitates a clear separation of concerns and simplifies the
interfaces between the layers. The main issue is to device a
well-structured clean architecture that does not introduce
tangled interdependencies between layers. In this paper, we
propose to structure the architecture of a fault tolerant
adaptive system in four layers:
 
• Application layer
• Adaptation layer
• Fault tolerance layer
• Physical layer
 
The physical layer represents the environment whose
state should be monitored. It might be a complex control
system that uses sensors to monitor the health of its
components. Another example might be an indoor sensor
network that monitors such conditions as temperature,
humidity, the level of CO, etc. Finally, it might also be a
sensor network for monitoring the outdoor environment, e.g.,
such as used for forest fire detection, air pollution etc.
The fault tolerance layer performs the data aggregation
and evaluation of the quality of monitoring. This information
is supplied to the adaptation layer that is responsible for
defining the proactive adaptation policy. The aim of  the
application and fault tolerance layer is to continuously
supply the application with the monitoring data of an
acceptable quality. The design of the application is defined
by its purpose – it varies from the complex control functions
to collecting data intelligence. The graphical representation
of the system architecture is given in Fig.1.
The physical layer consists of the component to be
controlled by the application software. In order to implement
proactive fault tolerance, the software should continuously
monitor the state of the controlled components.
 
 
Adaptive Fault Tolerant System
Application
 
Adaptation layer
 
 
Fault tolerance layer
 
 
 
Physical layer
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of an adaptive fault tolerant system.
 
The monitoring capabilities are achieved by integrating
sensors that measure the parameters required to observe the
behaviour of the system in real-time. Usually, complex
systems contain a large number of sensors. Hence, from the
fault tolerance perspective, the physical layer can be
considered as a sensor network.
It generates raw data. Each sensor produces the data in
the following format
 
<value, timestamp>
 
We consider two most typical failure modes of the sensors:
stuck at previous value and producing a (detectably)
incorrect value. In the former case, the sensor fails silently
by failing to update its reading, i.e., the timestamp indicates
that the produced data is old. In the latter case, the sensor
produces the value that is outside of the feasible range.
At the fault tolerance layer resides fault tolerance
manager. The goal of the fault tolerance manager is
 
• To periodically read the sensor data,
• To filter out faulty data,
• To compute the average value of valid data together
with defining the quality level.
 
The fault tolerance manager produces the input for the
adaptation manager as a tuple
 
<value, level>
 
To compute the quality level, the fault tolerance manager
keeps track of the number of sensors that have produced
valid data. There are two thresholds: lim1 and lim2 such that
lim2 > lim1. They determine the quality level. If the number
of the sensors that produced the valid data is greater than
lim2 then the quality level is set to Level 3. If the number of
sensors produced valid data is between lim1 and lim2 then
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the quality level is set to Level 2. If the number of valid
readings is between 1 and lim1 then the quality level is set to
Level 1. Finally, if none of the sensors have produced valid
results then the quality level is assigned value Level 0.
The adaptation manager and deployment manager
constitute the adaptation layer. The adaptation manager
receives the data from the fault tolerance manager in the
format
 
<value, level>
 
where level is an integer between 0 and 3. If the level has
value 3, then, the value has a good quality and the adaptation
manager simply forwards the received value to the
applications. However, if the quality level is below 3 but
greater that 0 then the adaptation manager still forwards the
received data to the application but starts an observation
period.
The aim of the observation period is to establish
whether the decline in the quality of data is temporal or
permanent. Assume that, after receiving a value with the
levels 1 or 2, the adaptation manager observes a continuous
period of receiving data with quality level 3. Then, the
observation period terminates and no reconfiguration is
initiated, i.e., the adaptation manager treats the decline in the
quality of data as a temporal one and considers the system to
be healthy.
If, during the observation period the adaptation
manager continuously receives data with quality level 1 or 2
then after the observation period expires, it initiates
reconfiguration, i.e., considers the quality deterioration to be
the permanent one.
The reconfiguration is triggered by sending a request to
the deployment manager to deploy a new set of sensors. The
deployment can be achieved in several different ways. For
instance, if we consider a wireless sensor network that is
used to monitor the state of the environment then the
deployment is performed via a distribution of a set of fresh
sensors (e.g., from an airplane). If the sensors are used to
monitor an indoor environment then the deployment triggers
a request to the maintenance company. The same principle
applies if the sensor network is used to monitor the
behaviour of a complex control system. In any case, the main
advantage of the proposed approach is a possibility to
preventively react on the deterioration of the quality of
monitoring and avoid the loss of the observability of the
physical layer.
The requested number of new sensors to be deployed
depends on how deeply the level of data quality has
deteriorated. If the quality level has value 1 then the
deployment manager requests n new sensors to be deployed.
If the quality level has the value 2 then m new sensors are to
be deployed, where m<n.
In general, we could design a more sophisticated
deployment mechanism. For instance, if each sensor or a
group of sensors is assigned an id then the failures can be
diagnosed precisely. This would allow the adaptation
manager to communicate the exact requirements for the
deployment of new sensors.
When the new sensors are deployed, the deployment
manager acknowledges the completion of the reconfiguration
and the adaptation manager notifies the fault tolerance
manager about availability of the new sensors. The fault
tolerance manager closes the connection with the failed
sensors and establishes connection with the newly deployed
ones.
An important aspect to be considered is how to define
the behaviour of the adaptation manager when the quality
level keeps fluctuating between the values 2 and 3. On the
one hand, the adaptation manager should not trigger the
reconfiguration prematurely. On the other hand, delaying a
reaction on such an unstable situation might result in an
abrupt deterioration of the quality of data that should be
prevented.
To resolve this issue, we let the adaptation manager to
maintain the observation period as long as no continuous
improvement in quality has been observed. Every time when
the data are received with the quality threshold lower than 3,
the adaptation manager increments the counter of the
observation period. When this counter exceeds the
predefined threshold, the adaptation manager  triggers the
reconfiguration. This approach is taken to ensure that the
preventive reconfiguration will be initiated even if the
system keeps fluctuating between quality levels.
Finally, if the adaptation manager receives data with
the quality level equal to 0, then it immediately initiates
reconfiguration of the data flow. In this case, it starts to send
to the application data received  at the previous cycle. It
continues to send the last data with an acceptable quality
value until the reconfiguration is completed and the fault
tolerance manager starts to send the data with an acceptable
quality level.
In the next section, we define the main behavioural
patterns of adaptation manager and fault tolerance manager.
 
 
V. ALGORITMS FOR PROACTIVE FAULT TOLERANCE
 
 
Let us focus first on defining the module specifying the
fault tolerance manager.
The module should implement the procedures of
 
• Reading the sensor data,
• Checking validity of sensor data with respect to
time and feasibility
• Calculating the average of the received valid data
and the quality level.
 
In our definition of the fault tolerance manager, we used two
abstract functions fresh and valid. The function fresh relies
on the specific parameters to determine whether the
produced data is fresh. Since the clocks of the sensors might
fluctuate, the function checks whether the timestamp is
within certain boundaries.
The function valid checks feasibility of the data
produced by a sensor. It returns the Boolean value True if the
data is valid and False otherwise.
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Module Fault Tolerance Manager
Global Variables
in_buffers: array of <float, INT>
out_buffer: seq of <float, INT>
 
Local Variables
count: INT /*counter of healthy sensors
sum : float /*sum of readings
avg: float /*average value
level: [0..3]
 
Initialisation:
count:= 0;
sum:= 0;
avg:= 0;
level:= 0
 
Begin
 
for i = 1 to k do
read (data, time_stamp, in_buffer[i]);
if
fresh (time_stamp) = True & valid(data)= True
then count:= count +1; sum := sum +data
end;
 
if counter > 0 then avg:= sum/count;
 
case count = 0 then level:= 0
elseif count>0 & count<lim1 then level:=1
elseif count>lim1 & count<lim2 then level:=2
else level:=3;
 
out_buf:= out_buf^<avg,level>; 
count:= 0;
sum:= 0;
avg:= 0
 
End
 
Figure 2. Fault Tolerance Manager.
 
Reliance of the abstract functions allows us to
parameterise the definition of the module and reuse the
proposed definition in different contexts.
In our definition of the module, we have abstracted
away from the implementation details of the communication
between the fault tolerance manager and the sensors. We
assume that they communicate by shared variables -- data
and time stamps that are stored in the in_buf array of pairs.
The proposed algorithm implements the procedure of
reading the sensor data, checking their validity with respect
to time and feasibility and calculates the average of the
received valid data.
By keeping track of the number of valid readings, the
fault tolerance manager calculates the quality level. It
compares this number with two constants – lim1 and lim2.
The pair of calculated data and the quality level is appended
to the output buffer that is read by the Adaptation Manager.
The specification of the Fault Tolerance Manager module is
given in Fig. 2 and the Adaptation Manager in Fig. 3.
Module Adaptation Manager
 
Global Variables
a_out_buf: float
 
Local variables:
observ : Bool
cur_level : INT
cur_data:float
fault_count : INT 
suc_count : INT
mode: {Normal, Adapt, Adapt_Compl, Adapt_activ}
 
Initialisation:
observ :=0;
cur_level :=0;
fault_count :=0;
suc_count :=0;
 
Begin
 
cur_level, cur_data := head(out_buf);
 
if observ= False & cur_level= 3 then out_buf:= cur_data
 
if observ= False & cur_level= 2 & fault_count<thr
then fault_count:= fault_count+1; out_buf:= cur_data;
 
if observ= False & cur_level<3 & cur_level>0 &
fault_count>thr-1
then mode := adapt_active, adapt_req:= True;
 
if observ= False & cur_level=3 & fault_count>0 & fault_count<thr-
1
then observ:= True; suc_count := suc_count +1;
observ:= 0;
 
if observ= True & cur_level=3 & fault_count>0 &
fault_count<thr-1 & suc_count<thr_s
then suc_count:= suc_count+1;
observ_s_iter:= observ_s_iter:=+1;
 
if observ= True & cur_level=3 & fault_count>0 &
fault_count<thr-1 & suc_count>thr_s-1 &
suc_count =observ_s_iter
then observ:= False ; suc_count:= 0; fault_count:= 0;
observ_s_iter:= 0;
 
if observ= True & cur_level<3 & fault_count>0 &
fault_count<thr-1 & suc_count<thr_s
then suc_count:= suc_count+1;
observ_s_iter:= observ_s_iter+1;
 
if mode= adapt_activ then adapt_req ;
 
if adapt_conf then mode:= normal
End
 
Figure 3. Adaptation Manager.
 
In the specification of the Adaptation manager, the
variable observ indicates whether the observation period has
started. The variable obtains the value True when the first
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data with the quality level below 3 is received. The variable
is reset to True if the quality has recovered or a new period
of observation is initiated.
The variables cur_level and cur_data designate the data
and the quality level received from the fault tolerance
manager. The variable fault_count is used to keep track of
the number of iterations, in which the data with the quality
level lower than 3 have been received. When the value of
fault_count exceeds the predefined threshold thr, the
reconfiguration is triggered.
The variable suc_count is used to keep track of the
iterations that produced data with the quality level 3 after the
observation period has been initiated. When the value of
suc_count exceeds the predefined threshold thr_s the
adaptation manager has continuously received the data with
the quality level 3 for sufficiently long period of time.
Therefore, the quality level has recovered and the
observation period can be deactivated.
The adaptation manager provides the application with the
latest data by updating the global variable a_out_buf. It
forwards the data received from the fault tolerance manager
if the quality level is higher than zero. Otherwise, it simply
does not update the variable.
The adaptation manager triggers the reconfiguration by
issuing the adaptation request adapt_req that is received by
the deployment manager. When the new sensors are
deployed the deployment manager confirms the
reconfiguration by issuing the signal adapt_conf.
After triggering the reconfiguration, the adaptation
manager enters the mode Adapt. After the reconfiguration is
completed, the adaptation manager enters the mode
Adapt_Compl. In this mode [4] [5], it notifies the fault
tolerance manager about availability of new healthy sensors.
As a response to this, the fault tolerance manager shuts down
the connection with the failed sensors and establishes a new
connection with the newly deployed sensors. After this
procedure is completed, the fault tolerance manager notifies
the adaptation manager. It enables transition to the mode
Normal.
The general scheme of an implementation of the mode
transition is given in Fig. 4. The main principle that underlies
the mode transition is as follows: the mode is stable and
unchanged until a fluctuation  in the quality level is
registered. We show the snippet implementing this principle
as a generic mode changing procedure.
The proposed architecture ensures a separation of
concerns and clear allocation of responsibilities between the
components. Indeed, the fault tolerance manager is
responsible for collecting data and validating them. It
encapsulates the failures of sensors and gives only the high-
level indication of the current health of the system by
annotating the data with the quality level. The adaptation
manager is responsible for diagnosing the situation and
executing the preventive reconfiguration – requesting the
new sensors to be deployed before the quality of data
deteriorates below the acceptable level. At the same time, it
also ensures remedial actions when no data is produced – it
outputs to the application the last healthy value. Such
behaviour ensures graceful degradation of quality of service.
Procedure ModeTransition
 
Variables
last_mode: {Normal, Adapt, Adapt_Compl, Adapt_activ}
next_target: {Normal, Adapt, Adapt_Compl, Adapt_activ}
prev_target: {Normal, Adapt, Adapt_Compl, Adapt_activ}
level: int
 
Begin
 
if adaptation completed
then initiate a forward transition
to next_target according to
the predefined scenario;
 
if level dropped
then initiate a backward transition to next_target
adaptation mode
The choice of target mode depends on severity
of level decrease;
 
if the conditions for entering the target
mode are satisfied
then complete a transition to next_target mode
and become stable ;
 
if neither the conditions for entering
the next global mode are satisfied nor the level dropped
then maintain the current mode
 
End
 
Figure 4. Mode transition procedure.
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a systematic approach to
architecting adaptive fault tolerant systems. We have
demonstrated how to structure the system to facilitate layered
design of proactive fault tolerant mechanisms. We defined
the information flow between the layers of the system
architecture that enables adaptation and guarantees a
continuous delivery of services with an acceptable quality
level.
Proactive fault tolerance is a promising research direction
that aims at providing systems with capabilities of executing
preventive reconfiguration to preclude occurrence of failure
and disruption in service provision. In our paper, the main
mechanism of achieving proactive fault tolerance relies on
several levels of error detection and monitoring of system
health.
As a future work, we are planning to investigate
alternative approaches to preventive reconfiguration as well
as conduct quantitative assessment of various system
characteristics, e.g., correlation between frequency of the
network rejuvenation with new sensors and quality of data,
proportion between periods of low quality data and different
thresholds etc. Such a work, would allow us to define
heuristics for designing proactive fault tolerance.
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Abstract— Service-oriented computing offers an attractive
paradigm to designing complex composite services by
assembling readily-available services. The approach enables
rapid service development and significantly increases
productivity of the development. However, it also poses a
significant challenge in ensuring quality of created services
and in particular their fault tolerance. In this paper, we
propose a systematic approach to architecting complex fault
tolerant services. We demonstrate how to graphically model
the architecture of composite services and augment it with
various fault tolerance mechanisms. We propose an
approach facilitating a systematic analysis of possible
failures of the services, recovery actions and alternative
solutions for achieving fault tolerance. Our approach
supports structured guided reasoning about fault tolerance
at different levels of abstraction. It allows the designers
evaluate various  architectural solutions at the design stage
that helps to derive clean architectures and improve fault
tolerance of developed complex services.
 
Keywords - services; fault tolerance, architecture, service
composition, service orchestration; failure modes and effect
analysis
 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
Web-services [13] constitute one of the fastest growing
areas of software engineering. With a strong support for
compositionality, the process of developing an application
essentially becomes a process of composing available
services. Services – the basic building blocks of complex
applications are platform and network independent
components implementing computations that can be
invoked by clients or other services.
To enable a rapid service composition, services define
their properties  in a standard and machine readable
format. It enables service discovery, selection and
binding. Service composition introduces the orchestration
of the basic services to build applications. However,
usually research on service orchestration focuses on
defining the language for service composition that does
not support reasoning about such essential features as
fault tolerance. Such reasoning can be supported by
dependability analysis and architectural modelling [5].
In this paper, we propose a systematic approach to
architecting fault tolerant services. We demonstrate how
to graphically model  the architecture  of  composite
services and augment it with various fault tolerance
mechanisms. We propose static and dynamic solutions for
introducing fault  tolerance into the service composition.
The structural solutions rely on availability of redundant
service providers that can be requested to provide services
in case of failures of the main service providers. This
mechanism allows the designers to mask failures of the
individual service providers. The dynamic solutions rely
on re-execution of failed services to recover from the
transient faults of services. This solution requires
modifications of the service execution flow.
To facilitate design of complex fault tolerant services,
in this paper, we introduce a systematic approach to
analysing possible failure modes of services and defining
fault tolerance measures. Our approach is inductive – it
progressively analyses one component after another in the
service execution flow, explores possible fault tolerance
alternatives and systematically introduces them into the
service architecture.
We believe that our approach supports structured
guided reasoning about fault tolerance and enables
efficient exploration of the design space. It allows the
designers to evaluate various architectural solutions at the
design stage that helps to derive clean architectures and
improve fault tolerance of developed complex services.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II, we
demonstrate how to model a fault tolerant service from a
service user’s perspective. In Section III, we demonstrate
how to unfold service architecture, i.e., explicitly
represent the service composition and the service
execution flow. We also propose different fault tolerance
mechanisms that can be introduced to enhance fault
tolerance. In Section IV, we introduce a structured
approach to designing a fault tolerant architecture.
Finally, in Section V, we overview the related work and
discuss the presented work.
 
II. ABSTRACT MODELING OF FAULT-
TOLERANT SERVICES
 
The main goal of introducing fault tolerance in the service
architecture is to prevent a propagation of faults to the
service interface level, i.e., to avoid a service failure [7] [9].
A fault manifests itself as error – an incorrect service
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Figure1. Use case representation of a service.
 
state [9]. Once an error is detected, an error recovery
should be initiated. Error recovery is an attempt to restore a
fault-free state or at least to preclude system failure.
Error recovery aims at masking error occurrence or
ensuring deterministic failure behaviour if the error cannot
be masked. In the former case, upon detection of error,
software executes certain actions to restore a fault-free
system states and then guarantee normal service
provisioning. In the latter case, the service provisioning is
aborted and failure response is returned.
In this paper, we focus on the architectural graphical
modelling [12] of fault tolerant services [13]. We
demonstrate how to explicitly introduce handling of faulty
behaviour into the service architecture. We follow the
 
Figure 3. State diagram of communication.
 
As shown in Fig.4, the abstract model represents an
interaction of the service with a user. An abstract
architectural diagram defines an interface for
communicating with the user. The state diagram formally
defines the communication between the user and the
service.
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model-driven   development paradigm and start   our
modelling from a high level of abstraction [8]. The
consecutive model transformations introduce the detailed
representation of the service architecture.
The high-level model of a fault tolerant service is given
in Fig.1. The service is defined via its interactions with
different service users. Each association connecting an
external user and a service corresponds to  a logical
interface, as shown in Fig.2. The logical interfaces are
I_ToPositioning  
 
 
 
 
 
idle
 
 
Positioning
 
 
pc_req
 
 
pc_cnf
pc fail  cnf
 
 
 
 
 
 
servin
attached to the class with ports. At the abstract modelling
level, we treat a service as a black box with the defined
logical interfaces.
The UML2 interfaces I_ToService and I_FromService
define the request and request parameters of the service
user. We formally describe the communication between a
service and its user(s) in the I_Communication state
machine as illustrated in Fig.3. The request ser_req
received from the user is always replied: with the ser_cnf in
case of success, with the ser_fail_cnf in case of
unrecoverable failure and with the ser_tfail_cnf in case of a
recoverable failure. Let us point out, that already at the
abstract level of modelling, we explicitly introduce
representation of faulty behaviour and reaction on it.
To exemplify an abstract modelling of a fault tolerant
service, let us consider a positioning service. It provides the
services for calculating the physical location of the service
user.
 
1 FromService
1 ToService
 
Service
 
Figure 2. Abstract architectural diagram.
 
Fig.4. Modelling positioning service
 
The request to calculate the position is modelled by the
event pc_req. In case of a normal execution, the positioning
service returns the reply pc_cnf. Let us observe, that in our
modelling we explicitly define the possibility of a service
failure following the pattern proposed above. Indeed, in
case of the unrecoverable failure, the positioning service
returns pc_fail_cnf. In case of a recoverable failure, the
service returns pc_tfail_cnf. Such a fault-tolerance explicit
approach to modelling ensures that the service execution
always terminates, i.e., the service never becomes
unresponsive.
 
III. ARCHITECTURAL DECOMPOSITION
 
Our abstract modelling has defined the service from the
service user’s point of view. The model transformation
presented next focuses on defining the composition that
constitutes the overall service.
An execution of composite service consists of executing
several subservices. Coordination of a service execution
is performed by a service manager (sometimes
  
called service composer). It  is a dedicated software
component that on the one hand, communicates with a
service user and on the other hand, orchestrates the service
execution flow.
To coordinate service execution, the service manager
keeps the information about subservices and their execution
order. It requests the corresponding service components to
provide the required subservices and monitors the results of
their execution.
Let us note, that any subservice might also be composed
of several subservices, i.e., in its turn, the subservice
execution might be orchestrated by its (sub)service
manager. Hence, in general, a composite service might
have several layers of hierarchy [5].
To model a composite service, we introduce the
providers of the subservices into the abstract architectural
service model. The model includes the external service
 
 
Figure 5. Architecture of a positioning service.
 
providers communicating with the aggregated service via
their service director. For each association between the
main service and the corresponding subservice, we define a
logical interface. The logical interfaces are attached to the
corresponding classes via the corresponding ports. This
enables a structured representation of the modular structure
of the composite service. The functional architecture is
defined in terms of the service components, which
encapsulate the functionality related to a single execution
stage of another logical piece of functionality.
The architectural diagram of the position calculation [5]
[14] – the composite service example described above is
presented in Fig. 5. The service manager role is two-fold: it
orchestrates service execution flow and handles
communication with the service user. The dynamics of the
execution flow is refined by introducing the corresponding
sub-states in the service state as shown in Fig. 6.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Unfolded dynamic behaviour.
Now, let us discuss the fault tolerant aspect of the
composite services. Execution of any subservice can fail.
To ensure fault tolerance of composite services, we propose
a two-fold approach. On the one hand, we define a set of
patterns [11] that allow us to introduce structural means for
fault tolerance using various forms of redundancy. On the
other hand, we propose to extend the responsibilities of a
service manager, to implement dynamic error recovery.
Next, we propose the architectural patterns for introducing
structural fault tolerance and define the corresponding
modeling artifacts.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Duplication scheme.
 
Duplication pattern. The duplication is a simplest
arrangement for structural fault tolerance. It can be
introduced if there are two service components available
that provide the same functionality. In this case, the
services can be executed in parallel. A successful execution
of a service by any out of two service components suffices
for the successful service provisioning.
An architectural diagram of the duplication arrangement
is given in Fig. 7. We introduce a dedicated service
manager to take care of the execution of the duplicated
service. The dynamical behavior of the duplication pattern
is shown in Fig. 8. An alternative architectural approach
would be to allow the main service manager to orchestrate
this arrangement.
Figure 8. Dynamic behavior of duplication pattern.
 
Stand-by spare. This arrangement relies on availability
of a spare service component implementing the desirable
service. The spare is used only if the execution of the
service by the main component fails. If the main service
component succeeds in executing a service, the spare
service component remains inactive. However, if the main
service component fails to execute a service then the spare
service component is requested to provide the service.
The stand-by spare arrangement can be implemented
with and without an introduction of the dedicated service
  
director. The design decision depends on the complexity of
the composite service, i.e., whether the design of the main
service manager would become too complex with the
introduction of this additional responsibility.
The architecture of the stand-by-spare implemented with
the dedicated service manager coincides with the
duplication pattern. However, the dynamic behavior is
different as shown in Fig.9.
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Figure 10. Architecture of triple modular redundancy.
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might be non-implementable. However, they provide an
efficient means to cope with permanent service failure. In
Figure 9. Dynamic behavior of stand-by spare.
 
Triple modular redundancy pattern. A more complicated
scheme for structural redundancy – triple modular
redundancy is shown in Fig.10. The precondition for
implementing it is that we have three service components
available that provide identical services with the same
functionality. All three service components receive the
same service request and work in parallel. The results of
the service execution are sent to a voting element.
The voting element is a dedicated software component
that performs comparison of the results and produces the
final result. The voting element takes a majority view over
the produced results of the successfully executed services
and outputs it as the final result of the service execution.
In the context of the service-oriented computing, the
voting component might be implemented in two different
ways: it might output the results after receiving the first two
replies or it might start to act only after the certain deadline
when all non-failed services have replied.
Let us discuss a difference between triple modular
redundancy scheme adopted in hardware and services. In
hardware context, the scheme can mask failure of a single
component by adopting the majority view. In the service-
oriented context, it gives more fault tolerance options.
Indeed, if two out of three services failed to reply within
the timeout, the voter component can be design to simply
output the result of the non-failed service. Obviously,  in
case of a failure of a single service, it gives better  fault
tolerance guarantees, because it can compare the results of
two non-failed services and take the one, which is more
accurate as the output.
Since the triple modular redundancy scheme has a rather
complex architecture by itself, we propose to introduce a
dedicated service manager to integrate the arrangement in
the architecture of a composite service. The proposal is
depicted in Fig. 10.
The dynamic behavior of the triple modular arrangement
is depicted in Fig.11. Here, the dedicated service manager
performs voting before outputting the service result.
The static redundancy schemes require availability of
redundant  service  components  and  hence, sometimes,
contrast, dynamic fault tolerance relies on service re-execu-
 
 
Figure 11. Dynamic behaviour of triple modular redundancy.
 
tion to increase the chances of the successful service
execution and does not require an availability of the
redundant service components. Obviously, the dynamic
fault tolerance solutions can cope with transient failures.
To leverage fault tolerance of a composite service, the
service manager might alter the normal flow of service
execution to dynamically cope with failures. For instance, it
might repeat service execution, roll-back or abort service
execution.
If service execution failed, but the returned exception
indicates that the error is transient then by re-executing the
failed subservice, the service manager might recover from
the error. The service execution flow is shown in Fig.12.
 
Figure 12. Service execution flow.
 
If service execution failed but the returned exception
indicates that the error is unrecoverable and there are no
alternative services available, then the service manager can
abort the entire service execution and return failure
response.
Obviously, designing fault tolerant composite services is
a non-trivial task that requires a systematic support. In the
next section, we propose an approach to systematic
development of fault tolerant architecture by a structured
  
analysis of failure modes of the services and fault tolerance
schemes.
 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF A FAULT TOLERANT
SERVICE ARCHITECTURE
 
The main motivation behind our approach is to facilitate
a structured disciplined derivation of fault tolerant service
architecture. Essentially, we define the guidelines for
analyzing faulty behavior of the services and deciding on
the mechanisms for fault tolerance.
Our approach is inspired by the Failure Modes and
Effect Analysis (FMEA) technique. FMEA [16] is an
inductive analysis method, which allows designers to
systematically study the causes of components faults, their
effects and means to cope with these faults. FMEA is used
to assess the effects of each failure mode of a component
on the various functions of the system as well as to identify
the failure modes significantly affecting dependability of
the system.
FMEA step-by-step selects the individual components of
the system, identifies possible causes of each failure mode,
assesses consequences and suggests remedial actions. The
results of FMEA are usually represented in the tabular form
that contains the following fields: component name, failure
mode, possible cause, local effect, system effect, detection,
and remedial action.
Let us exemplify the proposed approach. Assume that a
service S1 is a part of the composite service S. The services
S11 and S12 have identical functionality. Assume that the
service S1 might experience transient silent failures, i.e.,
become temporally irresponsive. Such failures can be
detected by timeout. Then we can arrange services into a
triple modular redundancy scheme. The structured analysis
of the fault tolerance arrangement around the service S1
according to the proposed approach is shown in Table I.
TABLE I. TRANSIENT FAILURE ANALYSIS
 
Service S1
Failure mode Transient silent failure
Detection Timeout
Available
redundancy
S11, S12
Structural
redundancy
Triple modular redundancy
arrangement. Result is produced upon
timeout
 
 
Recovery
Masking failure by use of triple
modular redundancy arrangement. In
case of simultaneous failure of S1,
S11 and S12 repeat execution
Let us now assume that a service S2 is also part of the
composite service S. Assume that the service S2 might
experience transient failures that are identified by receiving
the response S2_tfail_cnf from it. Since no redundant
service components are available for this case and the
service failure is detectable with the corresponding
notification, we can rely on dynamic redundancy to cope
with failures of S2. The structured analysis of the fault
tolerance arrangement around the service S2 according to
the proposed approach presented in Table II.
TABLE II. FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS
 
Service S2
Failure mode Transient detectable failure
Detection S2_tfail_cnf response
Available
redundancy
No
Structural
redundancy
No
 
Recovery
Re-execute service. Maximal allowed
number of retries is 3.
 
It easy to observe that reliance on the proposed approach
facilitates structured derivation of  fault tolerance
architecture for both structured and dynamic fault tolerance
schemes.
As a result of introducing various means for fault
tolerance, we also should modify the design of the service
manager. Fig 13 depicts the modified flow with a retry.
Figure 13. Execution flow with retry.
 
The process of introducing fault tolerance mechanisms
can be iteratively applied to unfold all the architectural
layers. As a result of this process, we obtain a hierarchical
structure of service managers augmented with fault
tolerance properties.
 
V. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
 
While the topic of service orchestration and composition
has received significant research attention, the fault
tolerance aspect is not so well addressed. Liang [10]
proposes a fault-tolerant web service on SOAP (called FT-
SOAP) using the service approach. It extends the
standard WSDL by proposing a new element to describe
the replicated web services. The client side SOAP engine
searches for the next available backup from the group
WSDL and redirects the request to the replica if the
primary server failed. It is a rather complex mechanism
that hinders interoperability.
Artix [2] is IONA's Web services integration product.
It provides a WSDL-based naming service by Artix
Locator. Multiple instances of the same service can be
registered under the same name with an Artix Locator.
  
 
When service consumers request a service, the Artix
Locator selects the service instance based on a load-
balancing algorithm from the pool of service instances. It
provides useable services for the service consumers. An
active UDDI mechanism [4] enables an extension of
UDDI’s invocation API to enable fault-tolerant and
dynamic service invocation. Its function is similar to the
Artix Locator. A dependable Web services framework is
proposed in [1]. Once a failure for one specific service
occurs, the proxy raises a “WebServiceNotFound”
exception and downloads its handler from DeW. The
exception handling chooses another location that hosts the
same service and re-invoks the method automatically. The
main goal of DeW is to realize physical-location-
independence. Providing fault-tolerance capability for
composite Web service has also been discussed in [3].
A formal approach [15] [17] to introducing fault
tolerance to the service architecture has been proposed in
[5] [6]. This work extends the set of architectural patterns
that can be introduced to achieve fault tolerance as well as
propose a systematic support for deriving fault tolerance
solutions.
In this paper, we have proposed a systematic approach
to architecting fault tolerant services. We demonstrated
how to  graphically model the architecture of composite
services and augment it with various fault tolerance
mechanisms. We defined a set of static and dynamic
solutions for introducing fault tolerance into the service
composition. The proposed mechanisms can cope with
different types of failures to increase reliability of
complex composite services.
To facilitate design of fault tolerance mechanisms, we
proposed an approach to a structured analysis of possible
failure modes of services and introducing fault tolerance
measures. The proposed approach is inductive – it
progressively analyses services in the execution flow,
explores possible fault tolerance alternatives and
systematically introduces them into the service
architecture.
We believe that  our approach supports structured
guided reasoning about fault tolerance and enables
efficient exploration of the design space while
architecting complex composite services.
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